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I n t r o d u c t i o n
in the midst of a difficult problem, the Danish physicist 
Niels Bohr was overheard to say, "how wonderful that we've 
met with a paradox. Now we have hope of making some 
progress." (Von Oech [1983], pll8)
There is a reflexive paradox (or set of paradoxes) associated 
with self-deception, and a variety of theories have been 
proposed in response, to explain self-deception.
The study of reflexive paradoxes has been fruitful in the 
history of philosophy. Such a paradox may appear to be no 
more than a minor puzzle, which we will easily be able to mop 
up after having formulated solutions to more major problems. 
Sometimes the minor puzzle turns out to be surprisingly 
resistant to our "mopping up" operations; it may force us to 
re-think our major theories. For example the "truth-teller" 
paradox and other paradoxes of self-reference have been viewed 
initially as minor puzzles, while later on they have provoked 




In subsequent chapters I will discuss the paradox of self- 
deception and the theories which have been developed in 
response to the paradox. I shall emphasise what I take to be 
the good points and the bad points of each theory. These 
theories are not all in conflict; some of them are 
complementary, one supplying what is lacking in another. But 
there is no one theory with which I wholeheartedly agree; some 
of them I find undeveloped (and so I am not sure what there is 
with which to agree or disagree). Where I feel that someone's 
discussion of self-deception has alluded to a theory rather 
than actually presented that theory, I have tried to develop 
the allusion to a stage at which we can find out to what sort 
of theory they are alluding. This means that (borrowing an 
expression from the plant breeders) the theories which I 
discuss are "pure strains", which I have bred from the 
"hybrids" presented by other writers. This is not a criticism 
of the other writers: I think that "hybrids" is the right way 
to go if we wish to explain self-deception. The point of the 
"pure strains" is to sharpen up our understanding of what is at 
issue in the discussions about self-deception.
Dissatisfaction with the available theories provoked me to try 
to develop my own theory about self-deception. Several 
chapters are devoted to challenging what I take to be false 
assumptions which lead to the paradox. I then present my own 
account of self-deception and in the final chapter discuss the
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consequences of that account. In particular, I argue that 
often discussions in epistemology are guided (or rather 
misguided) by a collection of metaphors which have inhabited 
philosophy from ancient times. These "dead" metaphors are 
still very active and effectively prevent us from developing 
some new theories which we need.
Before entering into the detailed discussions contained in the 
following chapters, I want to briefly summarise their content. 
The aim is to map out my line of argument so that the reader 
knows where the discussion is heading and "what I am driving 
at".
Firstly, lets present the paradox (or paradoxes) of self- 
deception. There are many formulations of the paradox, but a 
typical version goes like this: the self-deceiver must know 
what he (or she) is up to, otherwise he is not really self- 
deceived but merely mistaken. Self-deception is different from 
mistake. If he knows what he is up to then he is not really 
deceived. For someone who knows he is self-deceived also knows 
that the belief he has as a result of the deception is false. 
But if someone knows that what he "believes" is false, then he 
does not really believe it. At most he may pretend to believe 
it. Therefore 'self-deception' is always a misnomer: either 
the alleged "self-deception" turns out to be merely a mistake, 
or else it turns out not to be genuine deception. If someone
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is genuinely self-deceived then he must believe something which 
he knows to be false, but this, we have shown, is impossible.
’Self-deceived' and other expressions which mean the same thing 
(such as 'kidding himself', 'fooling herself' and 'being 
dishonest with oneself') can be found in a vast number of works 
about people, including both fiction (novels, plays) and non­
fiction (history, sociology, psychology). Reading some of 
these works makes it apparent that when people refer to self- 
deception, they intend to distinguish it from "honest 
mistakes", and from "honest pretences" (e.g. joking, 
playacting); they also do not regard self-deception as 
equivalent to any of the varieties of dishonesty and 
insincerity which have other people as their intended audience. 
Self-deception is not a lie to other people: it is sometimes 
described as lying to oneself.
One response to the paradox is to agree that it shows self- 
deception to be impossible, therefore there is no such thing. 
I call this the "No Such Thing" theory of self-deception.
Another response is the Schism theory. Schism theories point 
out that the paradox arises because it is reflexive: the 
deceiver deceives himself. Schism theories propose that the 
sel f-deceiver is divided, with one part deceiving the other 
part. This situation is supposed to explain without paradox the
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behaviour which causes other people to describe someone as 
self-deceived.
I reject Schism theories; where there is independent evidence 
of a schism we do not find self-deception, and where we find 
alleged self-deception there is no independent evidence of a 
schism. Therefore the main strength of Schism theories is the 
claim that there is no other way to explain self-deception, and 
so we have to postulate that a person is divided, when we call 
them self-deceived. The Schism theory is vulnerable to 
competition from other theories of self-deception. And there 
are a few other theories.
Dissociation theories (or "Disconnection theories" - I use the 
two descriptions interchangeably) argue that the self­
deceiver somehow disconnects the knowledge he has from the 
false beliefs he has, or manages to "think" something which he 
"believes" to be false, or disconnects true beliefs from 
actions or emotions - there is disagreement among the different 
theories about what is disconnected from what, and where the 
disconnection happens. How it happens also goes unexplained, 
and some of the terminology used strikes me as in need of more 
explanation.
I also have a suspicion that perhaps Disconnection theories are 
saying, in a roundabout and imprecise way, something which is
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just as paradoxical as the original "the self-deceiver must 
know what he is up to": "thinking something you do not 
believe" seems to me rather like "believing something you know 
to be false", when it is used in the way Disconnection theories 
do, i.e. as something which is going be substituted for 
"believing something you know to be false". For the "thinking" 
is going to have to do all the work of what was called 
'believing" in the original formulation of the paradox.
Role theories of self-deception offer an explanation of the 
disconnection: the self-deceiver does not believe that p 
(where 'p' is some expression which we use to identify a 
belief), but he adopts the role of someone who does believe it; 
and to do so, he uses p as he would use a belief: p is given 
the role of a belief.
Role theories are open to the objection that what they describe 
is not self-deception since they do not describe genuine 
belief, only someone pretending to believe. The Role theory is 
an unparadoxical account, but only because it abandons the 
problem: the "self-deceiver" is not deceived.
I think that Role theories make some very good points, and the 
objection can be answered in a satisfactory way, when the good 
points of Role theories are put together with the good points 
of the Negligence theory of self-deception. The Negligence
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theory claims that self-deception is epistemic negligence: the 
self-deceiver does not do the things which are needed to gain 
truth: self-deception is not a positive act of seeking 
falsehood but the negative act of not seeking truth (or of not 
trying hard enough when seeking truth).
Negligence theories are vulnerable to the claim which gives 
rise to the paradox: "the self-deceiver must know what he is 
up to". He needs to know in order to guide the strategy of 
being self-deceived: in order to steer away from evidence 
which would threaten to destroy his preferred beliefs. Someone 
who is merely negligent has no control over his beliefs: but a 
self-deceiver, typically, is not content to have any beliefs 
which happen to occur to him: he has preferences as to which 
beliefs are acceptable to him.
I claim that the paradox-generating claim can be refuted. The 
self deceiver does not need to "know what he is up to", indeed 
he must not know what he is up to (for that way lies paradox). 
The self-deceiver needs to use a theory in order to guide the 
strategy of self-deception, but it does not need to be a true 
theory: for some purposes a false theory can be just as 
effective as a true theory, or more effective. So the self­
deceiver need not "know what he is up to", but he may need an 
effective (though false) theory. No theory at all will be
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needed if the "strategy" of self-deception is guided by 
something else, something which is not a theory at all.
Self-deception is a way of managing self-misunderstanding. 
Lack of knowledge does not mean that the self-deceiver is 
merely mistaken. Negligence is not a mere mistake: someone 
who is negligent can be held responsible for being negligent.
Having rejected the claim which generates the paradox, we are 
in a position to construct an effective explanation of self- 
deception. The self-deceiver is able to "know what he is up 
to", but unwilling to exercise this ability. He is unwilling 
to do so, not merely too lazy to do so: for if he were merely 
too lazy then any beliefs would do, true or false. Whereas the 
deceiver displays a preference for some beliefs over others.
Instead of using knowledge, the self-deceiver uses a false 
theory, or some other means which is not a theory, to "guide 
the strategy". But, it can be objected, if the theory is false 
then it will not enable the self-deceiver to predict and so 
avoid evidence which can refute, and so destroy, his favoured 
belief. My reply is two-fold. Firstly, evidence is not a 
natural product which we might just accidentally bump into: 
evidence is made. Normally to say that evidence is made (or, 
even more derogatory, "fabricated") means that it is 
counterfeit: it is not genuine evidence. This is not what I
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mean. My claim is that all evidence (including "genuine" 
evidence) is made. There are processes which create evidence. 
They are related to the processes which create beliefs. The 
self-deceiver's belief is not vulnerable to destruction by 
evidence because although he is able to construct that 
evidence, he does not do so.
Secondly, evidence is not coercive: it does not compel us to 
believe the conclusions it makes evident. There is a set of 
metaphors which encourage us to think that evidence is coercive 
(it is "forceful", "compelling" etc). But these metaphors 
should be resisted. Beliefs are not "based" on evidence, for 
they are not "based" at all. They are invented, and tested (if 
at all) in practice.
Everyone agrees that our falsehoods are invented. Not everyone 
agrees that our truths are also invented. But they are. We 
get both truths and falsehoods through the same type of 
process. The self-deceiver is not doing something special and 
different from the truth-seeker when he invents beliefs. But 
he invents his beliefs not to gain truths but for some other 
purpose. The self-deceiver might even invent a true belief and 
still be self-deceived, for self-deception is characterised by 
the purpose with which it is done: someone could deceive 
himself into believing something which is true. He would 
nonetheless be a self-deceiver because truth was not his goal.
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To sum up: I claim that the available theories do not provide
a satisfactory explanation of self-deception. I offer a theory 
which I take to provide a satisfactory explanation, but there 
is a cost attached to it: we have to give up some assumptions 
which, it seems to me, are deep-rooted in the terminology of 
epistemology.
We must give up the idea that evidence is a generator of 
belief; the justification of belief comes after we adopt the 
belief, not before: "the proof of the pudding is in the
eating". Evidence, and truths, are not found but made. We 
"find" that our truths are true by trying them. If they
"work", then we cannot distinguish them from truths. The only 
sort of thing which in all circumstances is indistinguishable 
from a truth, is a truth.
Plato, in the Republic (382d), writes:
we don't know the truth about the past but we can invent a
fiction as like it as may be. (Plato [1974] pl38)
Plato uses the word 1 pseudos1 , translated as 'fiction' in the 
quotation above: 'pseudos’ can also mean 'falsehood'. My 
footnote to Plato is that if the fiction is exactly like the 




How could something originate in its antithesis? Truth in 
error, for example? Or will to truth in will to 
deception? ... Such origination is impossible; he who 
dreams of it is a fool, indeed worse than a fool; the 
things of highest value must have another origin of their 
own - they cannot be derivable from this transitory, 
seductive, deceptive, mean little world, from this 
confusion of desire and illusion. (Nietzsche [1973] pl5)
Nietzsche writes this in irony . But he also writes:
a philosopher; alas, a creature which often runs away from 
itself, is often afraid of itself - but which is too 
inquisitive not to keep 'coming to itself* again. 
(Nietzsche [1973] pl98).
The claim that "truth is what works" has been derided by people 
who did not bother to distinguish the work for which we want 
truth from the work performed by other sorts of interpretive 
instrument - such as the self-deceiver's belief. A study of 
the "work" performed would enable us to define truth by the way 
our truths are grounded in the way we live, in what 
Wittgenstein called our "forms of life". It would provide more 
than a dry definition: it would give us insights into 
ourselves, our enquiries, and our need for truth.
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This is not the sort of insight which the discipline of 
psychology seeks: my thesis is not about scientific laws which 
explain how one sort of thing - people - work, or what they 
are: it is more like the "user guide" which explains, in 
layman's language, how to use something. Even though, from a 
technical point of view, it may misrepresent the inner workings 
of the thing, the thing behaves "just as though it were true".
This thesis is not intended to be an essay in psychology - not 
even in "folk psychology", if that is meant to be some kind of 
competitor to the academic discipline of psychology. The 
thesis has more to do with making our theories of truth and 
evidence workable: an essay in epistemology, not psychology. 
Some epistemic theories help us to explain self-deception while 
others hinder. We should drop the ones which hinder us.
The self-deceiver is not engaged in a project very different 
from that of someone seeking truth. Both seek an instrument 
that "works", but their aims in seeking that instrument differ, 
and so the work to be done also differs. Epistemology has a 
long history of attempting to provide a methodology for 
enquiry: for seeking truth or, as I would say, for making 
truths. The need for such a methodology indicates that there 
are other ways of proceeding, which we can adopt at will. 
Enquiry is only one among many procedures for making the 
instruments which we use for processing information. The
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assumption that it is the only one contributes to making the 
"paradox" of self-deception insoluble. The instruments are 
interpretations - theories, for example. The processes by 
which we construct these instruments are processes of 
interpretation. Later on I shall have a good deal to say about 
interpretations (see my chapter on "Radical Interpretation 
theories" about self-deception) and about processes (see my 
discussion of the "Process theory" about self-deception, in the 
chapter titled, "The Production Process").
In the next chapter I offer a classification of the theories 
about self-deception.
A Note On Terminology
I have generally used the words 'he', 'him' and 'his' as 
generic expressions rather than as gender-specific 
designations. The generic expressions can be translated into 
the gender-neutral but cumbersome expressions - 'he or she', 
'him or her', 'his or hers' - without contradicting the sense 
of the text, though the result is rather difficult to read. No 
sexism is intended and I certainly do not wish to imply that 
women are any less likely or any more likely to be self- 
deceived than are men.
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I suggested that the theories of self-deception are usually 
"hybrids" of "pure strains". In this chapter I classify these 
pure strains. I also outline the basis for classifying 
theories in this way. This is only one way of classifying 
them; but it is one which is well adapted to my aim in this 
thesis.
Diagram 1, on the following page, summarises the 
classification. It shows a hierarchy of types of theory. The 
first branching in the hierarchy is the division between those 
theories which claim that there is such a thing as self- 
deception and "No-such-thing" (NST) theories, which argue that 
'self-deception', taken literally, is a misnomer. They claim 
that while there is something which we call "self-deception", 
the expression 'self-deception' misdescribes it.
NST theories use the paradoxes of self-deception to corroborate 
their claim. They therefore fail if any other theory provides 
a solution to the paradoxes.




Other theories - lets call them Such-Thing (ST) theories by 
contrast with No-Such-Thing theories - are divided up according 
to the way they aim to solve the paradoxes.
To begin with, allegedly "the self-deceiver must know what he 
is up to". Some theories deny this. I call these "Not-Know" 
(NK) theories. Other theories are designed to show how self- 
deception is possible even when the self-deceiver knows what he 
is up to. They do so by suggesting that the self-deceiver's 
knowledge is disabled or segregated in some way so that it 
cannot inhibit the self-deception. These I call "Avoidance 
theories".
Avoidance theories come in three varieties:
Schism theories
Dissociation (or Disconnection) theories
Role theories.
Schism theories argue that the self-deceiver 




Dissociation theories do not go so far as proposing a schism in 
the self-deceiver; they argue that:
Self-Deception Page 15
Classification Of Theories/2
the effects of the self-deceiver's knowledge are altered 
by disconnecting the knowledge from other things - things 
such as action, emotion, "thinking" etc
or that the self-deceiver "knows in one sense and not in 
another".
Role theorists argue that, by playing a role, the self-deceiver 
disables the knowledge of what he is up to.
Role theories also appear under the heading of "Not-Know 
theories" - see below for an outline of how Not-Know Role 
theories differ from Avoidance Role theories.




Negligence theories argue that self-deception can be explained 
as a form of epistemic negligence. They claim that self- 
deception is achieved by not doing the things which would lead 
to true beliefs and prevent false beliefs. Since someone's
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negligence does not exculpate them, we can explain how the 
self-deceiver is responsible for being deceived even though he 
does not "know what he is up to".
Role theories describe self-deception as the adoption of a 
role: the role can guide the strategy of self-deception even 
though the self-deceiver does not "know what he is up to".
Role theories come in two flavours: some of them are Avoidance 
theories, according to which one may be self-deceived by 
adopting a role in order to mask or draw attention away from 
what one really believes or feels. The role may be used to 
defer making use of a belief (or to defer the loss of a 
belief), for an indefinitely long time and perhaps forever. I 
call theories of this sort "Role Dissimulation" theories, and 
distinguish them from "Role Simulation" theories. Role 
Simulation theories are Not-Know theories. They do not make 
the claim that adopting a role masks or defers beliefs. There 
need be no "genuine" belief lurking behind or beneath the role: 
the role need not be a mask. Role simulation theories claim 
that adopting a role in a thorough and unrestricted way results 
in genuine beliefs, not pretences.
Radical Interpretation theories argue that self-deception is 
achieved by the self-deceiver creating (rather than "adopting") 
false beliefs, and that knowledge is not needed to guide self­
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deception - a false theory can be as effective an instrument of 
control as a true one.
I describe my own account of self-deception as a "Process 
Theory". The process theory is intended to explain self-
deception by giving an account of the processes by which 
beliefs are produced. I claim that the process theory can be 
used to spell out what makes the other theories appealing.
That is not to say that the other theories are correct. The 
Process theory is not neutral with regard to the other 
theories. It is a Not-know theory: part of the claim is that 
Avoidance theories are false, and in any case the Process 
theory makes them redundant - because it is a better theory.
Other Not-know theories are limited and insufficiently spelled- 
out rather than incorrect.
There is a further distinction which cuts across the 
classification which I have proposed. This is the distinction 
between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of self-deception. 
Supporters of non-cognitive theories argue that many accounts 
of self-deception put too much emphasis on the cognitive issues 
- e.g. knowledge and belief - and that more discussion of the 
non-cognitive issues - such as volition, action, and emotion - 
is needed.
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X agree with this up to a point. The point at which I cease to 
agree with it is when the cognitive issues disappear from the 
discussion altogether. The paradoxes of self-deception are 
cognitive paradoxes. If we cease to discuss the cognitive 
issues then the paradoxes will seem to be "dissolved". But 
that is because we have simply ceased to talk about them. That 
does not solve the paradoxes, it ignores them. So an 
exclusively non-cognitive approach would not help unless we 
could lead exclusively non-cognitive lives. This seems 
unlikely and so we need to discuss both: the cognitive issues 
and the non-cognitive.
In this chapter I have outlined the basis of my classification 
of the theories and named the major "pure strains". I will 
discuss each of the pure strains in more detail. Before doing 
so I have some remarks to make about the use of examples in 
discussions of self-deception. That is the subject of the next 
chapter.
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Many discussions of self-deception start by giving an example 
of self-deception and then go on to discuss it. I have not 
taken that approach because I think it is very difficult and 
perhaps impossible to describe an example in a way which is 
neutral with regard to the various theories about self- 
deception .
Any example we select will encounter problems such as the 
following.
1. Anyone who agrees with the alleged "self-deceiver's" belief 
is likely to argue that the example is not an instance of self- 
deception - in self-defence. For otherwise they are conceding 
that in all probability they are self-deceived too. Perhaps 
this is why the examples given are almost invariably examples 
of isolated individuals deceiving themselves, never of large 
groups of people. An exception to this rule may be Marx's 
discussion of "false consciousness", which I take to imply that 
large groups of people are self-deceived in the same way and 
about the same thing (and other large groups are deceived 
though not self-deceived by false consciousness). Another 
exception may be N'ietzsche's claim that "the will to truth" is
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a "will to deception". I discuss both Marx and Nietzsche later 
on.
This problem is ameliorated if we suggest (as I do) that 
someone may acquire true beliefs in a self-deceptive way. They 
will then have deceived themselves into believing something 
true. This is still not going to allow us to create an example 
that we can all agree on if the "self-deceptive way" is 
characterised in such a manner that it fits the behaviour of 
the people whose agreement we are seeking.
2. No example of self-deception can gain agreement anyway, 
since if we describe it as self-deception then No-Such-Thing 
theorists will argue that it is better described as something 
other than self-deception. So any example we choose will fail 
to be theory-neutral.
3. What we can do is to set up an example and invite the No- 
Such-Thing theorist to knock it down. But this is problematic 
too. If we invent an example, then the NST theorist can argue 
that it is not realistic or life-like. If we use an example 
taken from life then the NST theorist can argue (probably 
correctly) that we do not know enough about the alleged self­
deceiver's motives, or that we have not spelled out enough of 
the circumstantial details which, if they were added in to the 
example, might alter our claim that it is an example of self­
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deception. If we borrow an example from literature, e.g. 
Karenin from Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, then we borrow the theory 
which the novelist has built into the example, and we cannot 
add in all the circumstantial detail which we may think 
relevant, because the novel does not supply it.
4. Suppose that we ignore all these problems and plough on 
with the attempt to give an example of self-deception. The 
example we give will be constructed to rule out explanations 
other than the claim that this is self-deception. This sort of 
construction is provided all the time in discussions of self- 
deception .
For example, the example may be that of a doctor dying of a 
terminal illness. The illness is her speciality so she, of all 
people, should know that she is dying. She demonstrably knows 
too much to be mistaken: and yet she behaves as if unaware 
that she is dying, and asserts that she is as fit as a fiddle. 
She might be denying the facts in order to deceive others, 
knowing that their attitude towards her will change, perhaps. 
But we can rule this out by constructing the example so that 
she is surrounded by sensible people whom she trusts will not 
alter their attitude towards her. We can rule out the motive 
by characterising her as never having cared what other people 
thought. Ruling out the motive to deceive others restricts the 
example to something which seems more like self-deception. For
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although she has no motive to deceive others, she may have 
plenty of reasons for deceiving herself. She wishes to avoid 
the painful emotions and moods of black depression which she 
would suffer if she believed that she was dying. She wants to 
go on working and the moods and emotions would prevent her 
doing so ... and so on.
Once again the theory we use is going to impinge upon our 
example. For a supporter of Dissociation theories can argue 
that she does not need to "avoid the truth" in order to achieve 
her goals: she only needs to avoid "the glaring truth". She 
can simply pretend that she is not dying, and that will be 
sufficient to evoke more comfortable emotions and moods. At 
this point the NST theorist may well point out that if she is 
merely pretending, then she is not self-deceived.
Someone who supports a Schism theory of self-deception may 
argue that mere pretence may not be sufficient to achieve her 
aims. For how can the pretence dispel the unwelcome moods and 
emotions if her belief is still present and evoking them? Even 
if the pretence works in this case, there may be other examples 
where a pretence will not be sufficient to achieve the person's 
goals, and will not be sufficient to explain what is going on. 
At this point the Schism theorist is likely to start 
constructing other examples, and challenging the Dissociation 
theorist to explain them.
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5. The construction of examples is inextricably bound up with 
the theory one has about self-deception. It seems that it 
would be more straightforward to explain one's theory first, 
and give examples to support it afterwards. Yet if we do that, 
how shall we know what we are trying to explain? NST theories 
seem like a good place to start: they claim that the very 
concept of self-deception is not just paradoxical but 
inconsistent, therefore it can have no application. So NST 
theories need no examples, since they allege there can be no 
examples.
However, what NST theories give is a description of self- 
deception which they then try to show is inconsistent. This 
description is, in effect, a very generalised example, so 
general that it consists of nothing more than 'Someone is 
(literally) self-deceived'. Other theories can challenge NST 
theories by giving descriptions which (they claim) are 
consistent. These may be supported by alleged counter-examples 
- and any example which they offer will be a counter-example to 
the NST claim.
I have opted to discuss NST theories first, with their very 
general description of self-deception. Then I discuss 
Avoidance theories at the same level of generality. Before 
discussing Not-Know theories I offer three examples which, 
needless to say, are aligned to my views about self-deception.
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The descriptions of the three examples are intended to 
exemplify three theories about self-deception. They are also 
intended to exemplify three ways in which we theorise about 
self-deception. Since I happen to be in broad agreement with 
the three theories, I also regard the three examples as correct 
characterisations of self-deception; but that is a claim for 
which I will have to argue subsequently. After offering my 
Process theory of self-deception, I offer a "case study": an 
extended example to show how the theory can be applied to 
particular instances of (alleged) self-deception, and a few 
sketchy examples drawn from other philosophical texts about 
self-deception. The extended example is drawn from the 
biographical and autobiographical book. Father And Son (Gosse, 
[1964]).
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No-Such-Thing theories launch a triple attack upon other 
theories about self-deception.
1. They argue that the concept of self-deception is 
incoherent, and that the paradoxes of self-deception are 
symptoms of the concept's internal inconsistency.
2. They argue in detail against other theories, aiming to 
show that they cannot solve the paradoxes.
3. They argue that alleged examples of self-deception can be
better explained by using some description other than 
'self-deception'. Elster, for example, argues that
alleged instances of self-deception can be more 
parsimoniously explained as instances of wishful thinking 
(Elster [1979] pl49 - 152).
If a non-paradoxical account can be constructed, then items 1 
and 2 listed above become irrelevant. Item 3 works only if the 
NST theorist's preferred theory really offers a better 
explanation. It must have at least as much power as the "self- 
deception" theory to yield true predictions and descriptions;
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its "parsimony" must not be achieved by defining away parts of 
the data which are in need of explanation; it must not be 
paradoxical; and it must be distinct from self-deception. So, 
for example, if some instances of wishful thinking were cases 
of self-deception, Elster's "wishful thinking" hypothesis might 
turn out to actually exemplify "Such Thing" theories of self- 
deception, and not refute them at all.
The Paradoxes
The paradoxes are the strongest cards in the NST theorist's 
hand. Pears [1984] formulates the paradoxes as follows.
(1) If I have deceived myself that p then I believe that p but 
I also really know or believe or suspect that not-p: this 
combination seems impossible.
(2) If I know that the combination is impossible then I cannot 
intend to produce it in myself.
(3) If it is suggested that my fundamental belief is somehow 
screened from the rest of my thoughts and feelings, then the 
process becomes unintelligable since awareness of the belief is 
needed to motivate and guide the strategy.
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(4) Perhaps then it is the whole plan which is screened, 
together with everything mental that it requires for its 
existence. But this merely shifts the paradox to a different 
point, at which it remains unresolved. If an internally 
coherent plan is impossible, it will not be made possible 
simply by my being unaware of it and not identifying myself 
with it.
I think that the paradoxes can be stated more strongly than
this. First I shall suggest how Pears' versions of the
paradoxes can be answered.
Regarding Pears' first point: the combination of believing
that p and knowing or believing or suspecting that not-p is not 
impossible. It is quite commonplace for someone to have a set 
of beliefs which is inconsistent. So if there is anything 
paradoxical about having inconsistent beliefs, it is a paradox 
which is shared by many things other than self-deception. But 
why suppose that it is paradoxical? One may even know that 
one's set of beliefs is inconsistent, though without knowing 
which of the beliefs are inconsistent with each other. Pears 
suggests - in point (2) - that if I know that a combination of 
beliefs is impossible, then I cannot intend to produce it in 
myself. To which I add the rider that if I do not know that 
the combination is impossible then I can intend to produce it 
in myself.
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Furthermore, someone might identify two beliefs which are 
inconsistent with each other, and have both beliefs while 
knowing that they are inconsistent. For the beliefs might be 
generated by circumstances beyond the person's control. 
Perhaps there are organic malfunctions in the person's brain 
which generate inconsistent sets of beliefs, pehaps the beliefs 
are caused by brainwashing, hypnosis, and so on. We regard it 
as undesirable to have mutually inconsistent beliefs, but the 
law of non-contradiction is a logical law not a psychological 
one: it is what we would like, not what we always get.
To make point (1) paradoxical, we need to add in more knowledge 
and more intention. For what I have suggested is that someone 
may be the unwilling victim of circumstances, and have 
inconsistent beliefs which he can do nothing about. In that 
case he is deceived, but not self-deceived: he is the victim
of the deception but not its perpetrator.
These are the extra ingredients we need to restore the paradox:
- the self-deceiver believes that the two beliefs are 
inconsistent
the self-deceiver intends to have both beliefs.
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The paradox arises not when we have mutually inconsistent 
beliefs, but when we try to construct a strategy for acquiring 
the beliefs. For what is the intended goal? I can assert that 
p and assert that not-p, I can even assert that p and not-p - 
an outright contradiction - but asserting alone does not amount 
to believing. If I act on the supposition that p is true, then 
my action demonstrates that I do not believe that not-p is 
true. So what behaviour could manifest having mutually- 
inconsistent beliefs (rather than just asserting that one has 
such beliefs)? I suggest that if the beliefs cannot be 
demonstrated in outwardly observable behaviour, then they 
cannot be demonstrated in thinking, that variety of "inward" 
behaviour, either.
The answer to this paradox must lie in what the self-deceiver 
actually does: for that is what leads us to propose that he 
has mutually inconsistent beliefs. The self-deceiver does not 
manifest now one belief, now another - that is inconstant 
belief, not inconsistent belief. However we could argue that 
the inconstancy is the symptom of inconsistent beliefs, or of a 
paradoxical belief. Suppose, for example, that someone 
believes that the following sentence is true:
A. Sentence A is false.
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If sentence A is true, then sentence A is false. If sentence A 
is false, then it is true ... and so on. This is a version of 
the "liar paradox". It is a very succinct instance of a 
paradox which could have much less succinct instances. The 
paradox can be created using two sentences:
B. Sentence C is true.
C. Sentence B is false.
Presumably similar paradoxes could be created using many more 
sentences. In that case one might work through very many 
sentences before the paradox received its "come-uppance" in the 
form of an outright contradiction. In working through all 
those sentences one might also be using them as hypotheses, one 
might be believing, acting, thinking, feeling, achieving goals 
by using them. Observing someone working through this sort of 
situation, we might argue that their behaviour manifests 
mutually inconsistent beliefs. For the set of beliefs is 
inconsistent, even though he has not worked through all the 
consequences in order to derive an outright contradiction.
This situation, though, looks like an instance of someone being 
mistaken, or confused. The situation is quite different to the 
proposed paradox of self-deception, in which someone starts out 
with the intention to have mutually inconsistent beliefs, and
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therefore "knows what he is doing". He may indeed adopt the 
process of "working through consequences"; but throughout that 
process he knows what he is doing, so that instead of making 
genuine mistakes, and genuinely believing, he is merely 
pretending to believe. Merely pretending, is not genuine 
deception. So this attempt to characterise self-deception 
fails to avoid the paradoxes.
Our aim was to give a non-paradoxical description of a 
paradoxical set of beliefs. But in the case of self-deception, 
we are not the only ones who can describe the set of beliefs as 
paradoxical. The self-deceiver, if he knows what he is doing, 
can give the same description: in that case, he is not really 
deceived, but merely pretending.
Let us note here, for later reference, that by "working through 
the set of beliefs" the self-deceiver is not at that time able 
to describe the set of beliefs as paradoxical: for while he is 
"working through" them he is not yet in a position to describe 
them as paradoxical: that position is arrived at when he has 
worked through them sufficiently to arrive at a contradiction. 
So "working through" the beliefs is a way of deferring the 
knowledge of what he is doing. Deferred knowledge is a topic 




In stating Pears' paradox (1) I have not mentioned the reason 
for suggesting that a self-deceiver has mutually inconsistent 
beliefs, namely that allegedly he uses a true belief to guide 
the strategy by which he acquires and sustains a false belief. 
This seems to me a very good description of how we use
instrumental theories. We use a true belief to guide the
construction of a false but useful simulation. in the sense
given by the Shorter OED (Onions [1983]):
simulation: the technique of imitating the behaviour of 
some situation or system (economic, military, mechanical, 
etc) by means of an analogous situation, model or 
apparatus, either to gain information more conveniently or 
to train personnel. (Onions [1983], p2660)
Constructing a simulation is one way of pretending. So this 
reinforces the suggestion that the self-deceiver is pretending 
to believe. To keep the paradox going we need to argue that 
the self-deceiver is "merely pretending", i.e. we need to argue 
that "mere pretence" never amounts to belief. I will suggest 
that some genuine beliefs (perhaps all of them) are pretences - 
in a sense of 'pretence1 which I shall explain.
One may also use a false belief to guide the strategy by which 
one acquires a false belief: in this case one can presumably 
be self-deceived without "knowing the truth": one merely adds
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another false belief to one's collection. I shall return to 
this point when I discuss Negligence theories of self- 
deception .
One may also use a false belief to guide the strategy by which 
one acquires a true belief. This has happened not infrequently 
in the history of enquiry. Presumably it is one way in which 
self-deception may cease. By using the false belief one 
arrives at the true belief which replaces it. If the process 
can go in one direction (from falsehood to truth), then it can 
go in the other direction too (from truth to falsehood). I 
shall return to this point later on. Here I am only setting 
down a marker for later discussion.
I have concentrated on what I take to be the strongest 
statement of paradox (1), in which the self-deceiver is 
supposed to have two beliefs which are inconsistent with each 
other.
However it is hard for me to understand why anyone would want 
to have inconsistent beliefs, and I have equal difficulty in 
trying to guess how that combination of beliefs would manifest 
itself in behaviour. Pears can help me out here since he 
claims that self-deception is (and must be) a manifestation of 
such a combination. But self-deception can be described and 
explained without postulating such a combination of beliefs, as
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I shall later try to show. The point of self-deception is to 
replace one belief with another, not to sustain two beliefs 
which are inconsistent with each other. Therefore point (1) 
does not describe self-deception, and so it does not show that 
self-deception is paradoxical. Alleged paradox (2) collapses 
at the same time, since it depends upon paradox (1). Since 
self-deception does not require a combination of beliefs which 
are inconsistent with each other, there is no need to propose 
that some of the beliefs are "screened". Therefore paradox (3) 
collapses, and so does paradox (4).
Pears' versions of the paradoxes do not arise if we describe 
self-deception without appeal to inconsistent combinations of 
beliefs and "screens". However, Pears' formulations of the 
paradoxes are extremely effective weapons against theories of 
self-deception which do postulate the existence of "screened 
beliefs" etc.
If I have really deceived myself that not-p, then, contrary to 
point (1), I do not know or believe or suspect that p - not 
any more. The supposition that self-deception requires us to 
sustain a "fundamental" belief behind a "screen" seems to me 
unnecessary. Sustaining the belief behind a "screen" is 
perhaps the sort of thing someone might try to do because self- 
deception failed, because he failed to do away with an unwanted 
belief. The aim of self-deception (supposing that self­
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deception has an aim) is not to produce an inconsistent 
combination of beliefs, but to replace one belief with another.
If point (3) shows that self-deception is paradoxical, then by 
similar reasoning we can show that shaving is paradoxical: for 
shaving is motivated by one's awareness of unwanted surplus 
hair. One must retain the hair in order to motivate the
shaving. Shaving cannot remove the hair, for if it did, the 
motivation to shave would disappear.
I hope this "paradox" seems as unconvincing to you as Pears' 
third paradox of self-deception seems to me. Shaving is 
possible, and so is self-deception. The aim of shaving is not 
to produce an impossible combination of hairiness and 
hairlessness, but to replace hairiness with hairlessness. 
Likewise, the aim of self-deception is not to produce an 
impossible combination of beliefs, but to replace one belief 
with another.
One counter-objection is that shaving is not a fair analogy for 
self-deception. Unlike beards, beliefs can be re-constituted 
simply through the awareness of operating with them: it is as 
though shaving produced the hair it was supposed to remove.
The counter-objection assumes without any supporting argument 
that our way of replacing beliefs must "operate with" the
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beliefs which are to be replaced. The production of the 
replacement belief may not use the belief to be replaced. I 
would expect that the self-deceiver would try to have nothing 
to do with that belief, and would certainly not make use of it 
in a way which builds it into the plan for a future without 
that belief.
Part of the argument is that the "fundamental belief" is needed 
to motivate self-deception. But the belief is not what 
motivates the self-deception; Dislike of the belief may 
motivate the self-deception; but that is a different thing.
Here is an illustration. Suppose I am socially inept, annoy 
people with my abrasive manner, and so on. I may dislike being 
like that, and try to do something about it. My strategy is 
unlikely to include any element of continuing to be abrasive, 
socially inept, and so on. If there is such an element, it is 
probably only to remind myself of how awful it is to be like 
that, thereby strengthening my resolve never to be like that 
again. Suppose I succeed in developing some tact and social 
graces; there is no reason to suppose that "deep down" I must 
still be socially inept or "really" still have an abrasive 
manner. The whole point is to do away with all that. The 
abrasive manner does not motivate the process; dislike of the 
abrasive manner does. Likewise, if the whole point is to do 
away with a belief, one is not likely to use the belief in
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order to do away with it. One is not motivated by the belief, 
but by dislike of the belief.
If the aim of self-deception is to replace one belief (lets 
call it "the original belief") with another (lets call it "the 
replacement belief"), then the self-deceiver may know what the 
original belief is, know what the replacement belief is, and 
know that he intends to believe the replacement instead of the 
original. After successfully achieving the self-deception he 
may think, "thank goodness I do not believe that [the original 
belief] any more". Before and during the process he may think, 
"I refuse to believe it, and I shall find something better to 
believe".
The paradoxes can be more strongly stated as follows:
1. Suppose that someone, S, is self-deceived. S either knows
what he is doing, or does not know. If he does not know, 
then he is merely mistaken. If he does know, then he is 
not deceived. Therefore the description of self-deception 
always collapses into a description of something 
different: being mistaken, pretending, deceiving others,
or whatever it may be.
2. The self-deceiver needs to know what he is doing. If he 
did not, he could accidentally encounter evidence which
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would convince him or her of the truth which he was trying 
not to believe. But if the self-deceiver (let us call the 
self-deceiver "S", for brevity) knows what he is doing, 
then he is not deceived.
S may deceive others, but self-deception seems to be an 
impossible task. Not only must S know what he is doing, but it 
seems he must also know the very thing about which he is 
attempting to be deceived. For one needs to know it in order 
to avoid being confronted by the evidence for its in order to 
ignore the evidence. But ignoring something is quite unlike 
being ignorant of it. One must be aware of it in order to 
ignore it. Otherwise, one may be confronted by it 
inadvertantly.
Ignoring something is a strategic movement of feigning 
ignorance, by putting oneself in a situation where ignorance 
would be possible (if one did not know already). We can detect 
the difference between someone who is ignorant of something, 
and someone who is ignoring something. For the behaviour of 
the latter is patterned around the thing he is ignoring, and 
this pattern exhibits the thing ignored as clearly as an 
archway exhibits the space left by the scaffold which once 
supported it: it is "glaringly absent". Someone who feigns 
ignorance is not ignorant, a feigned mistake is not a mistake, 
and someone who pretends to be deceived is not really self-
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deceived. The behaviour which we describe as self-deception 
may be pretence, deception of other people, mistake, or 
ignorance. What it cannot be (according to this argument) is 
self-deception, literally understood. Consequently every 
attempt to characterise self-deception collapses into a 
description of something else.
Describing self-deception in this way invites paradox. It is 
rather like "the relaxation paradox", which goes like this: 
relaxation is impossible, for the attempt to describe it always 
turns out to be paradoxical. Consider someone who is trying to 
relax: the more he makes an effort to relax, the less relaxed 
he becomes. Making an effort is incompatible with relaxation. 
But he must make an effort in order to relax. For if he does 
not make an effort, he will never be able to achieve the goal, 
relaxation. Therefore the very idea of relaxation is 
incoherent. 'Relaxation' is always a misdescription, and the 
things we call relaxation are really something other than 
relaxation.
I hope that it is obvious that we do not need to make an effort 
to relax; and that relaxation does happen. If you want to 
relax, you had better not make an effort. Relaxation is 
achieved by not making an effort. Relaxation only seems 
paradoxical when we describe it in a peculiar way.
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The "self-deception paradox" is similar. We do not need to 
know in order to be self-deceived; and self-deception does 
happen. If you want to be self-deceived, you had better not 
know. Self-deception is achieved by not knowing. Self- 
deception only seems paradoxical when we describe it in a 
peculiar way.
"The self-deceiver must know what he is doing" is like: "the 
person trying to relax must make an effort". Take away the 
assumption and there is no paradox. Instead there is a gap 
waiting to be filled with an explanation: the explanation we 
need is an account of what the person does instead of making an 
effort (in the case of relaxation), or instead of knowing (in 
the case of self-deception).
There is a variation upon the relaxation paradox. This 
variation too has a parallel in discussions of self-deception. 
We may be simply incredulous that someone is able to relax when 
he is placed in a very stressful situation: how can he be so 
relaxed when there is so much stress? The parallel in the case 
of self-deception is: how can he be self-deceived, when the 
deception is in conflict with such strong evidence? We are 
inclined to suppose that the evidence must coerce the self­
deceiver into (or out of) believing something: the evidence 
must put an end to the deception, just as stress may put an end 
to relaxation. But someone may stay relaxed because he does
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not regard the situation as being stressful; and someone may 
stay deceived because he does not regard "the evidence" as 
evidence. "The evidence" is what we call it; he may regard it 
differently.
The construction of the paradoxes depends upon keeping our 
distinctions sharp: feigning must be sharply distinct from
being deceived, mistaken or ignorant. For otherwise we might 
describe a process by which someone slowly drifts between one 
state and another, say between feigning and being self- 
deceived, or between feigning and knowing; somewhere between 
the two there might be self-deception, not another sharply- 
characterised state but something which comes and goes by 
degrees. Also, we must sharply distinguish being mistaken from 
knowing. For otherwise we might describe (as in practice we 
often do) a process in which someone gradually comes to realise 
something (and he may be held responsible for not coming to 
realise it more swiftly), or gradually forgetting something, or 
gradually sinking into ignorance or error. If such a process 
occurs then one might occupy that twilight zone between 
knowqledge and ignorance, knowledge and error, for a long time, 
without ever emerging into one of the boundary states 
knowledge, error, ignorance.
The paradoxes are constructed in a way that forces us to 
suppose that changes of belief nust always be discontinuities,
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never allowing for a slow change between beliefs. For 
otherwise one might loiter between beliefs, not wholly 
convinced of any of them. Self-deception might then be 
described as a state of "half-belief", belief waxing and waning 
by degrees. So the paradoxes require us to suppose that there 
are no such continuities.
This is rather like Zeno's paradox of the arrow. The arrow can 
never move, because at any instant when it is in flight it must 
be at only one place. Since there is never an instant at which 
it moves, then if time consists of instants, the arrow cannot 
move. For there is never a an instant at which it is in 
motion. Or at least, the arrow cannot move continuously: it 
can only be in a succession of different states at different 
instants. The problem is that if this is true of self- 
deception, it will also be true of all beliefs: any change of 
belief will involve discontinuities; there will never be any 
gradual transitions from one belief to another. I think that 
while some changes of beliefs may be discontinuous, others are 
not.
I do not find the sharp distinctions intuitively plausible 
(which is not to say they cannot be correct). I am inclined to 
say we spend our entire lives in the "twilight zone" between 
knowledge, error and ignorance. What happens there is a 
process which we must later examine.
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Despite what I have just said, I welcome the attempt to keep 
our distinctions sharp. For in this way, it becomes ever more 
obvious that self-deception cannot be either knowledge, or 
ignorance, or mistake, as "sharply defined". The instances of 
self-deception that we come across cannot then be explained as 
really being mistakes, pretences, or attempts to deceive other 
people. NST theories will then fail to show that these cases 
can be better explained without describing them as self- 
deception. For all other explanations will have been ruled out 
by the "sharp distinctions" which make self-deception unlike 
mistakes, pretences, etc.
However, the paradox can be reconstructed even if we replace 
the "discontinuities" hypothesis with a "continuities" 
hypothesis. Someone who is in the "twilight zone" between 
knowledge and error may have a combination of knowledge and 
error, but that does not compel us to suppose that therefore he 
is self-deceived. For to be self-deceived one must intend to 
be deceived, and if someone intends something then he knows 
what he intends: otherwise it is not intentional. If it is 
not intentional then it is merely a mistake.
Even if we propose such dubious psychological entities as 
"unconscious intentions", we do not escape the paradox. For 
being deceived by an unconscious intention is akin to being 
deceived by a parasite which has taken root in one's brain, or
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having false beliefs because one has a brain lesion. Unless 
one can be held responsible for it - in rather a strong sense 
of "responsible" - one is not self-deceived but merely 
deceived. The fact that the cause of the deception is internal 
to the agent rather than external is not sufficient. One 
cannot be held responsible for something of which one is wholly 
ignorant. So, if we are held responsible for it, we must know 
what we are doing. If we know what we are doing then we are 
not really deceived - so not self-deceived either. The
postulation of such things as "unconscious intentions" only 
appear to solve the paradoxes because they are not at all well- 
defined. As soon as they become well-defined the paradox 
reappears.
The construction of the paradoxes depends upon a sharp 
distinction between what is intentional and what is
unintentional. In fact there are more distinctions we can 
draw. We can distinguish:
1. intending to do or to be something
2. intending not to do or to be something
3. not intending to do or to be something
4. not intending not to do or to be something.
We can distinguish further by reference to the "something" just 
mentioned. For example, we can expand 1. above:
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1.1 intending to believe that p
1.2 intending to believe that not-p
1.3 intending to find out whether or not p is true 
... and so on.
If self-deception is characterised as "not intending to do or 
be something" - namely, not intending to believe the truth - 
then self-deception is not intentional, and so the self­
deceiver need not "know what he is doing". Although he lacks 
intention, he may still be responsible for being deceived. 
Negligence of something which one ought to do or be can be 
culpable. The self-deceiver neglects to believe the truth, and 
the truth is what one ought to believe, if one is able to do so 
(in some sense of 'ought'). Self-deception by negligence is 
not paradoxical. But it does not cover self-deceptions which 
are described by distinctions 1. and 2. above, i.e. where there 
is an intention and not just a lack of intention. If there are 
self-deceptions like that, they are not negligent. I shall 
argue that there are such self-deceptions, and that they are 
not paradoxical.
When we make our distinctions sharper, self-deception becomes 
more salient. For the sharper our distinctions are, the more 
obvious it becomes that self-deception is not knowledge, or 
ignorance, or unwitting error.
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Are NST Theories Better Descriptions Than Such-Thinq (ST) 
Theories?
Let us think about why we might want to describe something as 
an instance of self-deception. Suppose you have a theory about 
someone's aims. You observe them for a decade or two, and you 
notice that your theory accurately predicts their achievements. 
You also notice that their public statements of their aims do 
not match what they actually achieve. So your theory is 
inconsistent with their statements; and your theory works 
better than theirs.
There are a number of ways of explaining this. I label and 
itemise some of them below.
1. "Honest but inept": they stated their aims correctly, but 
failed to achieve those aims.
2 "Honest but inconstant": they stated their aims
correctly, but the aims changed. However, your theory, 
yielding accurate predictions, suggests that there is a 
constant trend or pattern in their behaviour, which belies 
their statements.
3. "Lying": your theory is correct. Their statements are
intended to deceive others.
Self-Deception Page 47
No-Such-Thing/4
4. "Speaking in code": you have mistranslated their
statements. Correctly decoded, they would predict the 
person’s behaviour as accurately as your theory does.
5. "Mistaken or confused": they are unwittingly mistaken or
confused about their aims.
6. "Self-deceived": they are mistaken or confused or
ignorant about their aims, in order to achieve those aims.
No doubt there are also other explanations which I have not 
listed.
There are ways of ruling out explanations too. For example, if 
the person shows no signs of disappointment and seems to thrive 
on his or her achievements, we may tend to think that he is not 
"honest but inept". For if he were, then he would consider 
them failures rather than achievements.
If he is "honest but inconstant", one would expect the 
statements of aims to alter, not just the behaviour. If he is 
"speaking in code", one can suggest a decoding. He may reject 
the proposed decoding. But if he cannot suggest a better one, 
then one may start to think that he is not merely speaking in 
code but is lying, mistaken, confused, or self-deceived. If 
the errors he makes consistently turn out to his advantage,
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then one may start to rule out the "mistaken or confused" 
option: for this link to advantages seems too much of a
coincidence.
This leaves the options, "lying", and "self-deceived". One can 
now forget about the person's own statements: the statements
made by a self-deceiver or an other-deceiver are not a reliable 
guide to truth. Observing the person, we may ask which one is 
needed in order to achieve the aims described by our own 
theory. Does he need to deceive others, or himself, or both? 
In this way we may, by adding all sorts of circumstantial 
details into our description, narrow the possibilities down to 
a single explanation. The one I am interested in is, of
course, "self-deception".
Such explanations may rarely proceed in so straightforward a 
manner. Someone may be self-deceived, lying, mistaken, 
confused, inconstant and inept, all at once. And so may we be, 
when we attempt to describe them. Sometimes, though, the 
situation may be relatively unambiguous, the description "self- 
deceived" being justified by a combination of:
a theory which accurately predicts someone's behaviour




- a test of one's "translation" of a person's statements
- a description of the advantages accruing to someone 
because of their "mistakes"
- the strategy which would be needed to gain those benefits 
intentionally (e.g. is the strategy self-deception or 
other-deception)
- plus, no doubt, other factors which I have not considered 
here.
We can telescope all these factors into one item:
- your theory that another person is self-deceived enables 
you to accurately predict their behaviour, in 
contradiction to their own statements, and other theories 
do not enable you to predict as successfully as this one 
does.
In short, sometimes "self-deception" may be the only 
description that fits the situation. Since it works better 
than the alleged self-deceiver's own statements, you can argue 
that he ought to use your theory too. Not for his own benefit, 
but for ours: we are entitled not to be told something which
can mislead us, and perhaps harm us.
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Perhaps the alleged self-deceiver would be unable to achieve 
his goals if he used your thory. The factor which leads one to 
abandon self-deception may be a change of goals rather than an 
encounter with more evidence, gaining more information, losing 
an argument, etc.
When one's goals conflict with those of other people there may 
be a variety of outcomes. The self-deceiver may sacrifice the 
interests of others, or sacrifice his own interests. If we 
demand that the self-deceiver should adopt our theory, we are 
asking that he make a sacrifice in the interests of enabling us 
to have a more widely accepted way of making accurate 
predictions. Whether or not our demand is justified is another 
question. Our entitlement to not be harmed may not be 
absolute; and someone else's self-deception may not harm or 
mislead us at all.
An NST theorist might argue that "we truth-seekers" may have 
less than creditable motives for calling someone "self- 
deceived". For we may wish to blame people for their (genuine) 
mistakes: annoyed by the mistake, we may want to take it out 
on someone even though it was not their fault. By redescribing 
their mistake as "self-deception", we arm ourselves with a 
justification for blaming them. Another possibility is that we 
wish to exculpate someone for "mistakes" for which they deserve 
to be blamed (including our own "mistakes": "I must have been
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deceiving myself" is more than halfway towards being an 
excuse).
One may wish to undermine the "self-deceiver's" arguments, 
drawing attention away from the arguments by finding fault with 
the person (which is irrelevant because a sound argument is 
sound regardless of the motives of the person who constructed 
it) . We may even be defending our own self-deceptions by 
attacking the epistemic authority of other people ("he's in no 
position to judge: he's self-deceived").
The description, "self-deceived", may be the verbal trigger to 
provoke a response without needing to argue for it: a 
compressed argument which is never spelled out and which, if it 
were spelled out, might prove to be quite feeble.
The mere attribution of self-deception is insufficient: it has 
to be substantiated. But if it is substantiated, then the 
motives of the person who made the attribution, however 
discreditable they may be, do not detract from the truth of the 
description.
We may be able to construct a strong defence of the terminology 
of self-deception, if it works for prediction better than other 
ways of describing behaviour. And it certainly seems to be a 
disadvantage of NST theories that they force us to redescribe
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every alleged self-deceiver as either mistaken or cynically 
lying to other people. NST theories force us to do so because 
they allege that the paradoxes of self-deception are insoluble: 
the very notion of self-deception is taken to be incoherent. 
NST theories are therefore vulnerable to the arrival of a non- 
paradoxical theory of self-deception. There is a variety of 
non-paradoxical theories available. Later on I shall argue 
that all the non-paradoxical theories are complementary (or can 
be made to be, by minor adjustments), and can be put together 
to form a super-theory.
I have not shown that 'self-deception' is ever a better 
description of some behaviour than all the other options. But 
the fact that 'self-deception' is part of our vocabulary 
suggests that we find some use for it, i.e. sometimes we think 
that self-deception is the best explanation of what someone is 
doing.
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If a house be divided against itself, that house cannot 
stand.
A H o u s e  D i v i d e d :  S c h i s m  T h e o r i e s
The Gospel According To Mark, 3:25
Sometimes one person deceives another. It seems unparadoxical. 
So if self-deception (intrapersonal deception) could be 
explained on the model of other-deception (interpersonal 
deception) then we could dispel the paradoxes associated with 
self-deception.
Schism theories in their simplest form consider the self­
deceiver to be divided into two parts. One part is the 
deceiver, the other is the deceived. More complicated forms of 
schism theory propose that there are more than two elements 
within the self-deceiver.
Some schism theories explain self-deception as a process in 
which a person creates a schism within himself or herself in 
order to be deceived. Other schism theories treat self- 
deception as a way of exploiting a division which is already
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there in the person, so that self-deception is more a matter of 
failing to integrate what was already divided.
Schism theories avoid the paradoxes by arguing that self- 
deception is not really reflexive.
Take the first sort of Schism theories first - those which 
claim that the self-deceiver creates a schism. So far as I 
have been able to find out, nobody knows how to create a schism 
within himself in order to be self-deceived. Supposing someone 
ever did achieve it, there is what I call the "Humpty Dumpty 
problem": once they are divided, nobody knows how to put the
pieces back together again. So if schism explained self- 
deception, it would seem to be irreversible. Yet I believe 
that self-deception can cease, people can emerge from it.
When people cease to be self-deceived, they do not, so far as I 
am aware, report that a schism existed while they were self- 
deceived. But if there was a schism then one would expect them 
to be able to report their experiences from one side of the 
schism or the other, perhaps from both sides: for the schism
is presumably no longer causing an intrapersonal communication 
problem.
Even if people did report the existence of a schism in their 
former self-deceptions, the report would not be irrefutable
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evidence that any such schism existed. People who made such 
reports might be simply making their best attempt at self­
explanation, based on the theories available to them. Since 
the theory available might be a schism theory, the report would 
be nothing more than an interpretation of what "must have 
happened" in the self-deception if the schism theory is true. 
The details of the report would be inferred from what the 
theory says must have been the case.
Creating a schism seems as problematic as deceiving oneself, 
and for much the same reason. Suppose that I could create such 
a schism. It would not help me to deceive myself because I 
would be on both sides of the schism. I might be able to 
arrange things so that the part of me on one side of the schism 
was able to deceive the part of me that was on the other side. 
But this arrangement would be very artificial; arranging for 
"part of me" to be "deceived" does not seem to help deceive me. 
So it might turn out that the easiest way to create a schism is 
... to deceive oneself. However this order of doing things 
prevents us using the schism to explain the self-deception; 
but self-deception seems a lot easier than creating a schism.
So perhaps we are better off with the second sort of schism 
theories; those theories which claim that self-deception 
exploits a schism which is already there.
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The schism itself is not the whole explanation of self- 
deception. If someone were deceived solely because of a schism 
which he had no control over, then there would be no self- 
deception: he would be the victim of the deception but not its 
perpetrator. He would be deceived but not a deceiver.
If schism alone were to explain self-deception, then there 
would also be a problem about real physical schisms within 
people who do not seem to be self-deceived. For example, a 
real physical schism is created by commissurotomy, an 
operation which divides someone's left brain from his or her 
right brain by cutting the connecting tissue between them. 
Wilkes [1978] discusses this in some detail.
If self-deception is schism, then people who have undergone 
this operation (sometimes called "split-brain patients") should 
be self-deceivers.
I do not believe that the commisurotomy operation creates self­
deceivers. It can certainly cause intrapersonal communication 
problems - although these do not as a rule seem very apparent 
except under special experimental conditions. The sort of 
conditions which are created for the purposes of experiment are 
things like preventing the person seeing with his left eye what 
he can see with his right eye, and vice versa, i.e. ensuring 
that the "communication gap" between left brain and right brain
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is not circumvented by using means of communication external to 
the person's brain. But these problems of intrapersonal 
communication seem like mistakes, not like attempted self- 
deception.
If a real physical schism is not what is intended when the 
self-deceiver is described as "divided", then there is a 
problem of knowing what sort of division is meant, and what is 
being divided from what. If we say that the self-deceiver's 
mind is divided, we have a problem about describing what a mind 
is, not to mention describing how it divides up.
Suppose we describe a set of mental functions which are 
divided. Are all the mental functions performed by one agent, 
or are they performed by two agents within a single body? If 
all the functions are performed by one person, in what sense 
could that person be described as deceived, and what is the 
point of postulating a division between the functions?
I am not suggesting at this stage that no satisfactory answer 
could be forthcoming: but it is a serious problem, which needs 
to be addressed.
To defend a Schism theory we would also need to be able to say 




Interpersonaldeception Ts possible when one person (the 
deceiver) has privileged access to information which the other 
person (the deceived) lacks, or when the deceived grants that 
privilege to the deceiver.
Here are some examples of situations in which person A can 
deceive person B:
A witnesses an event which B did not witness; B needs A's 
report in order to find out about the event
A claims to be a witness to an event which B did not 
witness; B relies on A's report to find out about the event; 
A was not a witness to the event, but B does not know that A 
was not a witness - either B is not able to find out that A was
not a witness, or B does not bother to find out (in which case
there might be "contributory negligence" from B)
Both A and B witness an event, but A claims to notice 
aspects of the event which B does not notice; A persuades B to 
accept A's account of what happened
- Both A and B witness an event, but A claims to have
expertise which B lacks; A persuades B that A's "expert"
account is a true account of what happened
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- Both A and B are experts; A claims to have applied his 
expertise to generate an account of something; B does not 
apply expertise but accepts A's account
- A fabricates evidence and leaves it in a place where B will 
find it, taking care that B does not know that the evidence is 
fabricated: B finds the evidence and draws the false but 
inviting conclusions which A designed the "evidence" to "point 
to"
- A interferes with B; e.g. by getting B drunk, A prevents B 
thinking clearly; or by persuading B to depart from B's normal 
routine, A ensures that B does not encounter evidence which A 
wishes to keep hidden from B; or, when B is trying to decide 
what conclusion to draw about something, A intervenes, 
emphasising some arguments and playing down others, 
interrupting lines of thought which look set to lead to the 
truth while encouraging lines of thought which lead to false 
conclusions ... and so on.
In all these cases A has information which he witholds from B: 
the information may be what he really saw when he witnessed an 
event which he lies to A about, or it may be information about 
A himself, e.g. that he never really witnessed the event, or 
that it was A who fabricated evidence, and so on.
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So, for example, you cannot deceive me into believing that 
Coventry City won the FA Cup this year if we are both present 
when the Cup Final is played and I can see with my own eyes 
that Coventry City lost; but if I retire to the bar in disgust 
at the way the match is going, and rely upon you to report 
further developments to me, then I have conceded to you 
privileged access which I have denied myself. You are then in 
a position to deceive me, should you wish to do so.
Suppose that you do not try to deceive me, but that I reject 
the information you give me. "What!" I roar, "City cannot be 
doing that badly - I don't believe you!" - but I do not make 
the effort to look through the window and check for myself. In 
this case the schism between deceiver and deceived explains the 
deception, not because one side is misleading the other but 
because one side distrusts the other in order to be misled. 
Instead of A misleading B, it is B who rejects A's information. 
In this case there seems little point in proposing a schism to 
explain the deception: for A performs no functional role in 
the explanation of how B came to be deceived. B does not need 
A's help in order to ignore the information. Instead of 
proposing that A supplies information which B rejects, we could 




There is one reason why A might not be entirely redundant in 
this scenario, namely that it can be much easier to reject 
hearsay evidence than the evidence of one'e own eyes. Even so, 
the hearsay evidence need not be supplied from within the self­
deceiver, and I have not seen anyone else offering a schism 
theory which does not propose that one element is a deceiver 
and another element is deceived. Whereas this variant suggests 
that A is not a deceiver, but B wants to be deceived and 
exploits the schism between them to gain its objective.
If schism is to explain self-deception, we need to know what 
elements of the self-deceiver go on which side of the schism.
For example, suppose that self-deception about an event is like 
eyewitness A giving a false account to another element, B. A 
must have access to information which B lacks, e.g. information 
gained through the senses. We do say things like, "my eyes 
deceived me", but being "deceived by one's senses" can be 
distinguished from self-deception. It is one of the things 
someone might say in order to show that he is not self- 
deceived.
That is why it is important to attribute aims to the deceiving 
element within the self-deceiver. For if the deceiving element 
does not have aims, then we do not have a case of self- 
deception: the deceiving element functions in a "mechanical"
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way, and the result is a mistake, not self-deception. The 
person is mistaken in the same way as someone who, due to poor 
eyesight, misjudges distances. If there is no aim to deceive, 
then there is no self-deception.
The deceived element must have aims too. For if all the 
person's aims reside in the deceiving element, then we would 
have to say that the person deceived an element within himself 
or herself which has no aims, which functions "mechanically".
We do sometimes say things like this. For example, a medical 
student who is about to witness a surgical operation for the 
first time may "steel his emotions": he makes an effort to
view the operation in a mechanical, functional way, to focus 
attention away from the thought that the surgeon's knife is 
cutting into the flesh of another human being and the thought 
of how much that would hurt if the person were conscious, and 
so on. We could (stretching words considerably) say that the 
medical student is deceiving his emotions. But we would not be 
justified in saying that the medical student is deceiving 
himself.
So what goes into the seperate elements of the self-deceiver?
We could suppose that element A processes sensory information 
while element B makes decisions about what actions, if any, to
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take. A influences B's decision-making by feeding false 
information to B, in order to secure a decision favoured by A.
Notice that quite a lot of extra assumptions have to be made 
for this sort of account to work. A is capable of much more 
than just processing sensory information: A also knows, or 
guesses, how B makes decisions: for otherwise A would not be 
able to decide what false information to feed to B in order to 
secure the desired decision. B must not process the sensory 
information directly itself, otherwise the deception will be 
discovered and defeated. And B must not know or guess that A 
is capable of practising such duplicity. For in that case the 
deception can only succeed with B's collaboration: which would 
make B not only deceived but also a deceiver. There would be 
no point in postulating a schism.
So A turns out to have a much greater role in the self­
deceiver's psyche than B does. I described B as "making the 
decisions" as though B was a sort of powerful company executive 
and A was one of the company's information-gathering minions. 
But effectively A has taken control and is exercising executive 
power. In that case, we no longer seem to be justified in 
saying that the person is self-deceived; at most we could say 
he is self-deceiving: for executive power resides with A, A is 
the one which really makes the decisions, the one we should 
really identify as the major component of the person. If the
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major component is the deciever and not the deceived, then we 
do not seem to have much of a case for saying the whole person 
is deceived. B is deceived, but the best way to describe this 
seems to be: "the person has made a decision to deceive one 
element within himself or herself: that element is B." B is 
deceived, but the person is not.
Notice the extreme artificiality of the terminology we are 
forced to use in describing the schism. We are obliged to 
think of elements A and B as two agents, both having their own 
goals and wishes.
Lets try out the idea that there are two agents within the one 
person, each agent being "complete" in the sense of having all 
the information-processing faculties and aims that a whole 
person might have.
"Eye-witness" style deception is obviously impossible, since 
both agent A and agent B share the person's senses. However A 
might use sensory information which B does not use. And 
"expert" style deception can occur if A is an expert and B is 
not, or if both are experts but B does not apply its expertise 
and relies instead upon A.
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If A and B also share whatever activity the person undertakes 
then there is no chance of A planting evidence while B is not 
there.
So let's try out the idea offered by Pears [1984]: that A is 
an agent which is within B. B observes its environment through 
the senses, and acts within that environment; whereas A does 
not have direct contact with that environment. A's environment 
is B: A is encapsulated within B. A knows about B and acts 
within B. A's aims are different to B's. For example, B wants 
to know the truth, but A wants B to be happy; and in the case 
of the self-deceiver, A knows that the truth is incompatible 
with B's being happy. A therefore acts upon B to change B's 
beliefs. Because A has this power to alter B's beliefs, B is 
unaware that A exists and that A is busy altering B's beliefs. 
A deceives B.
I wonder if we can call this an instance of self-deception. If 
B had a brain tumour which caused B to have false beliefs, we 
would not call B self-deceived. The consequences of A's 
activities are perhaps like those of the brain tumour. However 
there is a difference: unlike the brain tumour, A has aims; 
the alterations to the beliefs are not random, they form a 
pattern, with the design of keeping B happy.
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The situation reminds me of a common variety of science fiction 
plot, in which extraterrestrial creatures invade from outer 
space and take up residence in people's brains, imposing their 
own aims upon the people. B is certainly imposed upon by A 
("for its own good", no doubt). A is one element of the whole 
person. A is also the element which is in charge: B is its 
helpless dupe. But A has no direct access to B's environment, 
including other people.
The role played by A in the whole person's psyche seems rather 
like the role of a parasite which has intentions. Someone who 
was controlled and deceived by a parasite would not be 
described as self-deceived; but in this case the "parasite" 
grows from within; a brain tumour also grows from within, but 
we do not call someone self-deceived if their beliefs are being 
warped by a brain tumour.
B cannot detect A. But perhaps other people can detect the 
effects of A's activity. There is a pattern in B's beliefs 
which they can detect, and they can communicate their 
recognition of the pattern to B (remember that they cannot talk 
directly to element A).
B's beliefs are now being tugged by two conflicting forces: A, 
which aims to remain concealed, and other people, who are 
pointing out the effects of A's actions So it seems possible
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that B can, momentarily at least, become indirectly aware of A. 
B can then, through perception of the whole person's behaviour, 
indirectly trace A's activity, and take steps to counteract it. 
This is assuming that A can only influence B's beliefs, and 
does not wholly control them.
If A wholly controls B's beliefs, then the theory becomes 
vulnerable to the objection that B is "mechanical", that the 
whole person can be identified with A, and therefore that the 
person is deceiving an element within himself or herself but is 
not self-deceived.
Pears has breathed new life into Schism theories with this 
suggestion. However, I wonder how much of a role the "schism" 
actually plays in the "inner agent" variety of schism theories.
The inner agent, A, exists within B. A is able to intervene in 
its environment because it is part of that environment, not 
divided off from it. So A is a part of B, but a part which is 
detectable only indirectly, through its effects. Are the 
effects sufficient justification to warrant our positing that A 
exists, and is divided from B by a schism?
A is an agent with aims. Its effects are the pattern in B's 
beliefs. B also has aims, e.g. to have true beliefs. Instead
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of proposing that any such thing as A exists, we could say 
something like this:
the whole person (the alleged self-deceiver) has a mixture 
of aims, some of which are in conflict: he wishes to be
happy, and he wishes to have true beliefs
sometimes having true beliefs is incompatible with being 
happy
he pursues the aim of having true beliefs through a 
conscious process of assessing evidence, and so on
he consciously pursues the aim of being happy, where 
possible, by acting to alter the environment
sometimes, though, there is nothing to be done by way of 
altering the environment which could avoid unhappiness: 
e.g. the things which cause the unhappiness are in the 
past, and the past cannot be altered
yet he wishes the past were different




this process can occur spontaneously, without the need to 
perform any special actions or do any special conscious 
thinking
- the process happens whenever the person does nothing to 
prevent it
- therefore there is no need to propose the existence of an 
unobservable entity, element A, which is an agent internal 
to element B; because there is a tendency for wishes to 
become beliefs, there is no need for an agent to organise 
and carry out this process: it happens spontaneously.
The seperation between the individuals involved in 
interpersonal deception does not strike me as an important part 
of the explanation of how the deception is possible: if you
and I were entirely unable to contact each other, for example, 
then neither one of us could deceive the other, no matter how 
hard we tried. So the most important part of the explanation 
in Schism theories seems to me to be the explanation of how the 
schism is overcome. And that raises the question of whether 
the schism itself has any explanatory value at all.
Yet the ability to withold information, particularly about 
one's intentions, does seem to be an important factor if 
someone is to succeed in deceiving other people. If you could
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clearly recognise my intention to deceive you, for instance, 
then you would be forewarned and forearmed against my attempt. 
This does not mean that in such circumstances one person could 
not deceive another. It is quite possible to deceive people 
after having informed them that one is going to deceive them. 
They may not take the warning seriously, so they may be 
deceived despite it. But if you were aware of my intention to 
deceive at the instant when I was engaged in it, my attempt 
would be unlikely to succeed (though it might: if you were a 
self-deceiver it might suit you to collaborate in being 
deceived by me, for example).
So how does one person deceive another? The deception can be 
achieved through their behaviour, through arrangements of 
physical objects, by fabricating evidence to "point" to a false 
conclusion. But - let us ask an apparently naive question - if 
the deception is powerful enough to convince the victim of the 
deception, why does it not convince the deceiver too?
Suppose my behaviour deceives you but it does not deceive me. 
Why not? Perhaps I have information which my behaviour does 
not disclose to you.
We can give this case a "behaviourist" twist. We can argue 
that the way I find out about myself is exactly the same way 
that you find out about me, i.e. through my behaviour, as
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directly observed by you or as reported by third parties. Then 
if my behaviour deceives you it will deceive me too. If I am 
not deceived, then (dropping our temporary conversion to 
Behaviourism) maybe it is because I have private access to my 
own thoughts which you are denied. But my thoughts may be no 
more transparent than my behaviour. They may not be any more 
"opaque" than my behaviour either. My body language may 
express my thoughts as clearly as if, every time I think, a big 
bubble appears over my head expressing my thoughts in words and 
pictures. I might still be able to deceive you, by deceiving 
myself.
Unless I have a "transparent" understanding of my own thoughts, 
unless I am incapable of being mistaken about the reasons for 
which some thoughts pass through my mind, then I can deceive 
myself by the way I think just as easily as I can deceive you 
by the way I act - perhaps even more easily. For whereas you 
have your own independent thought processes with which to 
assess my behaviour, I do not have a thought process 
independent of my thoughts. In that case self-deception might 
be explained not by divisions within the self-deceiver, but by 
the self-deceiver being too well-integrated. Total integration 
would mean the lack of an independent thought process with 
which to criticise what may seem to other people a clear case 
of self-deception. I shall pursue the claim that the self­
deceiver is "too well-integrated" in a subsequent chapter.
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Imagine a very complicated, many-headed sort of beast, 
with heads of wild and tame animals all around it, which 
it can produce and change at will ... add two other sorts 
of creature, one a lion, the other a man. And let the 
many-headed creature be by far the largest, and the lion 
the next largest ... then put the three together and 
combine them into a single creature ... then give the 
whole the external appearance of one of the three, the 
man, so that to eyes unable to see anything beneath the 
outer shell it looks like a single creature, a man. (Plato 
[1974], p416, 588 c - e)
Plato portrays the human individual as consisting of a 
collection of animals. "Plato's bestiary" is my name for this 
portrayal. He takes the most characteristic, distinguishing 
element of a human being to be "reason", and so this element is 
represented in Plato's bestiary by a man.
Plato's view is that when the beastly elements in the 
individual overwhelm the most human element, the result is 
injustice: disharmony, disorder and deception. The individual 
can take steps to prevent injustice within himself, or he can
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allow it to happen. If he allows it, the result is a loss of 
freedom; the loss of freedom is related to, but not identical 
to, a loss of responsibility. The individual loses freedom 
because what is most characteristically human about him becomes 
enslaved to what is bestial. Injustice may be the result of 
his upbringing, the kind of society in which he lives, or his 
own choice: there can be degrees of responsibility.
"Degrees of responsibility", in my reading of the text, equates 
to the degree to which injustice is self-inflicted or inflicted 
by others. If it is self-inflicted, the individual is also 
self-deceived: if it is inflicted by others, then the 
individual is deceived but not self-deceived. But unless the 
individual is a helpless victim and not a responsible agent at 
all, there will always be some degree of self-deception.
In the previous chapter I suggested that, despite what Schism 
theories say, self-deception may be better explained by 
proposing just the opposite: that the self-deceiver is too 
well-integrated. Plato offers us such a theory. The theory 
says that there is - and ought to be - a division of functions 
within a person. Self-deception arises when the person allows 
one function to encroach upon the activities which properly 
belong to another function. Plato suggests this kind of 
functional division: that people are internally divided into 
three functional parts: reason, ambition (there is no single
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word which exactly translates the word used in the text, but 
'ambition' is my preferred option) and thirdly the appetites. 
Plato claims that society is divided into three classes: 
people can be assigned to their class on the basis of which of 
the three parts is dominant in their character.
The just man will not allow the three elements which make 
up his inward self to trespass upon each other's functions 
or interfere with each other but, by keeping all three in 
tune, like the notes of a scale ... will in the truest 
sense set his house to rights, attain self-mastery and 
order, and live on good terms with himself. When he has 
bound these elements into a disciplined and harmonious 
whole and so become fully one instead of many, he will be 
ready for action of any kind (Plato [1974], p221, 443d).
Each part has characteristic aims. Reason, for example, aims 
for truth. The appetites are physical and instinctive 
cravings. Ambition aims for honour: ambition has 
characteristics such as pugnacity, enterprise and indignation, 
which are often found in conflict with unthinking impulse. 
Ambition aims to win battle honours in war, to win arguments in 
disputation, and so on.
Plato's view is that Reason should command. But it does not 
always do so. Sometimes, for example, the appetites have the
Self-Deception Page 75
Plato's Bestiary/6
upper hand. The appetites, in Plato's view, are a disorderly 
lot and not at all amenable to reason. They can be reined in 
or given their head; some of them are "unnecessary" and can be 
"killed". Some of them are necessary (i.e. you cannot kill 
them off) but you can subdue them by starving them. That is 
about all that can be done to control the appetites. If you 
indulge your appetites, however, they will grow stronger and 
plenty more of them will spring up. The appetites are in 
conflict with each other as well as with reason and ambition. 
Someone aiming to be "just", in the sense of "justice" quoted 
above, will aim to prune down the appetites until they form a 
collection which can be satisfied with the minimum amount of 
conflict.
When reason, whose proper role is the pursuit of truth, is 
subservient to the appetites, it will be engaged in such 
activities as calculating the way to maximise rewards for the 
appetites. Or ambition may be dominant, so that Reason is 
engaged in devising strategems for winning honour, whether it 
be in battles or verbal disputes, in commerce or elsewhere. 
For example, the oligarchic character,
elevates the element of desire and profit-seeking to the 
throne [where it governs like] an oriental despot with 
tiara, chain and sword ... while reason and ambition squat 
in servitude at its feet, reason [is] forbidden to make
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any calculation or inquiry but how to make more money... 
Plato [1974] p370, 553c - d
When reason is subservient to another part of the person, then, 
considerations of truth are neglected; because reason is not 
performing its proper function, the person acquires false 
beliefs. The role of reason (to command) has been usurped. 
Someone who allows this to happen, and perhaps revels in it, is 
deceiving himself.
There are some problems in this account. Plato portrays the 
role of reason as being something like the role of a 
charioteer, directing and reining in the horses when necessary 
in order to reach his objectives. But how does reason do so? 
reason has the power to reason well: but reason cannot very 
well appeal to the appetites, for example, to be reasonable; 
by definition, they are not.
Reason can hardly overwhelm the appetites by force, since force 
is one of their dominant characteristics. Fortunately there is 
the third element, ambition, which under the tutelage of reason 
can strive for excellence and which may also be strong enough 
to rein in the unruly appetites. Ambition, then, is available 
as a mediator between reason and the appetites. But how does 
reason win the sympathy of ambition? Perhaps ambition is able 
to appreciate the arguments put forward by reason; but if
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ambition is amenable to reason, that seems to indicate that 
ambition can distinguish sound arguments from unsound 
arguments. Perhaps ambition, then, is capable of reasoning on 
its own account, while the element which Plato calls reason 
might ( against the spirit of Plato's text, to be sure) be 
described as an appetite for knowledge. It looks as though the 
three elements in the soul, which are supposed to be wholly 
distinct from each other, must share each other's 
characteristics to some degree.
How is reason to prevail? Plato uses the tripartite soul to 
give a metaphor for the tripartite state. He tells us: "our 
rulers will have to employ a good deal of fiction and deceit 
for the benefit of their subjects" (Plato [1974],450 c); 
spoken falsehood can be used "as a kind of preventive medicine 
against our enemies, or when anyone we call our friend tries to 
do something wrong from madness or folly" (Plato [1974], 382c). 
So, taking the tripartite state to be a metaphor for the 
tripartite soul, I take Plato's view to be that reason is to 
prevail by using fiction and deceit to rule over the lion of 
ambition and the many-headed dragon of the appetites.
I find this fascinating. Schism theories claim that self- 
deception is due to one element within the self-deceiver 
misleading another element. Now we find Plato claiming that 
one element, reason, must "bewitch" or deceive the other
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elements in order to prevent self-deception: self-deception 
arising when the other elements prevail over reason. The other 
elements, being unable to reason, will be all the more 
vulnerable to such trickery, of course.
Yet this picture poses problems. The appetites, at least, are 
presented as being not just poor at reasoning, but wholly 
unreasoning. Therefore an attempt by reason to bewitch or 
deceive the appetites would be like someone trying to deceive 
the force of gravity, or the east wind, or an amoeba: they 
just are not the sorts of things which can be deceived. You 
cannot make the appetites think something which is false, for 
they are not thinking things. So how does reason prevail?
Lets try another tack.
Suppose a man was in charge of a large and powerful 
animal, and made a study of its moods and wants; he would 
learn when to approach and handle it, when and why it was 
especially savage or gentle, what the different noises it 
made meant, and what tone of voice to use to sooth or 
annoy it. All this he might learn by long experience and 
familiarity, and then call it a science ... but he would 
not really know which of the creatures tastes and desires 
was admirable or shameful, good or bad, right or wrong; 
he would simply use the terms on the basis of its
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reactions, calling what pleased it good, what annoyed it 
bad. He would have no rational account to give of them, 
but would call the inevitable demands of the animal's 
nature right and admirable, remaining quite blind to the 
real nature of and difference between inevitability and 
goodness, and quite unable to tell anyone else what it 
was. (Plato [1974], 493a - c).
This seems like a way in which reason might prevail over the 
appetites: reason might prevail over the appetites in the way 
a keeper prevails over an animal. But Plato immediately 
disabuses us of this notion, comparing the keeper to "the man 
who thinks that the knowledge of the passions and pleasures of 
the mass of the common people is a science": "He is going out 
of his way to make the public his master and to subject himself 
to the fatal necessity of producing only what it approves." 
(Plato [1974],493d). If reason acts as a keeper of the 
appetites then it will end up subservient to them.
Plato offers a gentler image of the tripartite soul too, an 
image which is more helpful in answering our question, "how 
does reason prevail?" Reason is compared to a shepherd, 




It would be the most dreadful disgrace for a shepherd to 
keep sheep-dogs so badly bred and trained, that 
disobedience or hunger or some bad trait or other led them 
to worry the sheep and behave more like wolves than dogs 
... we must therefore take every possible precaution to 
prevent our auxiliaries treating our citizens like that 
(Plato [1974], 416 a - b).
The "auxiliaries" in Plato's tripartite state are the 
equivalent of "ambition" in the tripartite soul.
Sheep are not easily trained, and the shepherd does not attempt 
to train them. The shepherd trains the sheepdog, which is apt 
to be trained; he uses the sheepdog to control the sheep. 
Reason can train ambition by coaxing and shaming it, 
habituating it to seek excellence.
Plato's account makes a lot of good points. One of the 
drawbacks is that it appears to require that there be three 
seperate entities or faculties, and the idea of seperate 
faculties is for good reasons not a popular one today. But 
this may be a misreading on my parts the words used by Plato 
can be translated as describing three seperate "forms". 
Anyway, the idea of the reason-ambition-appetite relation can 
be translated from the terminology of faculties into that of 
motivation / function. We could say: here are a set of
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motives, some of which can be modified by education, some of 
which can be modified by training, some of which cannot be 
modified. Intelligent responses are typically modifiable, not 
rigid. The rational motives - such as the desire for truth - 
can be swamped and overwhelmed by other motives, such as those 
of appetite and ambition. Self-deception can be the result 
when physical and instinctive cravings or the ambition for 
honour and "success" gain greater priority than the rational 
desire for truth. Since we are not suggesting that there are 
distinct faculties, we do not need to propose that the 
different faculties overwhelm or trick each other.
Plato's distinctions between the different roles which may be 
played by reason are preserved in the English language by a 
variety of expressions. Consider these expressions, which 
range from derogatory to approving: 'crafty', 'calculating', 
'skilful', 'clever', 'knowing', 'knowledgeable', 'wise'.
'Crafty' is reason in the service of Plato's class of 
craftsmen/artisans. 'Calculating' is reason serving the 
artisans or the "ambitious" guardians, the military guardians. 
'Wise' is reason serving the characteristic aims of reason; 
and so on.
In Plato's account of the tripartite soul we find one element 
deceiving others - but this situation is not the one which is
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considered to be self-deception: Plato's theory is not a 
Schism theory of self-deception. Self-deception in Plato's 
theory is a consequence of "injustice": when the three 
elements in the soul are not harmonised, and all three are 
thwarted in the pursuit of their proper aims. Injustice leads 
to self-deception and the division between the three parts (or 
three motives) is what makes the disharmony and disorder of 
injustice possible. But the division does not explain the 
self-deception. Nor does the self-deception explain the 
division. The deception arises as a result of the loss of 
freedom, it does not precede it; for, Plato maintains, "no man 
wants to be deceived in the most important part of him and 
about the most important things; that is when he is most 
terrified of falsehood" (Plato [1974], 382a). Self-deception 
occurs because reason is interfered with by the appetites and 
by ambition, the "spirited" part of the soul.
I have described Plato's account as a "tripartite theory of the 
soul", and Plato's text does often read as though there were 
three elements battling it out within the soul. We may wonder 
what place is left in this picture for the person to make a 
choice or have a preference as to the outcome of the battle. 
It seems as though only the three elements make choices or have 
preferences; but in other parts of the text we find that 
these three elements are supplemented by a fourth, as in this 
passage: "a man of sound and disciplined character, before he
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goes to sleep, has wakened his reason and given it its fill of 
intellectual argument and enquiry; his desires he has neither 
starved nor indulged, so that they sink to rest ... the third, 
spirited, part of him he calms and keeps from quarrels so that 
he sleeps with an untroubled temper" (Plato [1974], 571d - 
572a). Here there is a fourth element at work: the one which 
wakens reason, neither starves nor indulges the appetites, and 
calms the spirited part of the man. Faculty psychologists 
after the time of Plato have given this fourth element a name: 
the will. It is the will which is the executive part of the 
soul, which integrates (or divides) reason, ambition and 
appetites or which, in some accounts, replaces them.
I should add that I do not believe in these seperate faculties. 
We can gain the same benefits from Plato's account if we recast 
it in this way: instead of Plato's "three parts of the soul" 
we focus on his "three sets of motives ... knowledge, success 
or gain" (Plato [1974], 581b - c). We can divide our time and 
resource in pursuit of any one of these, any two, or all three. 
Usually our motives are mixed; sometimes our combined motives 
are incompatible with each other because it is not possible to 
achieve all of the aims together. Sometimes we can choose how 
we spend our time and resource: it is up to us. Sometimes we 
may not have the choice: perhaps we can be helplessly 
"overwhelmed" by our "appetites", for instance. At other times 
we may "give in to" physical cravings or by a desire to be
Page 84 Self-Deception
Plato's Bestiary/6
honoured although we are not "overwhelmed" by them, and may 
have second-order desires which conflict with them (e.g. an 
example of a second order desire would be the desire of a 
heroin addict not to crave heroin). Then we may "not face up 
to" what we have done: if we devoted time and effort to our 
motive to achieve success, we might feel ashamed of what we 
did; or we might feel elated. What I am getting at is that 
these are all situations in which we can try, put in effort, 
achieve, fail - they are all situations in which it makes sense 
to say that we are (to some degree) responsible for what 
happened, that we did something at will: these situations do 
not just befall us: we contribute to them, develop them, bring 
them about, and influence their outcomes. One of their 
outcomes is that we acquire, sustain, alter or shed beliefs. 
And so we are responsible for our beliefs; therefore when we 
are held responsible for having false beliefs we may be called 
self-deceivers.
One of the claims made about self-deception is that "the self­
deceiver must know what he is up to". Very possibly someone 
may know what he is up to, if he is spending time and resource 
on trying to find out what he is up to - i.e. if he is pursuing 
the aims which, according to Plato, are characteristic of 
"reason". But if he is not engaged in that branch of enquiry, 
there is no reason why he should know: indeed it is impossible 
that he could know, because there is no process going on which
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would generate that knowledge. Perhaps there ought to be such 
a process going on: and perhaps we hold the person responsible 
for not knowing because we blame them for a sort of "epistemic 
negligence". Nonetheless, the brute fact is that no such 
process occurs. The self-deceiver is up to something and is 
getting false beliefs as a result, but whatever he is up to is 
not what Plato claims is a characteristic aim of reason, namely 
the pursuit of knowledge.
So here is a situation where someone acquires false beliefs and 
we hold them responsible for doing so and where, incredulity of 
bystanders notwithstanding, he does not know that it is 
happening. He is self-deceived. But this self-deception is 
not paradoxical. There is no suggestion that the self-deceiver 
"really knows that what he believes is false", only that he 
could know, if he put his mind (and other resources) to it. He 
does not acquire the beliefs as a result of seeking truth: if 
he did then he would be merely mistaken, (a failed truth- 
seeker), not a self-deceiver (who is not seeking the truth at 
all). He has the beliefs because it suits him to have them.
I need to answer a possible objection here. The objection is 
this: it is misleading to call these beliefs, for to believe 
something is to believe that it is true. But the self-deceiver 
does not acquire the "beliefs" as a result of seeking for 
truth, therefore he cannot believe they are true.
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My reply is this: truth-seeking is not the only way to acquire 
beliefs - why suppose that it is? The supposition certainly 
makes self-deception paradoxical. It also makes the paradox
f
impossible to solve. For if the self-deceiver is responsible 
for having false beliefs, and has those false beliefs for a 
motive (because those beliefs suit him), and truth-seeking is 
the only way of acquiring beliefs, then there is no way in 
which self-deception could be achieved. If he does not seek 
truths then he will not acquire any belief and so will not 
acquire the false belief; if he does seek truths then either 
he will acquire true beliefs or he will acquire false beliefs 
but only by mistake - and a mistake is not self-deception; nor 
can he make a "deliberate mistake" in seeking truth: for then 
he would not genuinely be seeking truth, and so whatever he 
acquired would not be a genuine belief: furthermore since he 
is engaged in truth-seeking, he would know that whatever he 
acquired was a sham belief, not the genuine article.
Plato's Bestiary contains many themes which deserve more 
development, such as: (i) self-deception through neglecting to 
do something one ought to have done; (ii) mixed motives, with 
motives being linked to beliefs; (iii) mental processes, (of 
which truth-seeking is only one), generating beliefs; (iv) 
responsibility for one's beliefs, and of being able to do 
something to acquire, sustain, alter or shed one's beliefs. 
These themes are developed in the next few chapters.
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Lets indulge in a rather fanciful example. Suppose that my eye 
is glued to a telescope, so that to look at things I have to 
look through the telescope. I can alter the focus of the 
telescope, and I can move it about so as to look at different 
things; but I cannot take my eye away from the telescope. 
Suppose also that I am unable to open the other eye. So I have 
no independent means of visually checking the accuracy of the 
telescope.
In epistemology there is a tradition of questioning the 
veracity of the senses. The scenario presented is that I am 
intimately connected to my senses, as though "glued" to them. 
I cannot see independently of my eyes - just as, in the above 
example, I could not see independently of the telescope. My 
other senses may provide independent means to check the 
accuracy of vision; but I have no means independent of all the 
senses by which I may check the veracity of the senses. So 
perhaps my senses are not sources of information, but only 
serve to deceive me.
The sceptical argument about the senses can be extended. For 
the veracity of my thinking may also be put in question since,
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after all, I cannot think independently of my mind. Just as I 
can focus and move the telescope, so I can focus attention on 
some things, and direct attention away from other things. But 
it seems that I have no independent means of checking what I 
think. I can only think the things which I have the aptitude 
to think, and my mind may distort information.
We may also doubt the veracity of people's first-personal 
reports of what they think. Perhaps I can give authoritative 
reports of what I think; but my reports, though authoritative, 
may be false. If we think by using a language, then we are 
vulnerable to its faults. It may be a distorting medium, a 
generator of falsehoods.
If I am "well integrated" then I will lack an independent means 
to check the truth of what I believe. Having no means of 
checking that is external to the means we have, the most we can 
achieve is internal consistency - cosistency between the media 
at our disposal - thinking, the senses, language. Within this 
limit, though, we have considerable room for manouvre. We do 
not know the limits of what we are able to think. Our theories 
are always vulnerable to the arrival of new and better theories 
which may replace them.
By trying out a different theory, we gain another means of 
checking the theories we have. If the theory is better (e.g.
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it provides more internal consistency) then we may swop to 
using that theory permanently - or until it is challenged by 
yet another new and better theory.
We are not compelled to try out new theories. We may confine 
ourselves to the theories we know and love. We will not then 
suffer the "schism", the inner conflict, of having two ways of 
thinking, neither of which is consistent with the other.
We do not know what a new theory has to offer until we try it, 
if only to the extent of "entertaining the idea" that it may be 
true. If we do not try it, then we do not suffer any schism: 
we remain "well integrated". But we may be denying ourselves 
benefits which the new theory could give us. In particular, we 
may be denying ourselves truths - deceiving ourselves.
The scenario which I am constructing here is one in which self- 
deception is due not to schism but to being "too well 
integrated". The example I gave, namely of refusing to 
entertain a new theory, is a conservative variety of self- 
deception: bigotry. The bigot's motto might be:
I do not know, and I do not care to know.
There is a sense in which the bigot can accept this motto, and 
a sense in which he cannot. The former sense is:
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I do not know about this theory, and I do not care to know 
about it.
The latter sense is:
I do not know because I do not use the theory: I deny
myself the means to knowledge.
The bigot cannot accept this because he would deny that the 
theory is a means to knowledge.
A less conservative self-deceiver might use the theory in order 
to put his or her old theory in doubt: now he has two ways of 
thinking, inconsistent with each other, both susceptible to 
sceptical attack. Since apparently neither theory is better 
than the other, he has the benefit of being able to pick and 
choose between them, using now one, now the other, at will.
This looks like a schism, but he is not divided: he is playing 
different roles in turn, "vacillating", and he does this as a 
coherent strategy. I think that this is a form of self- 
deception. He takes care not to create a decisive
confrontation between the theories, so that he preserves the 
freedom to pick and choose. He neglects to do what scientists 
often try to do: find an experiment, a test case, which will
decisively refute one or other of the contending theories.
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There is another kind of opportunity for self-deception, too. 
He may "leap" into the new theory, that is, abandon the old 
theory and start using the new theory forever more. He does 
not bring about a decisive confrontation between the two 
theories. He is now a "bigot" who believes the new theory. He 
knows all about the old theory, having used it in the recent 
past. But he does not use it now.
Like someone who possesses a telescope but does not use it, he 
is deprived of the information it could have provided. This 
seems to me an instance of self-deception. Even if the new 
belief is true, it was not obtained in a truth-regarding way. 
The means used to arrive at the new theory were deceptive.
In a later chapter I discuss what "leaping to conclusions" 
comprises. For now I want to follow up the characterisation of 
the "bigot" who, instead of being "open-minded", has a "closed" 
mind.
He may be prepared to discuss other points of view, but always 
from the unchanging perspective he already has. He never 
adopts another point of view, not even provisionally, as an 
experiment. He can never be persuaded of what he never thinks, 
and since he never tries out a new theory, he never thinks it.
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Adopting another point of view (even provisionally) requires us 
to make some suppositions. "But why," the bigot may ask, 
"should I suppose something which I do not believe? Why should 
I pretend that something is true when I do not believe that it 
is? Isn't that the way one slips into self-deception?"
Why pretend? The answer, as I shall argue in later chapters, 
is that without such "pretences" we cannot acquire beliefs at 
all. The bigot has forgotten (or chooses not to recall or to 
hypothesise) that the beliefs he has were to begin with 
constructed by making suppositions, "leaping to conclusions", 
and using them as if they were beliefs. If he has made 
suppositions in the past - in order to try them out, in order 
to acquire beliefs - what is the justification for refusing to 
make suppositions again? One reason for refusing to do so is 
that he is happy with the beliefs he has; but this reason, 
which explains the refusal, does not, in my view, justify it.
Perhaps he believes despite strong evidence against the 
beliefs. Consider how he might assess the evidence (I am 
assuming that he does not simply ignore it). He constructs a 
logical derivation taking the beliefs and the evidence as 
assumptions. He derives a contradiction. By reductio ad 
absurdem he is entitled to reject one or more of the 




The evidence may be obviously true (to other people). What is 
obvious to him is that it is inconsistent with his beliefs. So 
(to him) the evidence is obviously false. He may or may not 
construct an explanation of why the evidence is false. If he 
does, the explanation will be consistent with the beliefs.
Hence the bigot's beliefs are unshakeable. For he never 
engages in the activities which could shake them. This is not 
a case of failing to indulge in critical enquiry. He does so - 
after a fashion. He constructs logical arguments in which the 
evidence is refuted and the beliefs are sustained. He does not 
engage in critical activity in a way which could put those 
beliefs at risk.
However there are other ways in which the beliefs may be 
shaken. They may fail to work well to achieve what the bigot 
wants. A crisis then ensues in which the bigot's strong 
attachment to the beliefs is jeopardised by an equally strong 
attachment to the things he wants to achieve. In these 
circumstances the bigot's self-deception may be destroyed 
because the motivation for it is destroyed.
I have implied that there is an activity which can "shake" 
beliefs. I also hinted that this activity involves an 
imaginative leap: we have to make suppositions: suppositions
Page 94 Self-Deception
Too Well Integrated/7
which need not be counterfactual, but which may contradict our 
beliefs.
Making an imaginative leap is something we can do at will - or 
fail to do, at will. So the construction of beliefs can be a 
directly voluntary activity, and not just "indirectly 
voluntary" as some people (e.g. Audi [1982]) have suggested.
This does not mean that we are totally free to "leap". There 
may be limits to what we are capable of imagining. There may 
be horrible threats as to what may happen to us if we do leap - 
or if we refuse to leap. We may perceive that the leap tends 
towards beliefs which would cause us pain or grief. If we leap 
to a false belief, and act upon it, it could kill us - though 
not as invariably as epistemologists sometimes suggest.
Preserving one's integrity - the unity within oneself - may be 
less valuable than it is often claimed to be. Intellectual 
honesty may lead to deep inner conflicts, the disintegration of 
the much-vaunted "well-integrated" personality. The result may 
be a more genuine understanding of oneself and the world. A 
failure to avow the activities in which one is engaged may be a 
phase in a movement towards authenticity and not, as Pingarette 
[1969] and others have suggested, self-deception.
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To hesitate in the divided, conflict-ridden phase of this move 
need not be self-deceptive. One may be genuinely unsure of 
what to do - perhaps of what one should do. It may take time 
to summon up the courage to "leap": one's sense of one's 
identity may be at risk. The duration of the phase, and its 
direction (towards a leap or away from it) may be important 
factors to consider, when we try to assess what is going on.
I do not wish to give the impression that self-deception 
consists of a failure to make imaginative leaps. Someone may 
hop from one theory to another in order to avoid a persistent 
suspicion which pursues them, or perhaps in order to evade a 
belief which a combination of circumstances and motives will 
make inescapable if he ever settles down. For just this 
reason, the refusal to leap may be the "authentic" thing to do: 
to "dig in" and wait for an understanding to develop. Our 
strategies for thinking are complicated and adaptable. Each 
case has to be assessed on its own merits. There is no limit 
in principle to what the assessment needs to take into account. 
In this respect a discussion of our cognitive activities is 
like the moral evaluation of actions. We cannot rule out the 
possibility that the situation may be re-described, or that 
more detail may be added to the description, in a way which 
completely alters our assessment.
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Dissociation theories start from the premise that the self­
deceiver knows, suspects, or has a true belief about, what he 
is doing, and / or the thing that he is deceived about.
They aim to explain how he can nonetheless be self-deceived. 
To do so, they claim that his knowledge, suspicion or true 
belief is, in some way, disconnected from his actions, 
emotions, or other beliefs, which, therefore, it cannot 
influence. It is, though, connected to wishes or desires, for 
the self-deceiver (according to dissociation theories) knows 
(or believes, or suspects) but does not wish to know (or 
believe, or suspect). The knowledge, suspicion or true belief 
is disconnected and something else is put in its place. This 
is the deception which the self-deceiver practices upon 
himself.
For brevity I will talk about "true beliefs" rather than the 
full (and longwinded) "knowledge, suspicion, or true beliefs". 
This will limit my remarks to one variety of dissociation 
theory; but the remarks can be extended with ease to the 
varieties of dissociation theories which talk about knowledge 
or suspicion rather than about true belief.
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Dissociation theories disagree about what is disconnected from 
what. Some of the proposals offered are:
knowledge that p is disconnected from belief that p (where 
'p' is our identifier of what is known, believed, etc)
belief that p is disconnected from thinking that p
- belief that p is disconnected from (some) actions or 
emotions
thinking that p is disconnected from (some) actions or 
emotions.
These suggestions may all be complementary. They may describe 
different varieties of self-deception with disconnection as 
their common theme, and differing with respect to the point at 
which the disconnection occurs. However, it is perhaps 
suggestive that the later proposals in my list seem to be 
developed in response to criticisms which aimed to show that 
the proposals earlier in the list were untenable.
An objection to Dissociation theories is that they do not 
explain (or do not explain satisfactorily) how someone makes 
such a disconnection. For example, one suggestion (Bach 
[1981]) is that by focussing attention and other strategies for
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directing awareness, one may "think" what one does not believe. 
The "telescope" analogy seems especially apt here. Focussing 
the telescope on something nearby makes distant things out of 
focus, and vice versa. One may direct the "telescope" of 
attention towards one thing, so that all others are outside or 
peripheral to one's field of vision, "out of focus".
Focussing attention is something we all do: it seems eminently 
familiar. The metaphor is so apt - too apt, perhaps? Why did 
that particular metaphor spring so readily to mind? Is it 
perhaps because the telescope metaphor is one which we already 
presupposed, the model we habitually use when we think about 
how we think? So is it not possible, even likely, that what 
actually happens is that, because we use this particular model 
to understand thinking, we actually make it come true, shaping 
our thinking to live up to (or down to) the expectations which 
the metaphor itself created. If so, then explaining self- 
deception by this illuminating metaphor is simply finding the 
evidence we planted in the first place. The metaphor of the 
telescope seems to fit so well because we presuppose it every 
time we think about ourselves: we use it in order to 
understand (perhaps to misunderstand) ourselves. This does not 
establish that it is true. Every time it does not fit we will 
discover a strange "failure" of consciousness - which is better 
described as a failure of the metaphor to fit consciousness.
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Suppose we play along with the metaphor for a little longer. 
Focussing attention seems less familiar and easy to understand 
in the case of self-deception than it is in other cases. For 
in the case of self-deception, one is focussing upon something 
with the aim of not focussing upon something else which is, 
nonetheless, having to do the work of guiding your strategy of 
focussed attention. Ignoring something is quite unlike being 
ignorant of it. You need to be especially aware of something 
in order to ignore it. It seems as though the thing one 
ignores must still be "playing upon one's mind". If it is so 
important, then it may prevent you attending properly to the 
things you are focussing upon. Still, it might be possible to 
deceive oneself this way. If something is "playing upon one's 
mind", in the circumstances described it would do so in an 
"unfocussed" way.
Self-deceivers, under this description, will have a distracted 
air, indicating that there is something on their minds. The 
distracted air may be one of the things which alerts us to the 
delicate balancing act by which they achieve self-deception.
I have tried to defend Dissociation theories as persuasively as 
I can. Now I want to say what I think is wrong with them.
1. Firstly, Dissociation theories seem to describe some 
varieties of self-deception but not others. For instance, they 
do not describe the brash self-deception of a bigot who is
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ready to take on the world with unshakeable conviction. There 
is nothing fragile or delicate about the bigot's performance, 
yet I would say that it qualifies for the title of self- 
deception. For the bigot clings to his belief regardless of 
whether it is true or false, right or wrong (although, of 
course, he believes it is true and right, not false and wrong).
2. The description seems incomplete. It does not tell us what 
the self-deceiver puts in place of the disconnected belief, or 
how he does the disconnection. We need an account of this too 
- which I suggest will be in terms of what role the self­
deceiver adopts (Role theories) or an attitude or theory which 
he adopts (Radical Interpretation theories).
3. Dissociation theories explain self-deception by assimilation 
to something familiar, such as focussing attention. But the 
penalty for doing so is that instead of self-deception becoming 
less puzzling, the familiar activity may become mysterious. 
How do we do it - and do we do it? The explanation could not 
fail to fit, because it is the filter through which the data is 
strained before we become aware of it. We "focus attention" - 
but how do we do that? "Focussing attention", in order to 
ignore something, seems to me a form of pretence - "pretending 
that it isn't there" - so that the plausibility of dissociation 
theories arises from their tacit allusion to a different kind 
of theory: Role theories, which I discuss in a later chapter.
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4. The theories do not show that the belief is sufficiently 
disconnected to avoid the paradoxes of self-deception. For 
example, the belief is connected to a wish or desire 
(otherwise, what motivates the self-deception!), and the wish 
or desire is connected to the "thinking" - the process of 
focussing or directing attention onto chosen objects (it must 
be, in order to guide the self-deceiver's strategy). The 
belief is supposed to be disconnected from the thinking (or: 
disconnected from what we think - I doubt that the distinction 
makes much difference in this context); yet what I have just 
described is not so much a disconnection as a puzzling 
connection between the belief and the "thinking", mediated by 
wishes or desires.
In this case, it may be more parsimonious - and adequate - to 
give up the claim that there are cases of self-deception, and 
instead describe them as cases of wishful thinking - as Elster 
suggests (Elster [1979], p27).
However, we might prefer to classify wishful thinking as a 
special variety of self-deception. What happens in wishful 
thinking? A desire suppresses (or represses) the unwelcome 
true belief and becomes manifest in the desired false or 
inauthentic thinking, action, emotion, etc.
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This description of wishful thinking needs more elaboration: 
is wishful thinking something one does consciously or 
unconsciously? In other words, does the "wishful thinker" know 
what he is up to, or not?
Suppose that someone, S, consciously satisfies a wish by (to 
borrow Freud's terminology) "hallucinatory wish fulfilment". 
Suppose that he knows the resulting belief is false: then the 
self-deception paradox appears again within the description of 
wishful thinking.
Suppose then that S unconsciously satisfies the wish by 
"hallucinatory wish fulfilment". In this case there is a false 
belief but no self-deception, unless we can find some way to 
hold S responsible for the wish-fulfilment. For unless S is 
responsible, then he is deceived but not self-deceived. Yet in 
that case, the alleged example was not a candidate for the 
description ' self-deceived' in the first place, I.e. Elster 
would be knocking over a straw man. If we do hold S 
responsible, then:
- either we have a case of self-deception by negligence (see 
the chapter on Negligence theories) because he could have 




- or we have a case of self-deception by radical 
interpretation (see the chapter on Radical Interpretation 
theories) because S does something in order to be 
deceived: he constructs a belief.
Wishful thinking can be as paradoxical as self-deception. If 
we accept Elster's proposal and make wishful thinking distinct 
from self-deception, by definition, then we will have 
"paradoxes of wishful thinking", in place of (or in addition 
to) the paradoxes of self-deception. These paradoxes of 
wishful thinking will need to be solved - probably by the same 
means as the paradoxes of self-deception. For when we explain 
alleged cases of self-deception as "wishful thinking", the 
explanation inherits a paradox which formerly arose in 
descriptions of self-deception.
Elster can be defended by pointing out that the paradox does
not arise in a description of wishful thinking unless we
introduce the (surely gratuitous) claim that the person who
indulges in wishful thinking must have a (masked, veiled, or
disconnected) true belief which is inconsistent with the
wishful one. But, as I shall argue when I come to discuss Not- 




Disconnection theories capture the intuition that the self­
deceiver thinks that p because he believes that not-p. This 
suggests to me that there might be a sort of controlling 
hierarchy within a person, with a high-level wish and high- 
level true belief guiding a strategy of self-deception. The 
idea here would be that self-deception can work because one's 
consciousness of oneself and others always exists at a low 
level in the hierarchy: that one never knows what the higher 
levels in the hierarchy are doing (though one may be able to 
make educated guesses from their manifestations in behaviour). 
Conscious beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on, would always 
be the lowest and least significant level: they would be 
manufactured by the activity of the unconscious ones. But 
this, of course, is pure speculation, not grounded in any kind 
of empirical testing. I leave it to psychologists to sort this 
sort of question out.
The gist of Dissociation theories is that they tell us the 
self-deceiver believes (knows, suspects) that p but acts as if, 
thinks as if, feels as if, he believes that not-p.
They say that this can be explained as a disconnection. But, I 
have argued, it seems more like a strange connection than a 
disconnection. How is it achieved? The activities mentioned 
(focussing attention, etc) seem more like tactics than 
strategies. So what is the unifying strategy which integrates
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all the tactics into the overall project of self-deception? 
The "disconnection" seems to play only a very minor explanatory 
role, and the major part of explaining self-deception will 
occur not in describing the disconnection, but the things the 
self-deceiver does in order to put something else in place of 
the "disconnected" belief. One wonders if the disconnection 
may not be a symptom of self-deception rather than a cause - if 
it occurs at all; and who is to say that it does?
The dissociation occurs when the self-deceiver fails to use the 
belief he has. He does not use it to guide action, or to 
interpret data, and he "steels" emotions in order not to feel 
the emotions which the belief evokes.
However, if we describe self-deception in this way, there is a 
problem. The problem is that either the belief is redundant 
(it performs no detectable function, so there seems little 
reason to propose that it exists), or the self-deceiver's 
actions, feelings, and interpretations are explained by 
proposing that the belief motivates or in some way influences 
them. If the latter is the case, then the belief is not 
disconnected but connected, in a strange way, to actions, 
feelings and interpretations. In that case it seems that the 
self-deceiver is not really deceived, since he has the belief.
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We may prefer to describe self-deception by using an option 
different from Dissociation theories. We could argue that the 
self-deceiver does not have the "unwelcome belief". He may 
have an unwelcome item of information but he does not believe 
it. The self-deceiver uses actions, interpretations and 
emotions in order not to have the unwelcome belief.
At this point I might as well cement together two ways of 
talking about self-deception, both of which crop up 
independently in discussions of self-deception. Sometimes 
self-deception is described as avoiding an unwelcome belief 
(which the description usually also characterises as true), and 
sometimes it is described as aiming at a favoured belief (which 
the description usually characterises as false). These two 
descriptions are compatible and seem to me to belong together: 
the self-deceiver aims for a favoured belief in order to avoid 
an unwelcome belief; he avoids an unwelcome belief because he 
aims to have the favoured belief.
Sometimes we use theories which we do not believe as 
"instruments" to achieve some aim. Usually these instruments 
do not interfere with our beliefs; usually the use of the 
instrumental theories is guided by the beliefs. However, an 
instrumental theory might contradict the belief which guides 
it; and using the theory might "mask" the belief by preventing
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the user from being conscious of the belief. So this seems 
like a way in which one might be self-deceived.
This scenario can be illustrated with an example. Take some of 
the examples which are common in the literature about self- 
deception, and let us test them against this proposal. Bear in 
mind my claim, made in the chapter about examples, that 
descriptions of self-deception incorporate theories about self- 
deception. One must therefore treat the examples with caution.
1. Suppose that Mr Dread has evidence that his son is a 
criminal. However he invents a different interpretation of the 
evidence and thereby avoids the painful consciousness of the 
son's criminal activity. But this seems to be an example of 
someone avoiding a belief rather than being deceived despite 
having the belief. He may originally have interpreted the 
evidence in such a way as to gain the information that his son 
is a criminal. But he does not believe it. We all have plenty 
of items of information which we acquired by forming 
interpretations, but which we do not believe. We may well know 
that, for example, the British economy is coming out of 
recession, according to the Chancellor of the Exchequer; but 
we may not believe it. Having done the interpretation does not 
guarantee that we believe the result. Mr Dread did the 
interpretation but did not believe the result; not liking the 
result, he found some other interpretation instead. So, I
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suggest, this is not an example of someone being self-deceived 
despite having a true belief.
2. Another example is an instance of "protesting too much". 
Mrs Dread thinks (and says) that her son is not a criminal in 
order to avoid thinking what she really believes, i.e. that he 
is a criminal. She apparently needs to argue the case 
constantly, even when no-one else raises the issue. It seems 
that her arguments are not defences against what other people 
say or think, but against her own belief, against which she is 
desperately fighting.
However, surely denial is not, in most cases, evidence of 
belief: if Mrs Dread denies that her son is a criminal, that 
is surely evidence that she does not believe it. "Protesting 
too much" is a sign of being aware of an interpretation which 
one is refusing to believe (or which one does not want others 
to believe).
Once again, I suggest, we do not need to propose that the self­
deceiver believes that her son is a criminal (assuming that Mrs 
Dread is self-deceived). She can be re-described as preventing 
or deferring the belief rather than having an unwelcome belief 
and "masking" it. This is the "shaving paradox" again: 
shaving is a way of preventing unwanted surplus hair; one does
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not need to preserve a beard, for example, in order to motivate 
the act of shaving.
3. The self-deceiver may have a belief which circumstances 
later make unwelcome. For example, a doctor may believe that 
an x-ray photograph which shows a shadow on her patient's lung 
is evidence that the patient has cancer. Later on she 
discovers that the x-ray photograph is of her own lung. But 
the conclusion, "I have cancer" is unwelcome; so she starts to 
deny that the x-ray photograph provides evidence of cancer. In 
addition she may use her medical knowledge to guide her self- 
deception, pre-empting other evidence that she has cancer ("the 
only reason I have a low white blood cell count is because I 
had a few stiff whiskies before having the blood test," she 
argues, while arranging to be too busy to have the blood test 
again).
The doctor not only has the knowledge which undermines the 
self-deception, she even uses it to protect the self-deception 
from refutation. However, one may use an interpretation which 
one does not believe, in order to pre-empt arguments with which 
one does not agree. I am told that during the Second World War 
the British Ministry of Defence used astrologers to predict 
what Hitler was planning to do next - not because people at the 
Ministry of Defence believed in astrology, but because Hitler 
did. In the same way, we can argue, the doctor uses the
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medical knowledge not because she believes it, but as an 
instrument, because it enables her to predict and disarm 
arguments against her own belief that she is perfectly healthy. 
Yet, she used to believe the arguments which she now denies: 
does she not still believe them, deep down, even though she is 
not admitting it to herself?
If this example is plausible then perhaps we have found an 
instance of self-deception which incorporates the "unwelcome 
belief" it sets out to deny. Notice, though, that in this case 
the medical knowledge is actually a complicating factor in our 
description of the self-deception: someone who had less 
medical knowledge might have found it much easier to be self- 
deceived about their state of health - "doctors? What do they 
know about it?" - for the doctor has access to a more detailed 
and systematic body of (unwelcome) knowledge. So, I argue, the 
"unwelcome belief" is not an essential part of self-deception, 
but a complicating factor. It can be accommodated within the 
account of self-deception which I am going to propose later on.
4. My last example is the case of the bureaucrat's in-tray. 
Suppose a high-ranking civil servant sees a document in his in- 
tray, labelled in bold letters: 'Evidence Of Corruption In The 
Civil Service'. This is unwelcome news to him, and he makes 
sure that he does not read it. But if he does not read it he 
cannot find out whether or not the document concludes, "we
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could find no evidence of corruption". Let us suppose, he 
avoids reading the document because he knows what it will say 
and cannot refute it: "deep down" he knows already that the 
document is not going to vindicate the civil service, but he 
does not want to think about it; if he did, he might have to 
do something about it. The very thought of having to do 
something about it arouses most unpleasant emotions, so he 
prefers to leave the subject of corruption hypothetical and not 
enquire into it too closely. He avoids disturbing the 
interpretation he currently uses ("everything is above board") 
and, however strongly he suspects, or even knows the truth, he 
avoids "the glaring truth".
I provisionally accept this example which supports the claims 
of Dissociation theories, in order to see where it leads us. 
The question is, what does the bureaucrat do instead of using 
the unwelcome belief (or suspicion, or knowledge) directly?
How is the disconnection done? He uses his belief (or
suspicion, or knowledge) in order to guide another
interpretation. a pretence. To pursue this element of self-
deception we need to supplement the Dissociation theory with a 
theory about pretence (a Role theory) and a theory about 
interpretation (a Radical Interpretation theory).
Dissociation theories are an advance upon Schism theories. 
They do at least offer some explanation of the connection
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between the two sides of the "schism". I suggested that there 
must be such a connection. I suggested that the connection 
could be explained as the mediation of a desire: an unwelcome 
belief, plus the desire which makes it unwelcome, leads the 
self-deceiver to use a different interpretation, a pretence. 
This is not a disconnection but a "strange connection".
Role theories offer an advance beyond Dissociation theories by 
emphasising this element of pretence which, I suggested, is 
needed in order to give Dissociation theories their 
plausibility. Role theories also allow us to spell out in a 
bit more detail the theme that the self-deceiver is "too well 
integrated". The self-deceiver is too well integrated because 
he never steps out of the role he has adopted, and so he can 
never engage in the interpretations which might make that role 
untenable. The role "masks" those other interpretations and 
the conclusions to which they lead.
Role theories promise to explain what the self-deceiver puts in 
place of the "disconnected" belief. They also mesh precisely 
with the description which Dissociation theories virtually 
force upon us: the self-deceiver acts as if, thinks as if, 
feels as if, such-and-such is true. Simulation and 
dissimulation ("as if") are at the heart of Role theories. The 
next several chapters set the scene for a discussion of Role 
theories.
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There are two distinct sorts of thing both of which can be 
referred to by the word 'evidence'. This could be confusing 
since I want to talk about both of them; so to avoid confusion 
I shall reserve the word 'evidence' for one of them and use the 
word 'data' for the other.
I distinguish data from evidence, as follows. Evidence is 
"that which makes evident"; data is the raw material from 
which we can get evidence by a process of interpretation.
Below I give two examples to illustrate my use of the words 
'data' and 'evidence'. The first example comes from the data 
processing industry, from which I derive my use of the word 
'data'. The second example is taken from the law courts, where 
the use of evidence is so important.
First Example
A gas company stores its computerised account records on 
magnetic tapes. However nobody at the gas company can read the 
tapes just by looking at them. In order to retrieve the stored
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records, the tape must be loaded into a computer, and a 
computer program must be used to translate the records into a 
form that someone can read. The patterns of magnetism on the 
tape are, in the company's view, uninterpreted data. The 
program is used to convert the data into information. But 
until someone reads the information, it does not inform 
anybody.
So the program is used, lets say to produce a gas bill for 
sixty pounds. The gas bill is sent out to a customer. Seven 
days later the customer's reply is received. He disputes the 
bill, claiming it is too high.
The people at the gas company are perplexed. How can the 
customer dispute the amount owing, when he has the evidence, 
namely, the gas bill. They suppose the reply must be due to 
wishful thinking on the part of the customer.
"Evidence" (that which makes evident) is relative to its 
intended audience - it is that which makes something evident to 
somebody. The gas bill was written in English (the sort of 
English used by gas companies). The customer did not 
understand it, mainly because he speaks Portuguese and not 
English. For him, the bill was uninterpreted data. He could 
interpret it sufficiently to recognise that it was a bill, 
however, and he found an interpreter to translate it. The
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translation did not make it evident to him that he owed the 
gas company sixty pounds. What it makes evident to him is that 
the gas company has made a mistake - or something worse than a 
mistake, an attempted deception. For he has been reading his 
gas meter, and calculates that he only owes twenty pounds.
Had he used the same interpretation as the gas company, then he 
would have arrived at their conclusion, namely that he owes 
sixty pounds. It would have been evident, but it would have 
been false.
The people at the gas company have forgotten that their 
evidence is fabricated. Normally to say that evidence is 
fabricated means that it is counterfeit, "planted" evidence. 
That is not what I mean. It refers to what I would call 
"planted" data. In my sense of 'evidence', all evidence is 
fabricated, i.e. constructed. The gas company's evidence is 
constructed from stored data by programmed computers. They 
have not questioned the construction process. There might be a 
fault in the computer program, for instance. There may be more 
than one program, more than one way of interpreting the data. 
They may be using the wrong interpretation. Let's suppose they 
are. If they had retrieved their information using a different 
program, they would have noticed that the bill was only 
estimated: the customer's meter was never read. In this case
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the data was "fabricated" or "planted": lacking a meter
reading, they substituted an estimate in its place.
There are several lessons to be drawn from this example:
a. evidence is constructed by a process of interpretation
b. evidence is relative to an audience, and in particular to 
the process that audience uses to construct the evidence
c. evidence is constructed from data
d. uninterpreted data does not make anything evident
e. what counts as data is relative to a process of
interpretation. So, for example, the gas bill was the 
result of the gas company's interpretation of their data: 
for the company, the gas bill is evidence. But to the 
customer it is uninterpreted data until he interprets it 
(or, in this case, finds an interpreter to translate it 
for him: he must then interpret what the interpreter
says, in order to arrive at some evidence). Evidence from 
one process may be data for another process.
Given points a through e, it is easy to understand how a self­
deceiver might fail to be convinced by "the evidence". For he 
may not do the interpreting that others do. If no processing 
takes place, then no evidence is produced. If different 
processing takes place, then the resulting evidence may be 
different too, making different things evident (e.g. that the
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gas company has made a mistake, instead of "I owe sixty 
pounds").
Since evidence (in my sense of evidence) is constructed, we may 
choose not to construct it, or to construct different evidence 
out of the same data.
Second Example
A criminal case is being heard before a court of law. The 
court usher places exhibit A on a table before the jury. The 
jurors look at exhibit A, which appears to them to be an 
ordinary house brick. The exhibit is "brought in evidence", 
but as yet they do not know what it is supposed to make 
evident. For them, its role in the case is unfathomable: it 
is uninterpreted data.
The data becomes connected with evidence by virtue of its role 
in the process of interpretation. The prosecution brings 
witnesses to give evidence. They tell a story about the brick: 
they claim that the defendant used the brick to break a 
jeweller's window, so as to steal jewelry.
Is there now evident that the defendant is guilty? I suggested 
that the witnesses gave evidence: perhaps it is better to say 
that they testified. For next the witnesses for the defence
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come along and tell a different story. According to this 
story, the witnesses for the prosecution were seen to break the 
window and then hand the brick to the defendant, before 
arresting him as a thief. The defence lawyer points out 
inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. 
The defence lawyer is using the testimony of the prosecution 
witnesses as data, not as evidence. He interprets it as false 
evidence, and what it makes evident is not what the prosecution 
claims. The same data, interpreted in different ways, leads to 
different conclusions.
I use the word 'interpretation' to refer to (a) a process, and 
(b) the products of that process. Evidence is such a product. 
The process is one by which data is used to construct evidence 
and by which "conclusions" are "drawn from" evidence. I put 
these expressions in scare quotes because I think that it is 
misleading to call these items "conclusions" as though they 
always came at the end of the process, and it is a mistake to 
suppose that the items are always or even often derived from 
the evidence.
Evidence is constructed, not found. Data is found, not 
constructed. There is always an element of invention in the 
construction of evidence: the invention may be justified - for 
example, when we tell a story about something, and the story 
turns out to be true. There is also an element of risk: the
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story may turn out to be false, so that we become aware that 
the story was an invention, a fabrication. We may say that the 
evidence was misleading; data cannot mislead, for it cannot 
"lead" either. We construct our true stories in just the same 
way as our false stories, so clearly they are inventions also: 
inventions which happen to be true.
By testing the story we may be able to show that it is false. 
We cannot show that it is false without putting it to the test.
The process by which evidence is constructed may be altered by 
our choices. The process cannot be performed if resources are 
not available for it: time, effort, data, for example. If we 
do not find time to think about the data, if we do not make the 
effort to do so, or if we do not find the data to begin with, 
the process cannot take place. If the process does not take 
place, the evidence is not produced. Without the evidence, 
nothing is made evident. If nothing is made evident, there is 
nothing available to believe. The evidence cannot "force us to 
conclusions" if it does not exist.
If the process is performed, then it may be starved of 
resources: we may not be able to think long and hard enough 
and well enough, if we are tired, ill, harassed, emotionally 
distraught, and so on. And sometimes it may suit us to become 
emotionally distraught about some topics - those where we do
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not wish to think through to the conclusions. We know in 
advance how to guide the process since, far from concluding the 
process, or being "concluded" from evidence, the "conclusions" 
are often the start of it - as I shall argue below.
If the process is distressing - producing ideas that we find 
hateful, for instance - then it may take great efforts to carry 
on with it. We may "face up to it" or "give in to it" - both 
expressions indicating that such processes do not take place 
wholly involuntarily, even if they are not wholly voluntary 
either.
We may also perform the process negligently: failing to apply 
epistemic norms: thinking "sloppily"; and so on.
The process may be altered by our aims and wishes: as I
suggested above, the process is an exercise in story-telling, 
which is at least partly voluntary.
Data cannot force us to conclusions, for uninterpreted data is 
not evidence: it does not make anything evident.
Interpretations of data - evidence - cannot coerce us into 
believing anything, because all evidence is a product of one or 
another process of manufacture: and since this process is
likely to take time, effort, patience, ingenuity,
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resourcefulness, commitment, endurance, and so on, it is 
something we can make choices about: to do it or not. Since 
the process may also involve us in great anguish or great 
pleasure, it may take lots of willpower to pursue it, or to 
desist. We may need to "face up to it" or try not to "give in 
to it"; this kind of venture is quite unlike the mechanical 
sequence of events which is called to mind when we are told 
that evidence is "compelling", that it "forces us to 
conclusions", "inclines the judgement" to one side or the other 
of an argument, and so on. I have more to say about these 
metaphors, later on.
Does anything compel us to choose one such process rather than 
another? We may fall victim to force of habit; we may be more 
or less addicted to one particular process; but in principle 
and often in practice we can choose. Sartre considered "bad 
faith" to be a refusal or denial of a vertiginous freedom which 
brooks no denial and allows no refusal; and bad faith has a 
lot in common with self-deception, if it is not identical to 
it. We draw back from the ways of interpreting of which we 
disapprove because it is too easy to become enmeshed in them. 
Thinkers in the Western liberal tradition do not as a rule wish 
to be open-minded about Nazism, for example: do not wish to 
understand what it would be like to hold those views, because 
to be open-minded is to be open to persuasion; understanding 
is only a step away from sympathetic understanding, which is
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only a step away from collusion, collaboration, fellow- 
travelling, and eventually participation. We do not wish to 
picture what it would be like for us to share the views we 
despise, for that comes uncomfortably close to seeing if the 
cap fits, becoming what we pictured ourselves being.
"See it from my point of view" says the recruiter; but to do 
so is sometimes to be lost. To see it from that point of view 
is to think with those patterns, to make those things obvious, 
to become immersed in it, with the possibility that we may 
never detach ourselves from the process for long enough to make 
a decision to escape it or not.
Once we take notice of the construction of evidence, we can see 
similarities between self-deception (by which one makes 
something which is false seem obvious to oneself), and some 
kinds of (not self-deceptive) innovative enquiry. If evidence 
were coercive in a way which prevented self-deception, then it 
would also prevent these (very valuable) kinds of enquiry.
Radical innovators in enquiry can face problems similar to 
those of a radical self-deceiver. It is worth noting some of 
the similarities.
By "radical innovation in enquiry" I mean such things as the 
production of hypotheses which are wildly at odds with those
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currently accepted, the well-established hypotheses which are 
widely used and familiar, and which are taken to be 
commonsensical and perhaps even indisputable. The radical 
innovator disputes them nonetheless.
Ways of thinking become habitual as they become established; 
habitual ways are also likely to be easy ways, which makes 
their results (the "conclusions arrived at") seem obvious since 
so little effort is needed to arrive at them.
Breaking established habits of thought can be difficult, 
needing plenty of effort, endurance and imagination; when we 
do break them, the results of a new way of thinking are likely 
to seem implausible because they are counter-intuitive. This 
should be no surprise since the intuitions are formed by the 
established ways of thinking.
There will be very little evidence available to "support" the 
new hypothesis, because the available evidence was produced by 
interpretations of data generated by the established ways of 
thinking. These interpretations of data may have been created 
by generations of people all working within the established 
ways of thinking. No similar amount of work has been done 
using the new approach; the amount of work which might have to 
be cast away or done all over again may be daunting.
Page 124 Self-Deception
Data Is Not Evidence/9
The established ways of thinking will also be closely woven 
into established ways of doing things: a wholesale change is 
impossible and a piecemeal approach will lead to constant 
conflicts with "unreformed" ways of doing things; the 
inevitability of such conflicts will mean that inconsistencies 
will be sustained for a very long time.
For the innovative enquirer, it will be easy to relapse into 
the established ways of thinking, "losing the thread" of the 
unfamiliar and difficult new approach.
Innovative thinking is therefore of necessity sustained by the 
hope of things to come and not by the available evidence, 
hunches, intuitions, and so on.
Despite these difficulties, innovative thinking is possible. 
If the innovative enquirer can resist the reign of the obvious 
by effort, endurance and imagination, then so can the self­
deceiver; and sometimes it will be difficult to tell them 
apart, the towering genius on one hand and the self-deceiving 
crank on the other. There may even be something of both in a 
single person. One might say, though only to emphasise a 
point, that lucky cranks turn out to have been pioneers, 
advancing the goals of enquiry; Unlucky cranks turn out to 
have been self-deceivers.
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Self-deception is possible because innovative enquiry is 
possible: both can take place only because we are able to 
resist the tyranny of the obvious and defy all evidence, 
intuition and authority. We may find it mystifying that self­
deceivers can be oblivious to "the" evidence, immune to what 
seems obvious to us (and surely must also seem obvious to them, 
we may think): but the innovative enquirers also do just that. 
It is possible because evidence cannot compel us to accept 
conclusions.
In this chapter I have argued that data cannot compel belief 
because it does not make anything evident, and evidence cannot 
compel belief because it is a product of something which we do 
and which we can therefore do differently. Beneath the "magic 
button" of evidence are the processes of interpretation.
In the next chapter I discuss a process which we are often 
cautioned against performing: leaping to conclusions. I shall 
argue that although we are right to be cautious ("look before 
you leap"), the "leap" is an indispensable part of enquiry 
without which we cannot gain evidence ("leap in order to 
look").
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"Leaping to conclusions" is inventing a story and then 
believing it - a useful skill for a self-deceiver to have! But 
we only leap to conclusions which seem to us obvious. Being 
obvious or evident is not something which items such as 
sentences or beliefs have by virtue of themselves alone: it is 
relative (being obvious to some specific person in some 
specific circumstances) and it is conferred by a process which 
makes them obvious. What is obviously true may not be 
genuinely true.
Data and evidence are distinct from each other. Data are the 
raw materials which are used to make a story. 'Evidence' names 
the role of data which are incorporated into such a story. 
'Conclusions' names those other items in the story, which are 
invented to explain the evidence.
When no data is available, there is nothing to tell a story 
about. When all the data is available, there is no room for 
interpretation and so no occasion for some data to play the 
role of "evidence" from which we may draw "conclusions" about 
missing data. So we need is some available data, and some data
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missing, to have both evidence and conclusions. But then the 
evidence cannot compel us to believe the conclusions, because 
it is only by virtue of our inventing the conclusions that data 
can play the role of evidence for them.
It is worth emphasising the importance of invention or 
fabrication in the process, because otherwise it may seem that 
evidence is a natural product and that we only need to find 
enough of it in order for it to "compel" us to arrive at 
"obvious" conclusions. Self-deception would then have to be 
avoidance of evidence. For if the self-deceiver encountered 
"compelling" evidence the deception would be destroyed. Self- 
deception which is sustained when the self-deceiver encounters 
"compelling evidence" would be as mysterious as an encounter 
between the irresistable force and the immovable object.
Negligence theories describe self-deception as a deviation from 
epistemic norms - norms for seeking truth and avoiding 
falsehood. But it may be more accurate to say that these norms 
are a deviation from self-deception: the norms have a 
historical development; enormous efforts have been made to 
create and improve standards of enquiry, a methodology for 
gaining truth. Self-deception, by contrast, has no 
methodology, no standards, and seems relatively effortless. So 
self-deception may belong to the normal pattern of behaviour. 
Instead of counting self-deception as a distortion of a truth-
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regarding process (enquiry), we should count enquiry as a 
development of a process which is not primarily aimed at truth.
Seeking truth is one way of acquiring beliefs, but it is not 
the only way. When we regard it as the only way, we are bound 
to run into paradoxes with regard to self-deception. For to 
fit self-deception into the mould of truth-seeking, we have to 
explain either how someone can aim to gain false beliefs by 
seeking truths, or else how someone can gain beliefs by seeking 
falsehoods (for to believe something is to believe that 
something is true: so seeking falsehoods will lead to 
disbelief, not belief).
We are often cautioned against such things as jumping to 
conclusions on insufficient evidence, against partiality and 
against wishful thinking. There is no methodology for jumping 
to conclusions (to take one example); no instruction manual 
tells us how it is done. Yet there would be no need for a rule 
forbidding it unless someone were tempted to do it. Since 
there is no instruction in the art of jumping to conclusions, 
it must be something we do naturally.
With this ability, all a self-deceiver need do is to jump to 
the desired conclusion, taking care ever afterwards not to 
assess that conclusion with regard to the norms of enquiry. 
However, just because jumping to conclusions is something we do
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"naturally", perhaps it is not so easily controlled: perhaps 
it is difficult to make sure that one jumps to the conclusion 
one wants to believe, and not to some other. For people 
usually jump to "the obvious conclusion"; whereas often the 
self-deceiver believes what seems (to other people) not at all 
obvious. This is one of the puzzling things about self- 
deception: how someone can be deceived "despite all the 
evidence", when the truth is "so obvious".
'Obvious* is relative: what is obvious to me may not be 
obvious to you; what is obvious to one person may differ 
according to time and place; what is obvious at the end of a 
process of thinking or a course of action may not have been 
obvious at the start. Being obvious is not a property which 
the sentences or beliefs have by virtue of themselves alone: 
it is the outcome of a process which makes them obvious.
There always is such a process whenever something is obvious; 
things are obvious because something makes them obvious, and 
not otherwise.
Sometimes the process may be so trivial that we do not notice 
it. For example, the sentence, 'a spade is a spade' seems to 
me obviously true. The processes which make it obvious to me 
include recognising that the sentence is a sentence of English; 
scanning the sentence with my eyes; interpreting what I see;
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deciding that the first occurrence of 'spade' refers to the 
same thing as the second occurrence of 'spade'; and so on. 
But I do not usually pay attention to these processes. Usually 
I do not notice them at all.
The self-deceiver would need to make the desired conclusion 
obvious to himself or herself, indeed "blindingly obvious", 
since it is intended to blind the self-deceiver to other 
possible conclusions - otherwise he would not know to which 
conclusion he means to "jump".
There are ways to make false things seem obviously true; e.g., 
by the interpolation of irrelevant information ("the angle on 
the right is called a right angle, what's the angle on the left 
called, a ...?" in this case the location of the angle is 
emphasised as though it has some bearing upon the name of the 
angle); or by the application of an irrelevant rule ("if a man 
from Poland is called a Pole, what's a man from Holland called, 
a ... ?" In this case a rule about rhyming is introduced to 
link 'Pole' with 'Hole'). Though these are trivial examples, 
they can be compelling in some circumstances e.g. in quiz games 
when people are under pressure to answer quickly - and have to 
"jump" to the conclusion. The primary way of making something 
seem obvious is to tell a story which makes it obvious.
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The pressures of a quiz game are mild compared to the pressures 
of everyday life: so that in practice we are often obliged to 
jump to conclusions, against the norms of enquiry. Indeed, 
there is always a "jump" beyond what can be derived from the 
data available to us, unless the case is a purely logical 
derivation. Not only is the "jump to conclusions" natural, it 
is also the only way we can arrive at conclusions at all. The 
rule against jumping to conclusions is misdirected: we have to 
jump to conclusions - it is the only way to gain conclusions; 
but we should be cautious of relying upon conclusions we have 
jumped to without further testing.
How do we jump to conclusions? Take the legend of Gelert as an 
example. In this story Prince Llewelyn goes out hunting, 
leaving his hound Gelert to guard his child. On his return the 
Prince finds Gelert covered in blood yet apparently unharmed; 
the child is missing. He jumps to the conclusion that Gelert 
has killed the child. i.e. he invents a story to explain the 
data. This story is sheer fabrication. It happens to be 
false, but it would still be sheer fabrication even if it were 
true.
Llewelyn invents a story which incorporates a few items of 
data. By virtue of being incorporated in the story in the way 
they are, the data become evidence for the "conclusion" that 
Gelert killed the child, though they fall far short of
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"compelling" evidence. Calling it a "conclusion" is grossly 
misleading, since far from being a conclusion it is the 
invention from which everything else commenced: Llewelyn had 
to invent the "conclusion" before the data could be given the 
role of "evidence for the conclusion".
I shall have more to say about "evidence" and "conclusions" 
shortly.
Having invented the story, Llewelyn does not assess it with 
regard to considerations of truth. He does not try to invent 
any rival stories which would incorporate the data differently. 
He gives himself no alternative to this single story. He does 
not seek any more data to test the story; he does not seek the 
body of the child, or look at the scene where his story takes 
place. The story arouses powerful emotions in him, and he 
allows them to draw him into immediate action. Acting upon his 
interpretation of the data, he kills Gelert with his sword.
The events happen more easily because Llewelyn seems not 
realise that the situation as he sees it is his own invention. 
He has invented the story, but he does not seem to notice that 
it is what he tells himself to explain the data: it seems to 
him to be something which "appearances" themselves tell him. 
He does not distinguish the means by which he sees the 
situation, from the situation which he sees; what he sees is
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that Gelert has killed the child - for this is what the story 
tells him. The appearances mislead him because he has 
interpreted appearances in such a way as to mislead himself.
Yet he is not a self-deceiver. His intention is to gain truth, 
but he "falls away from the norms for seeking truth". He acts 
upon the first hypothesis he comes across, without testing it 
further and without seeking alternatives. The conclusion does 
not appeal to him: he does not jump to a conclusion that suits 
him, as a self-deceiver would (I am excluding those peculiar 
explanations which might show that e.g. at some deep level of 
his psyche he desired to punish himself and so the conclusion 
really did suit him, etc). If Llewelyn had been a self­
deceiver he would believe what it suited him to believe. He 
would not believe that his child was dead, unless the evidence 
was unavoidable; he would not believe that Gelert had killed 
the child.
Suppose that the story did not proceed in the tidy way of the 
legend: Llewelyn does not find the body of a huge wolf; and 
the child is dead. It does not suit Llewelyn to believe that 
Gelert killed the child. So he fabricates a story which suits 
him and which is compatible with the available data: he argues 
that a huge wolf came and killed the child; and that Gelert 
fought the wolf, which slunk away to die somewhere else. This
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conclusion suits him, so he does not seek to test it or to 
create rival stories.
This scenario fits three descriptions of self-deception given 
by "Not-Know" theories: it is negligent (Negligence theories), 
since it does not assess the story with regard to truth 
considerations; it is radical (Radical Interpretation 
Theories), since it invents a story not supported by the 
circumstances; and Llewelyn simulates the role of someone who 
genuinely believes (Role Simulation theories).
In discussing the story of Gelert I have tried to circumvent 
something which makes self-deception more puzzling than it need 
be, namely the supposition that evidence is coercive: 
"compelling evidence" "forces" us to believe the "conclusions" 
it "supports". Here almost every word is a misnomer.
The conclusions do not conclude the process; they are the 
beginning of the process, not the end. The evidence does not 
lead to the conclusions, i.e. the process does not have 
evidence as an input and conclusions as an output: the 
evidence and the conclusions are both output (and therefore the 
evidence cannot "lead to" the conclusions, nor be "foundations" 
for them). The input is data. 'Evidence' is the name of a 
role which data plays within a story. 'Conclusion' names any 
element of the story which is not an item of data; calling it
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a 'conclusion' picks it out as something which the data 
"supports" by virtue of the data's role as "evidence" within 
that story.
The effect of the sentence is to make self-deception puzzling 
because self-deception is made to seem like the irresistable 
force (evidence) meeting the immovable object (the self­
deceiver's belief).
Putting things in this way forces us to say things like "the 
self-deceiver distorts the evidence" rather than "the self­
deceiver uses the data to construct a different sort of 
evidence"; we are obliged to say, "the self-deceiver is 
selective about evidence", as though there were something wrong 
in being selective; everyone is selective about evidence 
because some data has no role to play in the things we want to 
make evident, being irrelevant.
Suppose that instead of having to interpret a few data, 
Llewelyn could actually watch the scene unfolding, e.g. he 
watches through a telescope, being too far away to intervene. 
He sees Gelert attack the child and kill it. There is no sign 
of a wolf. Now he has so much data that there is very little 
room for creative interpretation: the story is so detailed 




To deceive himself now would require great efforts: he would 
need to persuade himself that this original interpretation of 
data (watching the scene through the telescope) is misleading: 
perhaps he is hallucinating; perhaps there is something strange 
about the telescope; could it be that what appeared to be 
Gelert was actually a wolf? and so on.
So "evidence" is most "compelling" when there is little 
opportunity for interpretation: when there are no missing data 
and so no need to "draw conclusions": we already have the 
whole story.
What is obviously true may not be genuinely true. Since the 
obviously true conclusion may well be the outcome of a flawed 
manner of interpreting data, someone seeking truth may need to 
set aside the obvious conclusion, resisting the force of habit 
and the comforts of the familiar ways of doing things in order 
to arrive at a novel interpretation (which may or may not be 
true). If a truth-seeker can resist the obvious conclusion, so 
can a self-deceiver.
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Williams [1973] describes belief in terms of its intimate 
connection with truth:
belief aims at truth. (pl36)
He argues that, in consequence, it is necessarily - and not 
just contingently - true that we cannot "believe at will". 
Later on I argue that Williams' description of belief is not 
justified, and so his conclusion (that we cannot believe at 
will) does not follow. But for now I will provisionally grant 
him the authority to legislate about the grammar of the word, 
'believe'. Suppose he is right, and we cannot believe at will.
Williams argues that if I recognise something to be true, I 
thereby believe it (by the definition of 'believe', for "belief 
aims at truth").
The word 'recognise' is particularly felicitous in this 
context. For example, government A may recognise that a 
particularly bloodthirsty dictatorship, B, has come to power in 
a neighbouring country. A recognises that B is now the
government of the neighbouring country. But A does not accord
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B any diplomatic rights: so in the diplomatic sense, A does 
not recognise that B is a government. Likewise, we may 
"recognise" that something is true without according it any 
"diplomatic rights": describing something as true does not 
prescribe what we are to do about it.
Hare [1952] distinguishes "descriptive" from "prescriptive" 
uses of moral expressions; e.g., someone may describe an 
action as "bad" without accepting that therefore he ought not 
to do it. In this case 'bad' is descriptive, not 
prescriptive.
We can also apply the descriptive / prescriptive distinction to 
the use of expressions like 'true' and 'believe'. Someone - 
lets call them "S" - might recognise that something is true 
(as a description) - without recognising it (as a prescription 
of what one ought or ought not to do, e.g. believe it). The 
"belief" (according to Williams' definition of 'belief') may 
have no consequences for the way S behaves, thinks, speaks or 
feels. S has accepted 'true' as a description without 
according it any prescriptive force. S does not have to think 
about what he "believes"; nor need he use it to interpret 
anything or to guide action. He does not even have to feel 
that it is true, if he can help it, nor incorporate it into any 
other aspect of life. He does not have to use it to do any of 
the things for which we might want to use beliefs.
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This starts to look like a rather "thin" sense of belief. 
Beliefs may not be amenable to will; yet they may be 
irrelevant to all the things which S can do at will, such as:




If S's emotions are linked to the things which he can do at 
will, then S's emotions too may be independent of S's beliefs.
In this situation the "belief" is disabled: it is, in effect, 
consigned to "storage" in S's memory along with all the 
theories, hypotheses, stories, dreams, fantasies, and so on, 
which he knows about but does not believe. S can invent any 
hypothesis he cares to, including ones in which the 'belief' is 
false, and can act in every respect as though the hypothesis is 
true.
It seems that S will then be self-deceived, or something very 
like it. For each variety of theory about self-deception can 




- the belief is "disconnected" from action, assertion, 
thinking (e.g. inventing hypotheses, connecting to other 
beliefs, etc)
. this terminology is typical of Dissociation theories
- the belief is removed from its role, and pretence or 
simulation fulfils the role of belief instead
. this terminology is typical of Role theories
S neglects epistemic norms, he "falls away" from them
. this terminology is typical of Negligence theories
- S engages in radical interpretation
. this terminology is typical of Radical Interpretation 
theories.
We can also see why non-cognitive theories should attribute 
relatively little importance to cognitive expressions like 
'believe' (when defined with respect to its intimate connection 
to truth, as Williams defines it). For if beliefs can be 
disabled, then the important parts of self-deception, its 
"active ingredients", can all go on independently of belief.
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We can even posit a "schism" between a part of S in which the 
belief resides and another part which performs all those 
things which he does at will (as in Schism theories of self- 
deception) .
Since every theory about self-deception seems to agree in 
furnishing a description of self-deception which fits the case 
of S, I think we may safely say that what I have described is a 
prototypical case of self-deception, or something very like it.
I have some supplementary remarks to make about the case of S. 
Notice that S "knows" what he is up to, but that this knowledge 
is wholly ineffectual, unconsidered, and irrelevant to what he 
does. S is "living a lie". Notice also that S's rejection of 
the prescriptive force of truth need not be wholesale: he may 
pick and choose when to reject it and when to accept it.
We may argue that S is behaving irrationally. That does not 
mean that he does not have intelligable reasons for doing so.
S's instrumental understanding (or misunderstanding) displaces 
(or replaces, or devours) S's truth-regarding belief. A 
misunderstanding can be a most effective instrument for 
"steering around the evidence", especially if it is designed to 
do so. The "belief" has no role to play in self-deception, 
because the self-deception can be guided and controlled by use
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of a false belief, a misunderstanding. This removes one reason 
for claiming that a self-deceiver "must know what he is up to", 
or "must know what he is deceived about". Truth - or true 
belief - has no power which compels us to accept it as a 
prescription of how we ought to behave with regard to it. A 
mere knowledge of facts does not at all decide for us what we 
are to do about those facts.
Although all the theories apply to the example, they are not 
all equally worthwhile. For example, all Avoidance theories 
(Sschism, Disconnection, and the "avoidance" version of Role 
theories) include the false claim that a self-deceiver must, of 
necessity, have a true belief about what he is doing. But it 
is not a prerequisite of self-deception. If S does have such a 
belief, it is coincidental to the processes of self-deception. 
Such a belief may complicate our description of a particular 
instance of self-deception, since the true belief may not be 
wholly de-activated: it may interfere in the processes of
self-deception. But it is not a necessary feature.
I wrote rather glibly of the "prescriptive force of truth" - 
what is it? The prescriptive force of truth is that we should 
believe it:
whatever else one does with a truth, believing the
proposition that expresses it is the first and most
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fitting thing to do with it - before we start deploring it 
or trying to alter it, for example. The connection 
between belief and truth is that belief is appropriate to 
truth; it is proper only when it is of what is true, and 
only intelligable, therefore, when it is of what could be 
true. (A. Phillips-Griffiths [1967], pl40)
According to Williams' description of 'believe', though, we 
cannot believe at will, so it cannot be something we ought to 
do.
I shall now argue against Williams, that belief at will is 
possible, and that belief can be defined functionally in terms 
of the things which we can do at will - in its relation to 
action, emotion, interpretation, perception, other beliefs, 
wishes, etc. I do not aim to provide a detailed functional 
definition of belief in this thesis. However I shall have 
• things to say about it indirectly.
If I am right in claiming that it is possible to believe at 
will, then Williams is wrong. In the next chapter I shall 
explain what I think is wrong with his arguments. I 
provisionally gave the word 'belief' to Williams. Now I want 
to take it back again.
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If belief at will is possible, then it seems we cannot 
distinguish beliefs from merely pretending.
Let us see how well pretence stands up to Williams' criteria 
for belief.
Truth and falsehood are a dimension of an assessment of 
beliefs as opposed to many other psychological states or 
dispositions. (Williams [1973], pl37)
Pretences too can be assessed for truth and falsehood, e.g. the 
pretence that I am Napoleon Bonaparte is false.
If a man recognises that what he has been believing is 
false, he thereby abandons the belief he had. (Williams 
[1973], pl37)
One need not abandon a pretence just because one recognises it 
to be false. However, recognising that it is false does 
restrict the pretence. If an actor playing Othello upon the 
stage takes time out to assert that he recognises that he is 
not Othello, he is commenting upon the pretence (that he is
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Othello) and not pretending. I shall say more about this
shortly. Williams writes that,
to say: 'I believe that p' itself carries, in general, a 
claim that p is true. (pl37)
To say 'I pretend that p' carries no such claim.
So pretence does not seem much like belief. But that is 
because there are many forms of pretence, and belief is only 
one of the forms of pretence. Belief is pretence, but it is 
not "mere" pretence. "Mere" pretences are performed only in 
restricted circumstances and for limited purposes.
For example, daydreaming is a form of pretence, elaborating an 
answer to the question, "what if p were true?" But this 
pretence is not used to guide actions, as beliefs often are. 
It is restricted.
A liar uses a pretence in order to guide the actions of others, 
not to guide his own actions. The pretence is restricted.
Drama is a form of pretence; but when the curtain comes down, 




Using theories instrumentally is a form of pretence. But we do 
not use these instruments without restriction: we restrict 
their use to those circumstances in which we expect them to 
work.
Suppose, though, we lift the restrictions upon these pretences. 
Suppose that the daydreamer starts using the "idle 
speculations" of the daydream as a guide to action. He dreamt 
that he was Napoleon, and when he "awakens" from the daydream, 
he acts as if he is Napoleon. The liar uses the lie to guide 
his own actions. The actor does not cease to act in character 
when the curtain comes down. The instrumental theories are 
used in all circumstances, with the expectation that they will 
work.
If these events started happening, I think that we would say: 
the daydreamer (now dreaming no longer) believes that he is 
Napoleon, the liar believes the lie, the actor believes that he 
is Othello (or whoever the character is), and the instrumental 
theory has become a belief.
Lifting the restrictions upon pretences makes them more like 
beliefs. Lifting all the restrictions makes them genuine 
beliefs (if there is no restriction upon the pretence, there is 
no other thinking that one does by which one could know that 
the pretence is "only a pretence and not what I really
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believe"). Since one may lift the restrictions by degrees, 
pretences may become more belief-like by degrees. Since one 
may impose the restrictions by degrees also, beliefs may become 
by degrees more like pretences.
The outcome of this is that belief is more of a pretence than 
is "mere pretence" - for it is less restricted. It is not mere 
pretence: it is full-blown, unrestricted pretence.
Unrestricted pretence matches Williams' criteria for belief. 
It is assessable with regard to truth and falsehood.
If a man recognises that what he has been believing is 
false, he thereby abandons the belief he had. (pl37)
If one recognises that what one has been pretending is false, 
that is a restriction upon the pretence. It ceases to be 
unrestricted pretence, so it ceases to be belief.
to say: 'I believe that p' itself carries, in general, a 
claim that p is true. (pl37)
To say 'I pretend that p' carries no such claim. But someone 
who pretends without restriction does not say 'I pretend that 
p', for that would imply that he merely pretends, i.e. the 
pretence is restricted, and if the pretence is restricted then
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he does not believe. The proper way to express unrestricted 
pretence is to say, 'I believe that p' (and so, 'I do not 
merely pretend that p').
Full-blown pretence matches Williams' criteria for belief: and 
so (according to Williams' account) it "aims at truth".
Yet my intuition, shared by Williams and others, is that while 
one can pretend virtually anything one chooses, at will, one 
cannot believe what one chooses, or at least not so easily. 
Perhaps this is because unrestricted pretences are much harder 
to construct than restricted pretences. They are tied in to so 
many more things. Full-blown pretences must fulfil some or all 
of these functions:
- we use them to interpret data
- we use them to guide actions
- they influence our moods and emotions
- they connect up with other items of mentation - beliefs, 
wishes, hopes and fears, and so on.
Performing all these functions locks a belief rigidly into 
place. So beliefs which perform fewer functions will be easier 
to alter. To alter a belief which is guiding action is like 
altering a gear while it is turning in a machine: even if we 
do not lose several fingers, the machine is going to grind to a
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halt. If the machine has already ground to a halt because the 
gear is broken, however, we may need to replace the gear; 
likewise if our action has ground to a halt because our belief 
did not work, then we are in doubt and, to engage in practical 
action, we need to find another belief, or at least something 
that will do the job - such as using a theory, instrumentally, 
for limited purposes. If we replace a belief we will also 
(eventually) remove its influence upon our moods and emotions, 
and alter the connections with other beliefs, wishes, hopes, 
etc.
Some pretences cannot perform all these functions. For example 
we cannot use a contradiction to guide action - for what 
guidance could it possibly give us? We might use each conjunct 
in turn - but then each one is restricted, and so is not a 
"full-blown" belief.
Beliefs are like crystals: they are fixed and rigid, but they 
can be dissolved, "corroded by doubt". Disconnected from the 
role of belief they become more like "mere" pretences, fluid 
and shifting; so we may dissolve our beliefs, amend them in 
their "pretence-like" state, and then re-crystallise them. But 
the new crystals may be different from the old. In the 
pretence-like state, the belief is not there to prevent some 
other belief (even its own negation) being formed.
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Winters [1979] says that,
Certain mental events can occur as the immediate result of 
an act of will. If I wish to imagine snow falling or that 
I am in the Bahamas, I can do it directly; I rarely need 
to get myself to imagine things by an indirect route. In 
typical cases, imagining may therefore be regarded as a 
"basic" or "primitive" action. Other mental phenomena are 
less amenable to the proddings of the will; most 
notoriously, acquiring beliefs has been held to be 
something that one cannot do directly. (p243)
Beliefs are fixed, pretences are not. If we fix our pretences 
in the right way, they become beliefs. And if we unfix our 
beliefs, they become (mere) pretences.
Williams argues that evidence fixes beliefs, and that is why a 
self-deceiver must use special strategies to "steer around the 
evidence". I have suggested that we construct evidence by 
interpreting data, so that if evidence fixes beliefs then 
beliefs are only as fixed as our interpretations - which we may 
change.
Negligence theorists argue that self-deception is possible 
because the self-deceiver does not follow the correct 
procedures for enquiry. The implication is that beliefs are
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justified by the procedures, whereas self-deception is 
unjustified. However, since the self-deceiver's beliefs are 
presumably as fixed as anyone else's (since they are beliefs), 
connection to the correct procedure is not what fixes beliefs.
We can recognise what fixes beliefs by considering how they 
become unfixed - how they become subject to doubt. One way is 
that when we are using them as instruments, they fail to work: 
Henry Navigator's theory of navigation causes him to steer onto 
the rocks, for example. If they fail to work, they cannot be 
true (whereas they may be false and still work, in some 
circumstances). If the hammer breaks, you cannot go on 
knocking in nails: you have to find something else to do the 
job. The same is true when we use beliefs as tools, e.g. to 
guide action. We test our theories by trying to break them - 
preferably before we believe them.
There is another way of unfixing beliefs. Descartes [1968] 
tells us the procedure:
finding no company to disturb me, and having, fortunately, 
no cares or passions to disturb me, I spent the whole day 
shut up in a room heated by an enclosed stove, where I had 
complete leisure to meditate on my own thoughts. (p35)
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Descartes isolates himself, as far as possible, from any need 
for practical action (presumably he may have put another log in 
the stove occasionally). He is not "disturbed by passions". 
He gives himself opportunity to doubt.
Pretences become more like beliefs as we fix them. There can 
be degrees of fixity.
Through all the nine years which followed I did nothing 
but wander here and there in the world, trying to be 
spectator rather than actor in all the comedies which were 
being played there (p49 - 50)
so, also, in order that I might not remain irresolute in 
my actions during the time that my reason would oblige me 
to be so in my judgements ... I formed a provisional moral 
code (p45)
In other words, Descartes put pretences in place of beliefs. 
The beliefs became unfixed, the pretences became 
(provisionally) fixed. But we might equally well say that 
Descartes decided to go on believing in practice what he 
questioned intellectually. Actions fix beliefs - they make 
pretences more belief-like. We may call these provisional 
beliefs - but most of our beliefs are provisional to some 
extent. When our beliefs are not locked in to actions, they
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become less belief-like, less fixed. Under hypnosis ("deep 
relaxation") the beliefs are more completely detached from the 
need for practical actions they can be changed: we become 
more "suggestible", more open to suggestion. After hypnosis, 
when we act again, the suggestions become fixed again. We need 
fixed beliefs in order to avoid being "irresolute". When we 
can afford to be irresolute (especially, when we are not 
engaged in practical action), the beliefs can become unfixed. 
As spectators watching a comedy we can "suspend disbelief" (and 
suspend belief). As actors in a stage comedy we must pretend, 
but this pretence is restricted; it is not full-blown 
pretence, i.e. belief. Lift the restrictions, and instead of a 
stage there is the world, instead of a stage comedy there are 
our lives, and instead of restricted pretence there is (in all 
probability) belief.
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Williams [1973] and others argue that belief at will is
impossible. I agree with them that there is something peculiar 
about the idea of belief at will. But this is not because 
there is something special about belief. It is because of the 
way "will" is assumed to work.
Williams does not spell out his understanding of volition. At 
the risk of doing him an injustice, I will do so on his behalf.
There are some things that we can do at will and some that we 
cannot. So, for example, I can raise my arm at will,
"directly", without needing to use something else to do it, 
whereas I cannot levitate two miles up in the air at will. If
I want to go two miles up in the air then I have to find some
means to do it - such as going up in an aeroplane.
Williams says - rightly - that for Hume, it is just a
contingent matter of fact that one cannot believe at will. 
Williams argues that it is not contingent. The impossibility 
of belief at will is built into the grammar of the word 
'believe*.
V o l i t i o n  Is N o  " M a g i c  B u t t o n "
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It seems to me that this makes volition into a sort of "magic 
button" which is located within people - only they can press 
it. By pressing the magic button, that is to say by "willing", 
they can do all the things which can be done "at will".
I object to this idea of the magic button. Agreed, it happens 
to be (contingently) true that I can at present raise my arm at 
will. But if I become paralysed then raising my arm ceases to 
be something I can do at will. This is because the "magic 
button" is connected up to a very complicated process by means 
of which the magic is carried out, and the process can go 
wrong. The fact that we only perceive the button does not give 
us reason to deny the existence of the process. The magic can 
go wrong, and this is evidence enough that there is more 
involved in volition than we know about.
Behind the "magic button" of the will there are processes by 
which the magic works. Sometimes we know what some of the 
processes are, other times we do not. In the case of getting 
oneself two miles up in the air, we know what a lot of the 
processes are: for instance one has to find a pilot, and an 
aeroplane, and probably a considerable sum of money to pay for 
all this, arrange a time and place when the event is to happen, 
travel to the airfield, etc. In the case of raising an arm we 
know a lot less about the processes, so we say that we can do 
it "directly", "at will". The upshot is that if we know about
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how we do something, we cannot do it at will! This is a 
peculiar way to talk. It would be less confusing to talk about 
the things we can do voluntarily - which includes both being 
able to raise an arm (in some circumstances, and by mysterious 
processes of which we are not directly aware), and being able 
to go up in the air (in some circumstances, and by processes of 
which we are more aware).
Someone who is paralysed cannot raise an arm "at will". 
However if we could construct some machinery to simulate the 
nerve and muscle processes which take place when one raises an 
arm, and if we could connect this machinery up to the paralysed 
person's brain, then he may be able to raise an arm again, "at 
will", because the machinery will simulate the process which 
was damaged and thus prevented the "magic button" from working. 
If we can define the processes taking place when someone raises 
an arm, it may also be possible to define the processes which 
lead to us having beliefs. This may enable us to establish 
whether or not we can perform them at will.
If we believe that there are any things we do "directly" at 
will then we believe in magic buttons. There are always 
processes by which the "magic" can be explained, and the 
explanations always show that the things we think we do 
directly are indirect: they are performed by means of a 
process, whether we know it or not.
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This means that beliefs too are produced by processes. At 
least one such process is voluntary, namely enquiry. Enquiry 
is an indirect way of voluntarily acquiring beliefs. But to 
call it "indirect" is misleading: it implies that there is 
some more direct way of acquiring beliefs. I am not convinced 
that "direct" is well-defined enough to say what is direct and 
what is noy, but in any case the supposition that there is a 
"direct" way to acquire beliefs is what I rather rudely called 
a belief in magic buttons; and the appeal to magic buttons 
does not help us to understand what processes are connected up 
to them. If we do not believe in magic buttons then we must 
say that every means by which we acquire beliefs is indirect.
Williams writes that in acquiring false beliefs, the self­
deceiver must proceed by indirect means. This is unsurprising, 
since every means of acquiring beliefs is indirect. But 
Williams takes it to show that only Avoidance theories can 
provide a satisfactory account of self-deception:
that ... is the project of the man who is deceiving 
himself, and he must really know what is true; for if he 
did not know what was true, he would not be able to steer 
around the contrary and conflicting evidence (Williams 
[1973], p.151, my emphasis).
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Williams' argument is sophisticated. But when it is put
crudely, I think it amounts to this: the will is not the magic 
button which can create beliefs - but evidence is!
In the preceding chapters I presented arguments to show that:
- evidence is not a "magic button" for the production of 
beliefs any more than is "the will"
therefore the self-deceiver does not need to "steer 
around" (i.e. avoid) "the" evidence, since "the evidence" 
does not compel belief.
My aim now is to counter the arguments which Williams uses to 
show that belief at will is impossible. My main counter­
argument is that there are processes by which we acquire 
beliefs, and that these processes can be voluntary. Later on I 
shall use this argument to defend Role Simulation theories.
Williams argues that belief at will is not possible because 
"belief aims at truth". This is an odd expression to use, and 
it seems to invite paradox. We have aims, but beliefs do not. 
Even if in some sense belief "aims" at truth, it would not 
follow that people acquire beliefs by aiming to acquire truths. 
However this is, I think, what Williams needs for his argument 
to succeed. Williams explains what he means by "belief aims at 
truth" in the following way:
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1. "truth and falsehood are a dimension of an assessment of 
beliefs as opposed to many other psychological states or 
dispositions". (pl37)
2. "To believe that p is to believe that p is true"; "if a 
man recognises that what he has been believing is false, he 
thereby abandons the belief he had." (pl37)
3. "To say 'I believe that p' itself carries, in general, a 
claim that p is true." (pl37)
Williams then argues as follows;
If I could acquire a belief at will, I could acquire it 
whether it was true or not; moreover I would know that I 
could acquire it whether it was true or not. If in full 
consciousness I could will to acquire a 'belief' 
irrespective of its truth, it is unclear that before the 
event I could seriously think of it as a belief, i.e. as 
something purporting to represent reality. At the very 
least, there must be a restriction on what is the case 
after the event; since I could not then, in full 
consciousness, regard this as a belief of mine, i.e. 
something I take to be true, and also know that I acquired 
it at will. With regard to no belief could I know - or, 
if all this is done in full consciousness, even suspect -
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that I had acquired it at will. But if I can acquire 
beliefs at will, I must know that I am able to do this; 
and could I know that I was capable of this feat if with 
regard to every feat of this kind which I had performed I 
necessarily had to believe that it had not taken place? 
(pl48)
X disagree with Williams' argument. He writes that, "it is 
unclear that before the event X could seriously think of it as 
a belief, i.e. as something purporting to represent reality." 
Being unclear is not the same as being impossible; and I 
suggest that it is not impossible. Suppose that someone else 
believes it "before the event", i.e. before I believe it. Then 
I have no trouble in thinking of it as a beliefs it is not a 
belief of mine (as yet), but it is someone's belief and so, in 
Williams' words, "something purporting to represent reality". 
If I am able to become sufficiently like them, I will be 
capable of believing it too.
I think that what Williams wants to say is that the belief I 
already have prevents me from believing something else 
inconsistent with it (such as its negation). What the self­
deceiver needs, then, is some way of suspending belief and 
disbelief. "Suspending disbelief" is an expression which is 
often applied to what we do when we read a novel or watch a 
play. It suggests a way to explain the manner in which
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beliefs can be changed: by suspending belief and disbelief we 
enable ourselves to use imagination to construct new beliefs. 
That process of construction may alter the ways we think, act 
and feel, so that when we stop suspending belief and disbelief, 
our beliefs are different to what they were before. The 
process might be like the crystallisation and dissolution of 
salts: fixed and frozen beliefs become fluid and thawed, they
are altered, and then crystallised again into fixed and frozen 
beliefs. Maybe we always have beliefs (stored away somewhere 
in the retentive material of the memory), but we are not always 
believing them - using them, that is. Sometimes one forgets 
something one believes, and cannot recall something one knows.
Armed with this metaphor, we need not suppose that a self­
deceiver somehow "masks" one belief in order to believe 
something else which is inconsistent with it. He need not mask 
the belief because he need not have the belief. It may be 
stored away in memory along with all the other things he once 
believed and believes no longer; but he does not need to 
"mask" the belief, since he can destroy it outright.
This approach has the added advantage that we need not discuss 
beliefs in isolation from all the other things we do 
imagining, wishing, feeling, wondering, hoping and fearing, 
surmising, hypothesising, and so on. Role theories of self­
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deception use this approach. I discuss Role theories later on. 
Before doing so I lay the groundwork for that discussion.
We know there must be some process by which beliefs change: 
otherwise we would all be in the position of the bigot whose 
staunch beliefs immunise him from any other way of thinking. 
That seems a caricature of what normally goes on when someone 
believes something.
Williams implies that evidence is what changes beliefs: 
evidence can compel us to believe what formerly we did not 
believe, or to disbelieve what we formerly believed. "If I 
could acquire a belief at will, I could acquire it whether it 
was true or not. Moreover I would know that I could acquire it 
whether it was true or not." But we do acquire beliefs whether 
they are true or not, often despite our best efforts to believe 
only what is true. We do acquire them through a voluntary 
process - enquiry, for example - and although this process does 
not occur "just like that" (as Williams puts it), it is not in 
that respect different from any other process by which beliefs 
are generated: there is no direct method, no magic button for 
acquiring beliefs. When we do enquiry, we know that we are 
aiming to voluntarily acquire true beliefs, and, if we arrive 
at a belief, then we know that we believe it, whether or not it 
is true. We hope that it is true, and since we believe it we 
at least do not believe that it is false. But unless we think
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that we are infallible then we will usually concede that we may 
be wrongs and in that sense, we know that we have acquired it 
whether it is true or not, and have done so voluntarily.
Williams' argument seems irrelevant to the question of whether 
or not we can believe something at will. If his remark is 
intended as a counter-factual conditional and therefore as a 
disproof of the claim that we can acquire beliefs at will, then 
I think it is a failure; for the consequent, 'I could acquire 
it whether it was true or not' is true. We do acquire both 
true beliefs and false beliefs, and we know that we do. Only 
we do not know which are true and which are false. Let's look 
at this another way, running an argument in parallel with 
Williams' argument;
- If I can acquire a belief against my will, then I can 
acquire it whether it is true or not. Moreover I may know 
that I can acquire it whether it is true or not. So in 
full consciousness I could acquire a 'belief' against my 
will irrespective of its truths could I seriously think 
of it as a belief?
The answer is, "yes, I could". Think of someone who knows he 
is about to be brainwashed, against his will. He may know that 
the brainwashing will be successful, regardless of whether or 
not the beliefs he acquires as a result are true or not. Now
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consider someone who is going to be voluntarily brainwashed. 
He too may know that the brainwashing will be successful, 
whether or not the resulting beliefs are true.
Williams concedes that this sort of case is possible: one may 
use drugs or use the services of a hypnotist in order to 
acquire false beliefs; but although it is possible, it is 
"very deeply irrational", and it is not "directly" at will.
I have argued enough about the "indirectness" of all belief­
generating processes, voluntary or not. Williams' admission 
allows us to undermine the whole argument. For Williams 
assumes that hypnotism and the use of drugs are wholly 
different from the normal means of acquiring beliefs (whatever 
they are); but one can argue that the use of drugs and 
hypnotism and (for good measure) brainwashing may all work 
because they utilise the normal means of acquiring beliefs. 
Unless Williams can show that normal belief-acquisition is 
relevantly different from these "abnormal" means, then his 
argument will reduce to the normative and not widely disputed 
suggestion that we ought to aim for the truth.
Belief against one's will seems as puzzling as belief at will, 
when we put it into the form of Williams' argument. It is 
irrelevant that we can acquire beliefs which are true and other 
beliefs which are false. If you acquire the belief then you
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cease to believe that it is false (if you ever did so). Better 
to ask how someone comes to believe something which they 
previously thought was false.
The answer I reconstruct from Williams' article (i.e. the 
answer which I suppose Williams would give) is that such a 
change of belief could come about when someone encounters fresh 
evidence: "in saying that his belief is based on particular 
evidence, we would mean not just that he has the belief and can 
defend it with the evidence, but that he has the belief just 
because he has the evidence. This says that if he ceased to 
believe the evidence then, other things being equal, he would 
cease to have the belief."
I think that there is something odd about this argument too. 
As a counter-example, lets imagine the following anecdote, 
recounted by a character whom I shall call Henry Navigator:
"I formed a hypothesis about the relation between the earth and 
the fixed stars; I leapt to the conclusion that the hypothesis 
was true, and I used it to make decisions about how to navigate 
my ship. The hypothesis worked well for this purpose: I 
always managed to navigate to the places I wanted to visit. I 
was not forced by compelling evidence to believe the 
hypothesis. I leapt to the conclusion: in other words, I
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believed at will. Fortunately, the hypothesis turns out to be 
true."
Henry Navigator claims that he can believe the hypothesis at 
will - for he thinks he did it, by "leaping to the conclusion". 
He does not claim to know that the hypothesis is true; he can 
even concede that it is highly probable that the hypothesis is 
false, and still say truthfully, "nonetheless I believe it". 
"After the event" he is capable of regarding the hypothesis as 
something he takes to be true and also knows that he acquired 
it at will. "Fortunately, the hypothesis turns out to be 
true".
He would claim that the belief is true, wouldn't he, since he 
believes it. So if the example is described correctly then it 
is possible to believe at will, and to know that one's belief 
was acquired at will; at the time he made the "leap", Henry 
Navigator could also know that he was sustaining his belief at 
will, unsupported by evidence.
What is more difficult, indeed impossible, I think, is to 
acquire a belief at will and then, after the event, both 
sustain the belief and believe that it is false. When (or if) 
Henry Navigator stops believing his hypothesis, he will still 
be capable of knowing that he believed it at will, and he will 
also be capable of knowing that he believed at will something
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which is false. So Henry knows that he is able to believe 
things at will. He also knows that the things he believes at 
will may be false - he sometimes makes mistakes. However, he 
thinks that all the things which he presently believes at will 
are true, while admitting that they may be false. He believes 
them: he does not claim to infallibly know all of them.
Henry Navigator might also tell us that: "when I invented the 
hypothesis I was just playing with ideas: I invented the 
hypothesis not with the intention of gaining a truth, but for 
the sake of an amusing and interesting fiction which, I 
believed, was false. But then it occurred to me that it would 
be a terrific help to navigation if it were true, so much so 
that I decided it was worth trying it out: suddenly I had a 
hunch that it was true." Henry moves from the belief that the 
hypothesis is false, towards "trying it out" - a stage which we 
could call tentative or provisional belief - until the 
hypothesis has become an habitual belief. At this stage he 
still does not have evidence of any "compelling" sort that the 
hypothesis is true: he only has evidence that the hypothesis 
works for his purposes - and false hypotheses may work as well 
as true ones, for limited purposes.
Believing a hypothesis is somewhat like trusting a person: one 
may trust someone more after long experience of their character 
and conduct has shown them to be worthy of trust; but
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sometimes one may trust as an act of will, knowing that there 
is no basis of evidence or experience to show that the person 
is worthy of trust.
I claim that Henry Navigator has provided us with a counter­
example to Williams' claim, and I do not detect the 
difficulties which Williams claims there must be. Suppose that 
Henry Navigator finds evidence which contradicts his belief 
about the relation between the fixed stars and the earth. He 
is entitled to reject one or more of the premises which led to 
the contradiction. He genuinely believes the hypothesis: so 
he rejects the evidence. On the basis of his belief he "knows" 
that the "evidence" must be false.
So how is the evidence supposed to change Henry's belief? 
Henry must first, as it were, put the belief in suspense: for 
if the belief is being used, then it ensures the rejection of 
the evidence. Henry must put the belief in suspense before 
the evidence can have any effect: the evidence cannot do it 
for him. Therefore evidence alone cannot alter beliefs. 
Evidence against Henry's hypothesis, for example, cannot alter 
his belief in the hypothesis unless he does something to allow 
it: and this may well be something that he does at will, 
namely what I called "putting the belief in suspense". He may 
have strong motives for doing so: for example, he may 
encounter the evidence because his navigation does not lead him
Self-Deception Page 169
Volition/13
to the places he wants to visit: the hypothesis breaks down,
it does not "work": Henry is then strongly motivated to throw 
out the hypothesis, as he would any other broken or useless 
tool - or else find ways to mend it. To do so he will probably 
want to study the conditions which broke the tool - and these 
conditions are "the evidence".
Williams thinks that there are ways of acquiring beliefs other 
than by the action of "evidence":
not every belief that I have which is based, is based on 
evidence. There are some beliefs that I have which are 
not (relative to the probability of their being true) 
random or arbitrary, and which are very proper beliefs to 
have, but which are not based on other beliefs that I 
have. Indeed, there is a very good reason why it cannot 
be the case that every belief which one has is based upon 
another belief one has - namely, that one could never stop 
(or start). Quite evidently there are non-random beliefs 
which are not based upon further evidence. The most 
notable of these, of course, are perceptual beliefs, 
beliefs that I gain by using my senses around the 
environment. (pl43)
If this is the case, then I do not need evidence to support a 
belief. If I believe p on the basis of evidence e, and I cease
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to believe e, then I can continue to believe p provided that I 
treat it as a non-random belief. For who is to say what we are 
entitled to classify as a "non-random belief"?
I deny Williams' claim that "one could never stop (or start)" 
unless one had beliefs which are not random or arbitrary 
(relative to the probability of their being true). We may 
start from any arbitrary hypothesis. We run the risk of being 
wrong, of course, but we may not have the option to start from 
anything else. We are forced to start from whatever 
circumstances we are in.
Suppose that we lack the non-random beliefs with which Williams 
thoughtfully provides us. We would not become helpless. We 
could adopt a hypothesis at random, and try it out in the hope 
that it works. We are frequently cautioned against this: it 
is "leaping to conclusions", or something very like it. 
Leaping to conclusions is justified, provided that we are 
prepared to test the conclusions and be proved wrong. It is a 
justifiable way to proceed because there is no other way to get 
started. It is the way we still "get started" in areas of 
enquiry which are unfamiliar to us (and everyone else), e.g. 
some parts of scientific enquiry.
As for the beliefs we "leap" to, they are justified (if at all) 
by standing up to testing. They are not justified in advance
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of testing by our giving them a special "foundational" status. 
Our perceptions are refutable, and often are refuted by our 
theories - theories which may well be true.
Williams argues that "perceptual beliefs" are not based on 
further evidence. It is strange, in that case, that people's 
perceptions differ according to the culture within which they 
grow up.
Williams' claim that "one could never stop (or start)" is 
coloured by his foundationalism; I do not think that it is the 
"evidence" which led to the foundationalism. For unless one is 
inclined to foundationalism to begin with, the argument does 
not seem very convincing. One can "start" from any random 
hypothesis: if it is falsified then you will know that it is 
false; if it is never falsified then at least you will not 
suffer the awful consequences of believing something which does 
not work (a theory which leads you to navigate onto the rocks 
in a raging sea, for example); and if it is false but not 
falsified then you will continue to believe something false, 
unless you can invent a better hypothesis - and so would anyone 
else, including those people who claim that they have non- 
random beliefs which are foundational.
Williams' claim that "belief at will is impossible" presupposes 
the truth of foundationalism. For belief at will provides an
Page 172 Self-Deception
Volition/13
alternative to foundational beliefs. Foundationalism is false. 
We do not need foundational beliefs to "get started". Even 
hypothesising at will provides an alternative to foundational 
beliefs.
When someone adopts a hypothesis as a guide to action, the 
hypothesis gains a more belief-like role in his or her 
thinking. If it becomes the person's habitual guide to action, 
then it looks even more like a belief. Ask Henry Navigator if 
his hypothesis is true: "I believe so", he replies. Ask him 
why he believes it. "I've tried it, and it works". But 
falsehoods can work too, sometimes, can't they? "Yes, I did 
not say that I know it, only that I believe it: it could still 
be false. But do you know a better way of finding out?"
If belief at will is possible, then Williams' non-arbitrary 
foundational beliefs are not necessary: one can get started 
without them. Admittedly the beliefs do not get justified 
without being put to the test. But why suppose that our 
beliefs can (or should) be justified before they are put to the 
test?
Williams claims that there are non-arbitrary foundational 
beliefs. Are they a better way of finding out than Henry 
Navigator's arbitrary hypotheses? Perhaps not: for although 
they are (allegedly) foundational, that does not guarantee that
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they are true. Perhaps they are ineradicable falsehoods. 
Perhaps they are eradicable falsehoods. If they are
foundational, they cannot be corroborated or refuted by 
evidence. Yet evidence can support or falsify "perceptual
beliefs", for example. If "perceptual beliefs" are
foundational, how is it that perceptual beliefs can be tested 
in practice: when the perceptual belief passes the test, that 
is evidence for the truth of the perceptual belief: and if it
does not pass the test, then it is falsified. So, to 
summarise:
foundational beliefs do not exist
- but there must be some way to get started 
we get started by belief at will
if belief at will is impossible, then we cannot get 
started
- so belief at will must be possible.
This argument is a mirror to Williams' argument for
foundational beliefs, which goes like this:
- belief at will is impossible
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but there must be some way to get started
we get started by acquiring foundational beliefs
if there are no foundational beliefs, then we cannot get 
started
so there must be some foundational beliefs.
I claim that we can believe at will, not in the sense of 
willing "directly" - using the magic button - but in the sense 
that sometimes we can voluntarily alter the normal processes by 
which beliefs are acquired. One of the voluntary processes for 
acquiring beliefs is "leaping to conclusions"; and, in an 
argument which paralleled Williams' argument for 
foundationalism, I argued that "leaping" is the only way our 
beliefs get started. Therefore "leaping" is a justifiable 
strategy. But it does not justify the beliefs to which we 
leap. That justification comes, if at all, when we test our 
beliefs.
So far as I know, nobody doubts that we are able to leap to 
conclusions. Many people doubt that there are foundational 
beliefs. So if we assessed our arguments on an electoral 
basis, more people would vote for my claim than would vote for 
the claim Williams makes!
Self-Deception Page 175
Volition/13
Against my claim it can be argued that someone who leaps to 
conclusions does so on the basis of evidence — inadequate 
evidence, to be sure, but evidence nonetheless; therefore my 
argument does not show that there must be beliefs at will.
I agree that we sometimes leap to conclusions on the basis of 
evidence. That does not show that there is always evidence 
when someone leaps to conclusions; "inadequate evidence" can 
mean: "no evidence at all".
There is an equivocation on the word 'evidence' which could 
make my argument seem less appealing. In one of the preceding 
chapters I distinguished between "evidence" and "data", and 
argued that:
1. evidence can "compel" belief but only if we construct it - 
and the construction of evidence can be voluntary
2. we do not construct data, but nor does it "compel" belief.
The idea that evidence is a "magic button" (which compels 
belief) is due to using the word "evidence" to refer to both 
what I call data and what I call evidence. Since it is up to 
us whether or not to construct evidence, evidence can only 
"compel" our beliefs if we consent to be "compelled". However, 
there may be plenty of things which can coerce us into giving
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that consent, or witholding it. These forms of coercion are 
more to do with our motives than with data or evidence.
My argument against Williams may provoke incredulity: "do you 
mean to say that we can believe whatever we want!"
That is not quite what I mean (though it is supported by, for 
example, Julius Caesar: "men willingly believe what they wish" 
- Caesar [1951], I.iii.18). I agree with Hume, that sometimes 
belief responds to the will, sometimes it does not. But this 
"merely a contingent fact" can be explained by describing the 
processes by which beliefs are acquired.
I am not suggesting that we can always believe whatever we 
want. Sometimes we can believe at will things that we do not 
want to believe. For example, one may not want to believe that 
one is less than perfect: it may be much more comfortable to
believe one is flawless. But one may also want to believe the 
truth, and the truth may be that one is not flawless. The 
desire for truth may be stronger than the desire for comfort.
Let's take another example: Henry Navigator "leaps to the
conclusion" that his hypothesis is true. I do not see that 
"wanting" enters into it (it could do, of course, if we set up 
the example in the right way; and I shall suggest some 
examples later). Henry believes the hypothesis "at will" but
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it would be misleading to say that he believes it because he 
wants to: that would suggest desires which Henry may not have. 
In particular, it may suggest that Henry wants to believe the 
hypothesis whether or not it works - which would be false.
Williams argues against belief "directly" at will, conceding: 
"but there is room for the application of decision to believe 
by more roundabout routes": "for we all know that there are 
causal factors, unconnected with truth, which can produce 
belief: hypnotism, drugs, all sorts of things could bring it 
about that I believe that p" (pl49) . Someone could use these 
factors to acquire a belief independent of considerations of 
truth. Williams add that such a project is:
very deeply irrational, and I think that most of us would 
have a very strong impulse against engaging in a project 
of this kind however uncomfortable these truths were which 
we were having to live with. (pl50)
My reply is: perhaps, perhaps not. I do not know what impulse 
most of us would have. It is misleading to talk about 
"roundabout routes" for it implies that there is some more 
direct route, when there is not. For Williams this more direct 
route is provided by a magic button, namely evidence.
Page 178 Self-Deception
Volition/13
Williams concedes that rationality is a desideratum, a norm 
rather than a psychological law. He also concedes that there 
may be causal factors unconnected with truth which can produce 
belief. These factors seem to me worth considering: we might 
find, for example, that the elements of hypnosis which make it 
an effective generator of belief can also be used "directly", 
at will.
There might be many more of these "causal factors unconnected 
with truth": and some of them might be the starting points 
which Williams claims we do not have unless we have 
foundational beliefs which are not arbitrary. Causal factors 
unconnected to truth can give us starting points for belief; 
they might not be justifiable starting points in Williams' 
sense of not being arbitrary "relative to the probability of 
being true"; but I see no reason to suppose that our starting- 
points are justifiable. Justification by results - because 
they work - or by logic - because they are logical truths - are 
the only kinds of justification I will concede: there is no 
reason to suppose that there is any sort of prior-to-experience 
justification of the kind needed for foundational beliefs.
There is also disagreement about what constitutes 
"rationality". There might be a trade-off between 




Consider some cases in which beliefs are generated by causes 
"unconnected with truth". For example, consider brainwashing. 
Why does it work? Here is a suggestion: brainwashing is 
achieved by making it extremely unpleasant for the victim to 
express his own beliefs: expressing those beliefs meets an 
extremely hostile reception, including verbal and perhaps 
physical abuse. This leads the victim to outwardly conform to 
the demands of the people doing the brainwashing.
Outward conformity requires the victim to do a certain amount 
of information processing: he needs to be able to predict what 
response is required, and make that response. The brainwashing 
sessions crowd out any time the victim might have had to think 
his own thoughts. The victim's own beliefs are never 
rehearsed, never aired, never used: they fall into decay and 
gradually the responses he is compelled to make create a 
changed psychic environment or "mind set": outward conformity 
leads to inward conformity too.
The information processing which he is compelled to perform 
then takes on the role of beliefs and the former beliefs cease 
to perform that role: they join the store of unused 
hypotheses, speculations, etc, which everyone carries around in 
their heads. In short, the victim's beliefs fade away from 
lack of use, while he is forced to use the brainwashers' 
proposals as though they were beliefs - and thereby they become
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beliefs. He "gets the habit" of acting as though he believed 
them. But this habit may become indistinguishable from belief.
If brainwashing works in the way I am suggesting, then it is 
only an extreme case of the "socialisation" we all go through 
by virtue of living in society with other people. If 
brainwashing works then so (in a less extreme but no less all- 
pervading way) will socialisation. The sort of socialisation 
will be relative to the sort of society and to one's position 
within it. If it is possible to change one's position in 
society then it is also possible to adjust the kind of 
socialisation to which one is subjected.
Let us take a further instance of causal factors influencing 
beliefs in a way unconnected with truth: subliminal 
advertising. Suppose that a cinema audience is subjected to a 
momentary message flashed on the screen; the event is over so 
quickly that the audience is not aware of the message. The 
message says "buy icecream!" and, in the interval, the cinema 
sells more icecream as a result.
What happens now if a member of the audience is asked to 
explain why he bought icecream in the interval. Probably he 
gives an explanation in terms of beliefs and desires. We, 
however, are in the know: we know that there is a well-tested 
observation that subliminal advertising can lead people to buy
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icecream; and we know that this member of the audience has 
been subjected to subliminal advertising. We also know that 
similar sorts of explanation are forthcoming when people are 
asked to explain actions which they performed in response to 
post-hypnotic suggestion. For example, someone under hypnosis 
is given a suggestion that after the hypnosis session is over, 
he will open a window when he sees the hypnotist make a signal; 
the session comes to an end; after a few minutes the hypnotist 
gives the signal, and the person who was hypnotised goes and 
opens the window. During those few minutes he is also observed 
to be covertly watching for the hypnotist to give the signal.
He is then asked why he opened the window, and gives an 
explanation: for example, that the room felt stuffy and he 
needed some fresh air.
What has happened? The person who was hypnotised seems unaware 
that he responded to a post-hypnotic suggestion, and also 
unaware of watching for the signal - even though observers 
could see him "keeping an eye on" the hypnotist. If we are 
correct in saying that the action of opening the window 
resulted from the suggestion made while he was under hypnosis, 
then where did the person’s own explanation of the action come 
from? He must have invented it, and by "invented it" I do not 
mean a deliberate lie: I suggest that the explanation was 
inferred from the behaviour, in just the same way as an
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observer might make the same inference with the same limited 
information: for example, the observer might have come into 
the room after the session of hypnosis and before the signal 
was given.
If my suggestion is correct then we have found a case in which 
someone infers his own beliefs and desires from his own 
behaviour, i.e. was deceived by his own behaviour in just the 
same way that someone could be deceived by the behaviour of 
another person. For the behaviour to be deceptive we must make 
the inference, and to make the inference we must presuppose 
that if there is an action then there will be beliefs and 
desires which explain it. But in the case we are considering 
it seems that the beliefs and desires do not really explain the 
action, indeed the beliefs and desires may never have occurred 
(for example, we can ensure that the room is not stuffy, so 
that there is no basis for the person to believe that it is 
stuffy or to wish for fresh air).
It is hard to imagine an action that cannot be explained by 
reference to beliefs and desires, for we are so inclined to 
think that there must be some such explanation if only we can 
find it; in cases where we cannot find it, we may still feel 
that there must be an explanation, or we may decide that the 
"action" was not an action after all but something which merely 
happened to the person, like a knee-jerk reaction.
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So how does subliminal advertising or post-hypnotic suggestion 
work? Not through the ratiocinative processes of critical 
thought, not through the processes of reason-giving and 
justification in terms of beliefs and desires); those 
processes are bypassed. Some other process or processes 
operates, and it seems inappropriate to apply the explanatory 
apparatus of "beliefs and desires" to it - for when we do try 
to apply that explanatory apparatus the result is that we make 
misleading inferences and draw false conclusions.
Suppose that someone does make the inference to explain his own 
behaviour, e.g. "the room is stuffy", to explain the action of 
opening the window. Although the inference is false, 
nonetheless it now becomes his belief that the room is (or was, 
prior to opening the window) stuffy; the inference from the 
action generates the belief: it generates "evidence" which 
seems to confirm its correctness.
Now consider someone who does something "for no reason at all", 
"out of high spirits", etc: let say that Henry has too much to 
drink, sees a policeman and knocks the policeman's hat off - 
for no reason at all, "for its own sake", "for the fun of it". 
Summoned to court to explain his action, Henry says that the 
policeman was harassing him, looked at him in a very aggressive 
way, and so on. And Henry seems to sincerely believe what he 
is saying. Perhaps he really is sincere - as sincere as the
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person carrying out the post-hypnotic suggestion. He has been 
asked to explain his behaviour and he gives the best 
explanation he can. It just happens to be false.
We can only detect someone's beliefs and desires through their 
behaviour - the things they do and say. Sometimes they too may 
make the inferences from their own behaviour: they are then in 
no better position than us to decide what beliefs and desires 
(if any) may have been involved in the behaviour. Someone 
might perform an action for its own sake, knowing that by doing 
so he was committed to having the action explained in terms of 
beliefs and desires; and yet, prior to the action, he never 
experienced such beliefs and desires. The only reason for 
positing such beliefs and desires is that they are required for 
explanation of the action: the action is taken as a 
prototypical action for those beliefs and desires: and so the 
beliefs and desires are, as it were, created by "back- 
projection" from the action.
Someone who wanted to have those beliefs and desires, then, 
could gain them by means of the behaviour: the behaviour 
would create them by "back-projection". Pascal suggests 
something like this for those who wish to gain religious faith: 
"go to mass and take holy water" is his advice: behave like a 
believer, and the beliefs will follow.
Self-Deception Page 185
Volition/13
we are as much automaton as mind. ... we must resort to
habit once the mind has seen where the truth lies, in
order to steep and stain ourselves in that belief which 
constantly eludes us, for it is too much trouble to have 
the proofs always present before us. We must acquire an 
easier belief, which is that of habit. With no violence, 
art or argument it makes us believe things. (Pascal 
[1966], p274)
But, it might be argued, the case is different when someone 
behaves that way with the aim of gaining a belief. In the case 
of post-hypnotic suggestion, there may have been no belief or 
desire when the behaviour was taking place: the belief and 
desire posited by the explanation could therefore occupy the 
place which was, prior to then, a vacuum. But someone who 
adopts behaviour in order to acquire a belief already has a 
desire and belief which explain the behaviour: "back- 
projection" will therefore try to fill a space which is already 
occupied: an explanation in terms of beliefs and desires 
already exists, so that the back-projection will fail.
It is by no means clear that the back-projection will fail. 
After all, if behaviour can create beliefs in the case of 
brainwashing, why shouldn't it do so in this case? Why should 
behaviour be an effective generator of belief in one case but 
not in the other?
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" T h e  M i s t e r  M e n " :  T h r e e  
C a s e s  O f  S e l f - D e c e p t i o n
Mr Negligent, Mr Mobile and Mr Radical all live in the same 
small community. Any news does the rounds very quickly, so 
they all have access to the same data; yet their beliefs 
differ, for they interpret the data in different ways.
Mr Negligent can claim the sanction of tradition for his way of 
interpreting data: it is the way anyone (that is, "anyone who 
is anyone") would interpret data, the "natural interpretation". 
What this means in practice is that if you do the sort of 
things Mr Negligent does in the circumstances which Mr 
Negligent occupies, then to interpret data as Mr Negligent does 
takes no noticeable effort whatever.
Mr Negligent takes it for granted that the natural 
interpretation must yield true beliefs. Other people in the 
community are less confident. Mr Radical, for example, thinks 
that Mr Negligent has false beliefs.
Mr Radical points out that tradition can sanction mistakes. 




Sometimes we can detect and correct our false beliefs simply by 
thinking about what we already know, without having to seek any 
further evidence. Mr Negligent could do so, for example. But, 
in Mr Radical's view, it suits Mr Negligent to have the beliefs 
he has. For while it is true that having false beliefs can 
have very deleterious consequences, in Mr Negligent's case the 
awful consequences befall other people, while Mr Negligent 
reaps rewards. Mr Negligent does not mind this since he lacks 
sympathy for the suffering of others and shrugs off his 
responsibility for causing those sufferings; the social setup 
is such that he can get away with it.
Mr Radical holds Mr Negligent responsible for having false 
beliefs. He points out that Mr Negligent could easily have 
corrected his mistakes, only it suited him not to do so. Mr 
Radical calls Mr Negligent a self-deceiver. He blames Mr 
Negligent not for what he does, but for what he fails to do; 
not for what he intends, but for the lack of an intention which 
he ought to have had.
Mr Mobile is one of those who suffers as a result of Mr 
Negligent's false beliefs. But Mr Mobile does not blame Mr 
Negligent. He admires and envies Mr Negligent although he is 
sure that Mr Negligent's beliefs are false. It seems to Mr 
Mobile that it would be worth putting up with the false beliefs 
for the sake of the rewards reaped by Mr Negligent. For Mr
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Mobile reasons that the false beliefs are a by-product of 
behaving as Mr Negligent does in the circumstances Mr Negligent 
occupies.
Mr Mobile takes Mr Negligent as an exemplar of the recipe for 
success. By following the recipe Mr Mobile aims to gain the 
same results as Mr Negligent - both the rewards and the 
beliefs. For the beliefs play a role in protecting Mr 
Negligent from any pangs of guilt for the way he is behaving.
So in Mr Mobile's view, Mr Negligent is a role-model for 
belief-acquisition: Mr Negligent has (or perhaps we should say 
is) the recipe by which one can acquire the particular beliefs 
which he has.
Mr Radical regards Mr Mobile too as a self-deceiver.
Mr Negligent, while content to turn a blind eye to his own 
shortcomings, is more than willing to analyse Mr Radical's 
failings.
This is what Mr Negligent has to say: any natural 
interpretation of the available data would lead to the 
conclusions which I have come to myself, but of course these 
conclusions do not suit Mr Radical. He cannot find any other 
data - although he would like to - and no other interpretation
Self-Deception Page 189
Mister Men/14
exists, since no interpretation other than the natural one has 
hitherto proved necessary. So Mr Radical replaces the natural 
interpretation with sheer invention. He invents a new, 
distorted interpretation of the data.
If only Mr Radical would follow the tried and tested reasoning 
which comes so naturally to all of us (sighs Mr Negligent), 
then he would inevitably arrive at the same conclusions as we 
do. For that reasoning is the process by which we generate our 
beliefs. But he avoids that process: and you cannot have the 
beliefs without having the process which generates them.
Instead of the tried and tested reasoning, Mr Radical 
substitutes some other process in its place. He consequently 
arrives at different beliefs. But what justifies this 
substitute process? Why, there is no justification whatever. 
Where did this process come from? Mr Radical invented it! 
What sort of basis does that give for belief? Not a very 
reliable one, suggests Mr Negligent. What is Mr Radical, but a 
radical self-deceiver!
Mr Radical, though, has his reply to Mr Negligent: where does 
Mr Negligent's traditional interpretation come from? It too 
was invented - we inherit not only the wisdom of the ancients 
but all their entrenched folly also, as Nietzsche pointed out. 
The traditional interpretation has been tried and tested - and
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found to have appalling consequences, though it suits Mr 
Negligent not to notice them. The justification for the 
Radical interpretation must be through its results - trying and 
testing is the only way to justify any interpretation. Mr 
Negligent is not entitled to complain that it lacks 
justification, when it has never been put to the test. Mr 
Negligent would rather that it never was tried.
Lets put these three characters into a situation and watch how 
they behave, and how they disagree.
Here is the situation: Mr Negligent is a senior manager 
working for a large company. Mr Mobile is a junior manager for 
the same company, and Mr Radical is a still more junior member 
of the staff.
Mr Negligent believes that promotion within the company is on 
the basis of merit, merit being the ability to do one's job 
well. It suits him to believe this, for if it turned out that 
his own promotion had something to do with being a nephew of 
one of the owners, for example, then his position, authority 
and self-esteem might all be called into question.
Mr Mobile is firmly convinced (rightly or wrongly) that 
promotion within the company depends upon being accepted as a 
member of the "old boy network" and has very little to do with
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merit. However, he knows that to say so would ruin any chances 
of promotion which he might have. He also knows that if he 
stays on and outwardly conforms in a way which will gain him
promotion. then that conformity will shape his attitudes and
beliefs as well . In the end he will become just like old
Negligent, who really believes (on very thin evidence) that
promotion is on the basis of merit.
Mr Radical too is firmly convinced that promotion has very 
little to do with merit. He may be right or wrong in this 
respect, but it is important for him to believe it since he has 
already been passed over for promotion a number of times: his 
self-esteem is at stake. There is very little evidence to 
support his belief (apart from old Negligent being a senior 
manager, but that might be just a ghastly mistake that someone 
made a long time ago).
Having formulated the theory that there is an old boy network, 
he finds that it explains and predicts a lot of things, such as 
the way Mr Mobile seems to be progressing so rapidly. 
Seemingly disconnected events begin to fall into patterns. His 
theory seems to work.
If we create patterns of thinking, then it is not surprising 
that events fall into the patterns - even if the patterns are 
not out there in the events but only in our thinking.
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So who is right? Suppose promotion is genuinely a result of 
merit. Mr Negligent therefore turns out to have true beliefs, 
but this is really a matter of epistemic luck since he has 
never made any attempt to test his beliefs. Mr Mobile has 
false beliefs, but his beliefs will become true as his 
circumstances mould them; of course, he deserves very little 
congratulation for this fortunate state of affairs since his 
regard for promotion far outweighs any regard he may have for 
the truth.
Mr Radical has achieved false beliefs, but this too is a matter 
of epistemic (bad) luck: they could just as easily have turned 
out to be true.
All three characters have adopted strategies typical of self- 
deception, although only one has acquired a false belief as a 
result. Their strategies would have been the same if the facts 
had been different. Suppose the truth had been that promotion 
was not given on merit. In that case Mr Negligent would be 
self-deceived, Mr Mobile would have been headed for self- 
deception and Mr Radical, though lacking a false belief, would 
have adopted the strategy of a self-deceiver.
The three strategies I have mentioned are not paradoxical. The 
next few chapters explain why.
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The basis of Negligence theories is simple: Negligence 
theories recognise that it is very easy to make mistakes, and 
not always so easy to avoid them. The mistakes can result in 
our having false beliefs. To avoid the mistakes may require a 
degree of diligence. We are not always forced to be diligent: 
we may not make the effort, we may instead neglect to do things 
which would prevent our having false beliefs. So we may be 
responsible (in rather a strong sense of the word 
'responsible') for being mistaken, or for being in ignorance.
Negligence is the prototypical way of being responsible for 
something of which one is wholly unaware, something which one 
never intended. For example the negligent driver may cause an 
accident: he did not intend to cause the accident, nor did he 
intend not to cause the accident: he never gave it a thought. 
He was not aware of causing the accident - not until it was too 
late to do anything about it.
Take another example: a metallurgist is testing a sample of 
aluminium to check that it conforms to the standard required. 
She is negligent: without testing the sample properly, she
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confirms that the aluminium conforms to the standard. But It 
is sub-standard, though she does not know it. She confirms "in 
good faith" that the aluminium is of the quality required. As 
a result, the aluminium is used in building an aeroplane, and 
shortly afterwards the wings fall off while the aeroplane is 
flying over the Atlantic. She did not intend this to happen; 
she was wholly unaware that it was going to happen. 
Nonetheless she is responsible: the disaster happens because of 
her negligence.
Being mistaken or in ignorance may suit us very well. For 
having false beliefs may not be disastrous for us: sometimes 
we benefit while other people suffer the disaster on our 
behalf. If, like Mr Negligent, we lack sympathy for other 
people, then we may not feel moved to alter the situation which 
benefits us.
For example, a false belief about one's own conduct can give 
the benefit of a quiet conscience; an easy bigotry can 
sidestep the torments of self-doubt and self-condemnation, 
while smoothing the way to picking up the glittering prizes at 
someone else's expense. One can maintain a sort of sensitivity 
while not bringing it to bear upon one's own acts: a tyrant 
can watch theatrical productions and participate in the 
experiences offered to the audience, condemning the deeds 
portrayed though he does the same and worse every day.
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Negligence theories show that there can be non-paradoxical 
cases of self-deception. People with false beliefs, who are 
able but unwilling to have true beliefs, can be counted as 
being self-deceived through negligence.
However there are, in my opinion, instances of self-deception 
which cannot be explained by negligence theories. Negligent 
self-deception is passive: it does not create false beliefs 
(or false doubts, or redeemable ignorance), it just neglects to 
dispel them. It relies on something else to generate the 
beliefs, something which is already in place. Butler suggests 
that "self-love" performs this role. Plato (as interpreted or 
misinterpreted by me) implies that the role is performed by the 
appetites or by ambition having mastery over reason, and the 
self-deceiver neglects to "restore the balance".
Yet there may be instances of self-deception where the 
deception is not derived from a pre-existing source of error. 
There may be cases in which the generator of the belief has to 
be invented, or sought, rather than just being effortlessly 
available.
In later chapters I go on to consider what it is that generates 
the deception. For negligence alone is not sufficient to 
explain self-deception. It describes what the self-deceiver 
does not do, but not what he does.
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The strength of negligence theories is that they do not require 
that the self-deceiver knows or intends what he is doing. 
Negligence is a way of being responsible through lack of 
knowledge and intention. If we now look for the positive 
generators of deception, we may lose that advantage, and have 
to explain, in the face of the paradoxes, how the self-deceiver 
can know and intend the deception and still be deceived.
A weakness of some Negligence theories (e.g. Mounce [1971], 
Peterman [1983]) is that self-deception is treated as an 
aberration from the normal way of acquiring beliefs: and this 
normal way of acquiring beliefs is taken to be something like 
doing enquiry in a "proper" way. The proper way is taken to be 
one which conforms to some set of epistemic standards or 
guidelines for seeking truth and avoiding falsehood.
This treatment seems to me an inversion of the true situation. 
The epistemic standards are subjects for disagreement; they 
are developed over long periods of time, with great effort and 
many mistakes. By contrast, self-deception has no methodology, 
no historical development, and seems often to be effortless and 
unerring.
Negligence can result in false beliefs only if the false 
beliefs are acquired by doing what comes naturally. Self- 
deception, therefore, can hardly be correctly described as an
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aberration from the usual ways of acquiring beliefs. A better 
description would be that self-deception is one way of doing 
what comes naturally, unconstrained by epistemic norms. It is 
better to explain the epistemic norms as a development of 
"doing what comes naturally" rather than to try to explain 
self-deception as an aberration from the norms. For one thing, 
all the epistemic norms that I recall serve to restrain belief, 
not to generate it: that is why scepticism plays such a large 
role in the development of epistemology as a methodology of 
enquiry, and why creativity has not been given such a role.
Negligence alone seems rather a restricted strategy for self- 
deception. Indeed in the absence of motives of an appropriate 
kind (discussed below), negligence may not be self-deception at 
all.
For example, someone may neglect to find out just how many 
earwigs there are in Europe, because he is more concerned to 
find out where his next meal is coming from: epistemic 
negligence which is localised may be explained and neutralised 
by epistemic diligence in another area which is more important, 
or which has more consequences, so that we would not wish to 
describe it as self-deception, and perhaps would not even wish 
to describe it as negligence.
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Another example: someone may be epistemically negligent 
through sheer laziness. He may be culpably deceived, yet not 
count as self-deceived. The difference between this kind of 
culpable error and self-deception, I think, is that a lazy 
person's motive is not linked to any particular belief or 
doxastic state. The lazy person in my example may 
indifferently count belief as good as ignorance, and false 
belief as good as true. Whereas, for a self-deceiver, the 
motive is connected to a particular belief (or the lack of that 
particular belief) and other beliefs would not be equally 
acceptable. That, anyway, is my intuition about how the word 
'self-deception' is often used, and while there may be equally 
acceptable interpretations which differ from mine, it is the 
interpretation I am at work upon.
Negligence is only one of the strategies which a self-deceiver 
may adopt. It is so because it relies upon the situation being 
already set up so that just the belief required is generated, 
without any positive action from the self-deceiver, whose only 
role is to succumb to the charms of the situation.
A policy of mixed negligence and diligence would seem to offer 
more opportunities for self-deception. Negligence would be the 
response when the situation encourages the generation of a 
belief which suits the self-deceiver; otherwise diligence 
would be the response. The diligence might be diligent
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criticism, to bring doubt upon an unwanted belief, or diligent 
generation of hypotheses, to introduce more options.
Introducing more options is a way of extending the self­
deceiver's room for manouvre. For example, consider choosing a 
newspaper: if there is a wide range of newspapers to choose 
from, each representing a different slant and different ways of 
selecting what to report, then the self-deceiver can choose a 
newspaper which will tell him what he wants to hear. But there 
is a disadvantage as well: the self-deceiver may prefer there 
to be just one newspaper, provided it confirms his favoured 
belief (or lack of belief). For that would cut out the risk of 
being disillusioned.
The range of options might also be a range of exemplars of 
belief. Suppose person A has a belief; A might be said to 
have (wittingly or unwittingly) the recipe for that belief. An 
observer, person B, who wanted to believe what A believes, 
could use A as an exemplar: by aiming to put himself in the 
same position as A, and doing the same sort of things as A, 
person B may be able to successfully mimic A's recipe for 
belief, and so gain the belief.
Yet there may be no exemplars to follow, if the belief required 
is idiosyncratic. In that case the situation would not exist 
which allowed A to acquire his beliefs by negligence. Nor
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could B gain beliefs by mimicry, copying a successful recipe 
for belief. Someone wishing to gain such an idiosyncratic 
belief would be obliged to invent the means to acquire the 
belief. Of course "the means" is the heart of the matter: it 
is the engine which generates the deception. Negligence is a 
contributory factor only insofar as it allows the deception to 
proceed. Self-deception by mimicry is a way of setting up the 
engine - the generator of the belief.
Negligence theories are also vulnerable to another kind of 
objection. Someone who is negligent may not bother to look for 
the evidence which would destroy his false belief; he may not 
think through the arguments which would make his belief 
untenable. But there are plenty of other people to do so on 
his behalf. They may present the evidence to him. They may go 
through the arguments with him. Sometimes he may be unable to 
avoid them. The false beliefs will then be liable to collapse 
under the onslaught of all the evidence and arguments which the 
self-deceiver did not bother to seek out. Even if he manages 
to avoid the confrontation, the very fact that he has avoided 
it indicates that he has been forced to alter his strategy. 
For instead of being passively ignorant of the evidence and the 
arguments, he is now actively ignoring them. Ignoring 
something is not at all the same as being ignorant of it: 
ignoring something involves being aware of something and
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actively doing something to avoid being aware of it: we come 
back to the problems of Avoidance theories.
Negligence alone is not going to be sufficient to explain self- 
deception in more than a minority of cases. Negligence 
theories are adequate to explain only those cases of self- 
deception where the self-deceiver is protected from evidence 
and argument which would destroy the deception. When the self­
deceiver has to do something to protect the deception, we are 
out of the realms of negligence. It takes more than an act of 
omission - it takes an act of commission - to sustain the self- 
deception in these circumstances. We are forced back to the 
claim that "the self-deceiver must know what he is up to", 
since that knowledge is needed to guide the strategy by which 
he "steers around the evidence" etc.
Negligence theories held the promise that we would be able to 
reject this claim, and thereby avoid the paradox of self- 
deception. The available negligence theories, in their current 
state of development, cannot deliver what they promised. To 
make them do so, we need to add two further elements.
The first thing we need to supplement negligence theories is a 
way of showing that "active" self-deception does not need to be 
guided by knowledge any more than "passive" self-deception
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does. This element enables us to avoid one route to the 
paradox.
The second thing is to show how the self-deceiver is able to 
protect the deception against the coercive power of evidence 
and argument. Evidence and argument are supposed to be 
(sometimes, at least) "compelling", i.e. powerful enough to 
destroy one belief (such as the self-deceiver's favoured 
belief) and replace it with another (e.g. belief in something 
they make "obvious" or "evident"). This element is needed in 
order to deny the claim of the incredulous observer, that the 
self-deceiver "must" know something-or-other because it is 
obvious, and therefore the self-deceiver "must know that he is 
deceiving himself". In this way we can avoid another route to 
the paradox.
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Role Dissimulation theories are Avoidance theories. They argue 
that the self-deceiver knows what he is doing, and that despite 
this knowledge, he is self-deceived. They claim that role 
playing is the technique used to deceive oneself. Role 
dissimulation is, as critics of the theories point out, 
"merely pretending". But the fact that someone is merely 
pretending does not rule out self-deception. By pretending, 
one can suspend disbelief (and suspend belief). By adopting a 
role, one can defer an unwelcome belief. Acting as if one does 
not have the belief, one need not use it to interpret data, nor 
need one use it to guide action; and instead of the belief 
evoking emotions, the emotions may be evoked by the role one is 
playing. So Role Dissimulation theories can explain how a 
self-deceiver "dissociates" or disconnects beliefs from 
actions, emotions, perceptions, and other beliefs.
However, someone who is self-deceived by dissimulating a role 
must also be constantly spoiling the self-deception. For he 
must be constantly refering back to the knowledge which guides 
the role, in order to steer the role and also, occasionally, to 
decide if the role is still worth sustaining. Also, if the 
role playing is periodic rather than continuous, he must decide
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when to stop role-playing and when to start. This must disrupt 
the role-playing considerably.
If we suppose that dissimulation is a way of deceiving oneself, 
though, we may go on to ask why simulation is not also a way of 
deceiving oneself. For, as I argued in a preceding chapter, 
the difference between simulation and dissimulation is only a 
matter of degree: dissimulation is more restricted than 
simulation. As a result dissimulation forces the self-deceiver 
to continually start and stop the role playing as he moves 
between situations in which the restrictions do not apply, and 
situations in which they do. Simulation - because the role is 
not restricted - does not force the self-deceiver to 
continually start and stop.
The dissimulating self-deceiver may be able to prevent this 
stopping and starting, by avoiding situations in which the 
restrictions curtail the self-deception; but in order to avoid 
those situations, the self-deceiver needs to refer to the 
beliefs which the role was meant to disconnect and thereby 
disable. For otherwise he will not know which situations to 
avoid. However, if the self-deceiver lifts the restrictions 
upon the role playing - i.e. if he starts simulating rather 
than dissimulating - then he need not refer back to the 
unwelcome belief at all. For, despite the argument that he 
"must know what he denies, in order to steer round the
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evidence", all that is needed is that he has some means of 
"steering around the evidence": he needs know-how rather than 
knowledge-that, and for this purpose a false belief may be as 
effective as a true one. Indeed, the history of enquiry 
suggests that a false belief is very often far more effective 
for "steering around the evidence".
Koestler [1968] provides some examples of (unwittingly) 
"steering around the evidence" by the use of false beliefs, 
false theories, false hypotheses. Koestler describes the long 
process of enquiry by which Kepler arrived at his Second Law of 
Planetary motion; Koestler then has this to say:
by three incorrect steps and their even more incorrect 
defence, Kepler stumbled upon the correct law. It is 
perhaps the most amazing sleepwalking performance in the 
history of science - except for the manner in which he 
found his first law (p333)
Kepler unwittingly "steered around the evidence" for years; he 
did so by the use of false theories. Koestler again:
At this point, the sleepwalker's intuition failed him, he 
seems to be overcome by dizziness, and clutches at the 
first prop he can find. ... and he falls back on the old
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quack remedy which he has just abjured, the conjuring up 
of an epicycle! (p334)
To make the worthless hypothesis work, he temporarily 
repudiated his own, immortal Second Law - to no avail. 
Finally, a kind of snowblindness seemed to descend upon 
him: he held the solution in his hand without seeing it.
(p335).
Koestler describes the activity of someone (Kepler) trying to 
gain the truth and being thwarted by the "worthless hypotheses" 
he uses. Imagine how effective a "worthless hypothesis" would 
be when used by someone who does not wish to gain the truth, 
indeed who cherishes a falsehood. Kepler's efforts also 
follow upon thousands of years when other, false, theories of 
planetary motion were adopted without any hint of being refuted 
by "the evidence". The evidence was "steered around" very 
successfully without the use of a true theory. Nobody had a 
true theory with which to "steer", and yet people did not 
notice, or did not recognise the implications of, "the 
evidence" which would have refuted their false theories.
It may or may not be possible for someone to be self-deceived 
by role dissimulation. Dissimulation could certainly be used 
to defer making use of a true belief that one has. Deferring 
the use of a true belief is a sort of self-deception - the sort
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described by Dissociation theories as "believing something but 
not thinking it," or words to that effect. So Role 
Dissimulation theories can go some way towards supplying the 
details which are missing in Dissociation theories. Yet how 
much easier it would be to deceive oneself by simulation - 
which is much more belief-like and does not require the self­
deceiver to "really know what he is doing". Role Simulation 
theories thereby seem to remove the paradoxes of self-deception 
at a stroke. Self-deception as characterised by Role 
Simulation theories is not so much mere pretence as sheer 
pretence: pretence which places false theories in the action- 
guiding and interpretive role which is performed by beliefs.
Before discussing Role Simulation theories further, I provide a 
chapter on Sartre's discussion of Bad Faith (Sartre [1975]). 
On my reading, Sartre characterises bad faith as a metastable 
process which "slides" between dissimulation ("cynicism") and 
simulation ("good faith"). However Sartre's characterisation 
can also be read as a description of role dissimulation only - 
the "slide" being between role-playing and momentarily dropping 
the role in order to refer to a guiding belief. My reading is 
intended to be the most "charitable" reading - attributing to 
Sartre the best theory I can read into his descriptions of bad 
faith. If Sartre's is a Role Dissimulation theory of self- 
deception, then it is vulnerable to the paradoxes of self- 
deception which haunt all Avoidance theories. For the self­
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deceiver must have knowledge in order to deceive himself, and 
one would expect the knowledge to spoil the deception. Role 
Dissimulation theories are at their strongest in describing 
instances which can be plausibly described as deferring the use 
of one's beliefs. Where the self-deception does not seem like 
a deferring strategy, some other theory must be used. Role 
Simulation theories offer us this opportunity. Sartre, on my 
"charitable" reading describes how role dissimulation could be 
a stage in a process which leads towards role simulation. 
Someone who engages in role dissimulation is in the process of 
deceiving himself, and is on the way to being self-deceived; 
someone who engages in role simulation has achieved self- 
deception.
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I assume, along with other writers (e.g. Santoni [1978], 
Russell [1978], Morris [1980]), that Sartre's description of 
bad faith is a description of self-deception. Bad faith, he 
tells us, is a metastable state, "sliding" between good faith 
and cynicism; we could gloss this by saying that it is a 
movement between states rather than an achieved state. 
Nonetheless it can be long-lasting, and may even be a way of 
life for a great many people. A person in bad faith exploits 
the nature of consciousness in order to "flee from freedom".
Sartre makes a number of distinctions:
between pre-reflective consciousness and reflective 
consciousness
. Russell [1978] describes this as a difference between 
"immersing" and "detaching" consciousness; I discuss 
this further below
between past, present and future aspects of the self
within the temporal synthesis of consciousness
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between the first-person perspective ("being-for-itself" 
or "being-for-oneself") and a third-person perspective 
("being-for-others")
- between different senses of the word 11', namely:
. my body (as in "I have blue eyes")
. a summary of patterns of past behaviour (as in "I am 
a coward" - an attribution of character traits)
. a chosen ideal self or "fundamental project" which 
gives structure, purpose and meaning to one's 
activities.
Morris [1980] remarks (correctly):
Sartre has often been interpreted as a nihilist because of 
his claim that the human being begins as "nothing". It 
would be more accurate, I think, to see that Sartre is 
offering an activist version of the traditional 
empiricist's "blank tablet" view of man. (p36)
Sartre's distinctions allow us to describe a number of 
strategies for self-deception. The person in bad faith can 
trade off different aspects of selfhood in order to disavow
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freedom and responsibility. For brevity, let us call one such 
person "B" (for Bad faith).
B can pretend that the present and the future are as decided as 
the past, by identifying wholly with his past self - thereby 
avoiding responsibility for present and future actions, since 
(according to the pretence) one's nature, or character, is 
fixed. The motto for this variety of faith might be, "you 
can't teach an old dog new tricks".
Another option is for B to ignore the "fundamental project" 
manifested by a pattern of actions in the past. B can own up 
to the actions, but treat them as isolated, trivial episodes, 
and refuse to see the pattern. B treats them as 
uncharacteristic deviations from the "ideal self" rather than 
as developments which cumulatively form his or her character 
and which, therefore, in practice constitute the "fundamental 
project". A motto for this variety of bad faith might be, "I 
wasn't myself - its so unlike me to do such a thing".
Garcin, a character in Sartre's play No Exit, exemplifies this 
strategy. He identifies himself with his future ideal self and 
denies the relevance of the third-personal perspective (the 
audience's perspective) which reveals his acts to be moving 




Sartre's account is a Role theory of self-deception. We should 
note, though, that Sartre has a role theory of human nature: 
the role you adopt determines what you are. If you take on the 
role of a waiter, for example, then you are a waiter. Sartre 
describes a waiter who tries to be "nothing but a waiter" as 
being in bad faith. Not because he is pretending to be a 
waiter - he is a waiter - but by pretending that being a waiter 
is "in his nature", not something he could choose to alter. He 
thereby tries to evade his freedom to do (and be) something 
else instead, and shrugs off responsibility for his choices.
It might seem that in Sartre's account bad faith is "merely 
pretending", that the self-deceiver is not really deceived. 
But Sartre has a way of avoiding this objection. Firstly, we 
should question the "mereness" of "merely pretending". The 
person in bad faith is playing a role - but in Sartre's account 
we are all playing roles, with more or less conviction. 
Adopting a role is a way to constitute what one is. There is 
no "deeper" reality masked by the role: the role is the 
reality. This does not mean that by pretending to be Napoleon 
Bonaparte I can become Napoleon Bonaparte. It means that I am 
someone playing the role of Napoleon Bonaparte - there is no 
more genuine self hidden beneath or behind the role. In 
Sartre's example, by adopting the role of a waiter one becomes 
a waiter (of course, one must get the job in order to adopt the 
role - otherwise playing the role is indeed mere pretence).
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Often we are not reflecting upon the role - we are "immersed" 
in it, as Russell puts it. But when we reflect upon the role, 
we become "detached" from it: instead of playing the role, we 
are thinking about it - adopting a different role. The person 
in bad faith "knows that believing always comes short of 
believing": consciousness of believing "spoils" belief. This 
is like the situation described by Palmer [1979]: one can make 
predictions about what someone else is going to do, but when 
one makes predictions about one's own future actions, the 
predictions cannot be distinguished from decisions.
I think that this is how Sartre regards reflection upon belief. 
By reflecting upon the belief, I detach myself from it, and I 
make it subject to my will. For if I choose to become 
something different from what I currently am then I become apt 
to believe things different from what I currently believe. 
Hence "belief always falls short of belief" (whilst we are 
reflecting upon it). So the person in bad faith decides that 
non-persuasion is constitutive of all convictions; "it [bad 
faith] accepts not believing what it believes". It plays a 
role of believing because, upon reflection, all beliefs are 
role-playing.
Playing the role, however, the person in bad faith is not all 
the time reflecting upon the performance. Instead of being 
"detached" he is "immersed": he becomes what he is pretending
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to be - in this case, a believer. Now it suits the person in 
bad faith not to reflect upon the performance: reflection is 
dangerous because it contains the invitation to be something 
different. Sartre illustrates this with the example of someone 
feeling vertigo when looking down from a great height. The 
feeling arises because one knows one is free to jump from the 
height: the recognition of that freedom makes one dizzy. 
Another example, which I prefer, is the example of the gambler 
who has decided to give up gambling, and has resolutely told 
himself of this fact. Russell [1981] remarks,
if he were to view with detachment his earlier 
pronouncements, he would thereby remove himself from that 
resolute person. So it is risky for him to reflect, with 
detachment, "You still could join the game." (p73)
Suppose he does so, and "succumbs": he goes towards the gaming 
tables; soon he is gambling. Now the dilemma is reversed: he 
could still walk away.
Now he wants to avoid any commentary which would detach 
him from his sense of being swept up in the activities of 
the table (p73)
that, I think, is part of the answer to why it would be 
important to him not to say [that he still could join the
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game]. One flees from explicitly taking the point of view 
of another, because one flees from being other than who 
one is choosing to be. (p73)
That is why bad faith is not "merely pretending": it is more 
than pretending because it is constituting oneself as a certain 
kind of person.
According to Sartre, bad faith is a precarious, "metastable" 
balancing act. The "sliding" between cynicism and good faith 
is a slide between reflective consciousness which decides that 
"all belief falls short of belief" and "immersing" 
consciousness when one is not reflecting upon the belief. But 
"good faith is still faith", Sartre remarks, suggesting that a 
person who is in good faith has not achieved Sartre's ideal 
of authenticity. Morris [1980] spells out the idea of 
authenticity implied in Sartre's Being And Nothingness:
The person who does not deceive him- or herself is 1) one 
whose moments of reflection on his pre-reflective 
activities are accurate: he has learned to see his own 
activities as objectively as an outside observer would, 
when necessary, while still preserving a sense of his own 
goals; 2) one who not only knows what seperate acts he has 
done in the past, but can see what kind of pattern they 
form; 3) one who can make the correct connections between
Page 216 Self-Deception
Sartre/17
past acts and his ideal self - seeing where the acts 
obstruct, fall short of, or actually tend in the direction 
of the ideal; and 4) one who does not mistake that 
connection for a causal connection: he accepts 
responsibility for the fact that the present and/or future 
acts might follow a somewhat or even wholly different 
pattern from the pattern of his past acts, if he chooses a 
different ideal; he does not mistake that future self for 
a predetermined goal. (p44)
With the help of the other commentators quoted above I have 
completed a brief survey of Sartre's comments on bad faith. 
There are dangers in such exegesis. My rendition of bad faith 
may be a rather radical translation - even a mistranslation - 
of Sartre. But even if this is not Sartre's account of bad 
faith, it is certainly one account of self-deception, and one 
which most commentators seem agreed upon. So now let us ask 
what, if anything, is right or wrong with it.
Some elements of bad faith are familiar landmarks in the Anglo- 
saxon tradition. For example, "focussing" and "avoidance" are 
varieties of "immersing" consciousness which are often used to 
characterise self-deception. Immersing consciousness avoids 
reflection, avoids focussing attention upon the role the person 
is playing. Instead attention is focussed upon an object other
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than the role. Reflective consciousness disarms commitment, 
and detaches the person from the role it focusses upon.
My view of self-deception differs from Sartre's account of bad 
faith in a number of ways. Firstly, in its moments of 
reflection bad faith (as described by Sartre) becomes 
cynicism: it decides to be "convinced when it is barely 
persuaded". In my account of self-deception, the self-deceiver 
need not become cynical when reflecting. For reflection, I 
suggest, consists of constructing an interpretation of the 
process of self-deception - an interpretation of an 
interpretation. This interpretation may be another 
misunderstanding of a misunderstanding. Detachment prevents 
one being immersed in the self-deception, but does not prevent 
one being deceived (in a detached, non-cynical way) about it.
Suppose this detachment takes the form of adopting a third- 
person perspective. Who is this third person? It may be 
someone objective (as Morris proposes); or it might be a 
deceiver, a self-deceiver, a tyrant, or someone just like 
oneself. Someone just like oneself will form just the same 
opinions, and so judge that the process is not self-deceptive.
On the other hand, suppose that this third person is someone 
very unlike oneself. The conclusion then may be that the 
process is self-deception: does the self-deceiver thereby
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become cynical? He may do, he may not. He may come to the 
conclusion that, "I can understand why so-and-so would think 
that I am self-deceived, given his assumptions. But I do not 
share those assumptions, so I have no reason to suppose that I 
am a self-deceiver". The self-deceiver is not forced to accept 
the third-person perspective. To think that one was obliged to 
do so would be an instance of the attempt to flee from freedom 
and responsibility, and to make someone else responsible. 
Sartre himself condemns this attempt as a "flight from freedom" 
and "bad faith", so he is not entitled to claim that the 
failure to accept a third-personal opinion is bad faith.
If I am right then self-deception need not be metastable. It 
may not be a precarious balancing-act of directed attention, 
strategic immersion and detachment, and so on. In some 
circumstances a self-deceiver can share one characteristic of 
"authenticity", namely, "to see his own activities as 
objectively as an outside observer would, when necessary, while 
still preserving a sense of his own goals" (Morris, p46).
The self-deceiver I am talking about could also "accept 
responsibility for the fact that present and/or future acts 
might follow a somewhat or even wholly different pattern from 
the pattern of his past acts, if he chooses a different ideal; 
he does not mistake that future self for a predetermined goal". 
Probably he does not reflect accurately upon his pre-reflective
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acts, or make the correct connections between past acts and his 
ideal self, or see what kind of pattern is formed by past acts 
- for after all, he is deceived about something. But the 
question of what is correct, what is accurate, etc, is up for 
grabs: it is not so obvious who is "authentic" and who is not 
"authentic".
I also have difficulty with some of Sartre's ontological 
apparatus. It may be just the difficulty of his terminology, 
style, love of paradox, etc. But (for example) I wonder if 
everyone has the "ideal future self" which allegedly gives 
structure to a life. Perhaps a lot of people have something 
which is a lot more ad hoc, such as that approach cited by 
Charles Reade:
sow an act, and you reap a habit. Sow a habit, and you 
reap a character. Sow a character, and you reap a 
destiny.
The "ideal future self" has no role here. It does not exist 
even as an idea. A "self" is constructed as one goes along, 
perhaps in quite a haphazard way which is influenced by 
situations which arise independently of any conscious or 
unconscious plan of the person who will reap this destiny.
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I intend to make use of Sartre's discussion as follows. The 
"slide" from "cynicism" to "good faith" can be mapped onto the 
change from role dissimulation to role simulation, or from 
"mere pretence" to "sheer" pretence. An instance of mere 
pretence is the construction of interpretations by "idle 
speculation", daydreaming, and so on: activities which can be 
performed as works of imagination without any commitment to 
believe the interpretations one constructs. That commitment is 
formed when one lifts the restrictions upon the pretence and 
starts to use it in the ways one would use a belief. This is 
done by adopting and sustaining a role. In cases of "sheer" 
pretence the role is not mere play-acting, it is the 
construction of a personal identity. It constructs a reality, 
not a sham or a facade masking and concealing a reality. For 
there is no other reality "behind" or "beneath" it. The 
interpretation it uses is the interpretation for that role, and 
since the role-player has no other, concealed role, it is the 
role-player's belief: his or her "genuine" interpretation. 
The role fixes the belief. It explains the role-player's 
aptitude to construct one kind of evidence rather than another, 
his aptitude to find some things "obvious".
The self-deceiver too can interpret freely, and then use an 
unrestricted role simulation to fix the interpretation and make 
it into a belief. Role simulation is the subject of the next 
chapter.
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If the self-deceiver does not notice what he is doing then 
he is a case not of self-deception but of mistaken or 
biassed belief [.•.] If the self-deceiver is not really 
ignorant of what he is doing then he is a case not of 
self-deception but of a man who knows but simply pretends 
not to. (Mounce [1971], p66)
Mounce distinguishes self-deception from "simply pretending", 
and apparently thinks that one precludes the other. This cuts 
the ground from under Role theories before they have a chance 
to get started; but it does so without argument. So let us 
reinstate the opportunity to argue that self-deception is a 
variety of pretence, and argue from there.
A Role theorist might say of Mounce's observations that he has 
hit the nail on the head without noticing: self-deception is a 
variety of pretence, but not a simple one.
Role theories are hinted at in various places; one such place 
is Hamlyn [1971, (1)], which Mounce criticises. Another is the 
recipe for faith proposed by Pascal [1966] and others: act as 
if you have faith, and you will come to have faith. Pascal was
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discussing ways of gaining faith when evidence is evenly 
balanced, not ways of deceiving oneself. However the recipe 
which is efficacious in that case may also be used as a means 
to self-deception when "the evidence" is not "evenly balanced".
Pretending that something is the case does not automatically 
lead one to believe that it is the case: but in some 
circumstances, with the right variety of pretence, it can. 
This is because all belief is a development of pretence: a 
pretence which is well-founded, we hope. I have not yet said 
which variety of pretence. So lets consider that now.
Pretence usually has limits imposed upon it. When NASA sent 
spacecraft on a "grand tour" of the solar system they used 
Newtonian physics to calculate the paths taken by the 
spacecraft. Yet they believed Newtonian physics to be false. 
They were using Newtonian physics as an instrument to generate 
predictions which were accurate enough for the practical 
purpose of plotting the course of the spacecraft. They were 
acting as if Newton's physics were true, in short they were 
pretending. Clearly this variety of pretence is not belief.
Theatregoers involved in a play often experience emotions 
rather like those which would be appropriate to someone who 
believes that the events portrayed on stage are real. They may 
also make deductions about the characters and about what is
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going to happen next, in ways which would be appropriate if the 
events portrayed were real. The pretence they engage in, 
though belief-like in some respects, is unlike belief in 
others. The play takes place upon a stage, lets say: but the 
place portrayed upon the stage is probably not a stage, and the 
play is probably not about actors (there is no reason why it 
should not be, of course: it just so happens that most plays 
are not about actors and theatres). The pretence engaged in by 
the audience probably does not incorporate information about 
the lighted exit signs, the rows of seats, the footlights, etc: 
some of the available information is filtered out. Nor does it 
lead to belief-like behaviour: the audience does not leap up 
to disarm the actor on stage who simulates the murder of one of 
the other characters, for example.
Yet sometimes the conventional limitations of theatrical 
pretence are broken. Actors from the long-running serial 
Coronation Street have sometimes been accosted in the street 
and addressed as though they were the characters they portray: 
the viewer's pretence spilled over into "real life", beyond the 
boundaries conventionally imposed upon the viewing of 
television soap operas. When it "spills over", the pretence 
becomes more belief-like. Suppose that "overspill" of the 
pretence is extended. Suppose we progressively remove the 
limitations imposed upon the pretence - what then? I suggest 
that then what we arrive at is fully-fledged belief: which is
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pretence upon which the pretender imposes no limit. Like the 
practical joke which "goes too far" and, ceasing to be a joke, 
"becomes serious", pretence can go beyond some conventional 
limit of pretence and become belief-like.
The pretender may not impose a limit. This does not mean that 
there is no limit: there may well be. But the limit is 
exactly that which we would expect a belief to have e.g. it is 
likely to fail if found to be inconsistent or turns out to be 
nonsense, provided that the person having the belief is 
committed to consistency and sense.
Someone who begins by making a wild guess at something may end 
up committed to its truth. At first he may "entertain it as a 
hypothesis", then start working out some of its implications; 
perhaps it starts to become more interesting: he discovers 
that it provides very neat explanations in an economical way, 
and clears up what had formerly seemed to be problems for any 
of the other available explanations. He brings it to bear upon 
tougher problems, and it works. He starts to think that it is 
true. At some point he comes to believe it; but believing it 
is a development of pretending it: it is what happens when a 
powerful pretence breaks through the limits imposed upon it. 
When he comes to believe it, does he stop doing the things he 
was doing when he was pretending? I suggest not. What makes 
something a "mere" pretence is that it is restricted: beyond
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some limit it is not used. It collapses as we cease to suspend 
disbelief. In the case of the pretence which becomes belief, 
we never cease to suspend disbelief, but eventually there is no 
disbelief left to suspend. But the pretence could only become 
powerful and become a belief because we suspended disbelief (or 
because, being "gullible", we had no disbelief to suspend).
The self-deceiver plays upon the borders of belief and 
pretence: his pretences become beliefs. But this situation is 
not unique to self-deception: it is a way of getting beliefs 
even when there is no self-deception. Indeed, being unwilling 
to pretend is often taken to be a sign of self-deception ("he 
won't even entertain the hypothesis - he won't even consider 
the idea that it might be true"). Pretending is a way to move 
from one belief to another, and willingness to engage in some 
varieties of pretence is taken to be a sign of an "open mind”.
So someone who pretends without imposing limits upon the 
pretence (a) acts like someone who believes (b) genuinely 
believes. The "man who believes but simply pretends not to" 
risks losing the belief he pretends not to have, and will lose 
it if the pretence is without imposed limits. For if there are 
no imposed limits then the pretence precludes him remembering 
that he is "only" pretending and that "really" he believes what 
he pretends not to believe. If the pretence is without limit 
then he cannot preserve the secret inner train of thought which
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a liar (for example) must maintain. If the liar wishes to 
deceive others without deceiving himself, then he must preserve 
the secret,inner train of thought. If he does not preserve it, 
then he will fall victim to the deception, for he will forget 
what he "really" thinks, and be convinced by his behaviour just 
as other people are. The liar must be duplicitous, for 
singleness - integrity - will leave him sincere and as deceived 
as anyone else; he may even be deceived though nobody else is.
The deceiver of others dissimulates: the self-deceiver 
simulates. This does not mean that the simulation goes 
undetected by others. For the state of mind enjoyed (or 
endured) by the self-deceiver may be attainable in no other way 
than by such a simulation. The self-deceiver may be deceived 
through the lack of duplicity; but other people observing him 
are always in a "double" situation: there is the self­
deceiver, and the observer, and they are two. The observer is 
not deceived by the integrity of the simulation, for he is not 
integral to the unity of the self-deceiver.
So we might propose as a rule that those who set out to deceive 
others are duplicitous, while those who deceive themselves 
"have integrity" - they are not divided enough to criticise 
themselves with an interpretation independent of the self- 
deception. This explains why self-criticism does not destroy 
the deception, but not how the deception is created.
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Every belief, not just self-deception, is a simulation, a play, 
a pretence. And some forms of belief have pretence-like 
limitations. Someone may adopt a provisional belief, thinking: 
"I'll try this out. I'll gamble upon it working. If it works, 
well and good. I'll carry on with it. If it doesn't. I'll 
scrap the idea and think of something else".
As soon as we get into the game of provisional belief, our 
description of it becomes open to objections which show how 
unlike belief it has become. Someone who has such a lack of 
commitment to the "belief", one can argue, does not really 
believe at all. Yet he is not merely speculating. There is 
some commitment, a willingness to gamble something upon the 
truth of the "belief"; and if we follow this route, are not 
all beliefs, perhaps at some extreme limit, provisional? We 
gamble upon them, but there may be circumstances in which we 
would abandon even our most strongly-held beliefs. What is 
"provisional" and what is not, may be a matter of degree.
Role Simulation theories explain self-deception while escaping 
the problems and paradoxes of Role Dissimulation theories (and 
Avoidance theories in general). For they do not require that 
the self-deceiver "knows" what he is doing.
What is wrong with Role Simulation theories? My answer is, not 
much. However, what they rely upon is explanation by
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assimilation: they suggest that self-deception can be 
understood by treating it as a variety of pretence. But does 
that make everything clear? I suggest not. For our 
understanding of pretence is not clear. "Simply pretending" is 
by no means as simple as Mounce's article might lead us to 
believe.
Also, we might assimilate in the reverse direction: instead of 
explaining belief as a variety of pretence, we might explain 
pretence as a variety of belief, or even as "suspension of 
disbelief". Better than either, we might consider some 
characteristics of both belief and pretence, and "contrast and 
compare", bringing them into a wider arena which includes 
belief, pretence, and other interesting human activities.
the procedures by which we establish truth and falsity 
have, in the case of the self-deceiver, been tampered with 
by desire, so that what we have is a different game, 
parasitic upon the first, but differing from it at a 
number of points [. .. ] since it is within the proper game 
of establishing truth or falsity that the terms knowledge 
and ignorance get their sense and since the self-deceiver 
does not play the game properly, one can say him, neither 




It is often pleasant to renew acquaintance with an old friend, 
and here is one of our oldest friends, which I shall label 
"reason versus". In Plato it was reason versus the appetites; 
in Descartes it was reason versus those passions which led us 
to misuse our power to make judgements at will; here it is 
reason versus desire. Reason establishes the proper procedures 
for establishing truth and falsity, but desire tampers with 
them. All of which would be upset if reason were an expression 
of desire, or if there were such things as passionate reason or 
reasonable passions, or if reason were an appetite, one among 
many. Can desire "tamper" in something which it instigated in 
the first place? And if desire or passion or appetite did not 
instigate enquiry, is "reason" capable of doing so? I lump 
together desire, passion and appetite here, because I think 
that they play similar roles in all these accounts: they are a 
foil and a counterpoint for the ballet of reason, they are what 
need not be accountable or reasonable, for no-one is demanding 
that they should be. But desire has its logic just as reason 
has, and "reason", observed in actual instances of reasoning, 
can be thoroughly unreasonable, not because it has been 
"tampered" with by "external" forces, but because it never 
existed independently of them.
I take it that Mounce's "proper game of establishing truth and 
falsity" is the activity of enquiry. So Mounce's argument is 
that if someone is not engaged in enquiry then we cannot say of
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them either that they know or that they are ignorant. This is 
a peculiar restriction upon how we are to talk. For it seems 
unexceptionable to ask if someone is ignorant or if they know, 
even if they are not "playing the proper game" of enquiry. We 
can ask whether the theatregoers know that what they are 
watching is a play and not an unscripted event in "real life": 
do they know, or are they taken in? They are not doing
enquiry, I take it, yet they know that they are watching a 
play. They are not deceived by the pretence they are engaged 
in. So why is this instance all right but self-deception not 
all right? The question is rhetorical - they are both equally 
all right.
So what shall we say about self-deception - knowledge or 
ignorance?
The self-deceiver will at one moment manifest what seems 
ot be knowledge and at the next what seems to be 
ignorance. From this we infer that he is moving from one 
category to the other ... the trouble is that on this 
interpretation the self-deceiver is not a self-deceiver in 
the normal sense at all. He is merely a man who is
ignorant of what at a former time he knew. (p67)
Why all this mereness? Mounce goes on to argue that the 
semblance of knowledge is not real knowledge, and the semblance
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of ignorance is not real ignorance. But I want to reply: the 
knowledge m-y be real knowledge; in cases of self-deception 
there is nothing "mere" about being "ignorant" of what one 
formerly knew: it is an achievement, like the old joke ("X 
wasn't born lazy, I had to work at it"). Some are born 
ignorant, some achieve ignorance, and some have ignorance 
thrust upon them: we shouldn't confuse the cases by inserting 
those little words 'mere' and 'simply' into our sentences.
But in any case I have reservations about the idea that someone 
who formerly knew can become ignorant. One may forget, but 
forgetting is not quite ignorance. One may mis-remember, but 
that kind of mistake - if it is a mistake -is not quite 
ignorance. Ignorance, once lost, is not so easily regained. 
But perhaps this is just a bit of legislation about how we 
should speak, and Mounce and I can agree to differ. 
Nonetheless I wanted to mark that difference between Mounce's 
use of words and mine, lest it misleads the reader elsewhere in 
this thesis.
The claim that believing is a variety of pretending is at odds 
with the claim that "belief at will is impossible". Williams 
[1973], Winters [1979], and Hampshire [1971] are among those 
who allege the impossibility of belief at will. Pretending is 
something one can do - more or less - at will, and believing is 
supposed not to be like that.
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The word, 'pretend', certainly has an etymology capacious 
enough to hold both belief and deceit. Among the many meanings 
listed in the Shorter OED (Onions [1983]) are: to put forward, 
allege, claim, profess, to put oneself forward in some 
character, to feign to be or to do something, to feign in play, 
to make believe, to put forward as a reason or excuse, to use 
as a pretext, to allege; now esp. to allege or declare with 
intent to deceive (a leading current sense), from pre + tend 
or stretch.
Lets be clear about the status of this claim that "belief is a 
form of pretence". It is not a claim about how we use words, 
but a recommendation about how to use words, like the claim 
"whales are mammals" put forward at a time when whales were 
usually described as fish. The point is to draw attention to 
the continuities between pretence and belief, that what 
distinguishes belief from pretence is the limitations and 
conventions surrounding pretence.
Role Simulation theories are not-know theories of self- 
deception. They escape the paradoxes of self-deception because 
they do not require that the self-deceiver knows what he is up 
to nor do they require that the self-deceiver is "merely" 
pretending or "merely" ignorant. Unlike Negligence theories, 
they offer an account of what the self-deceiver does (namely, 
role-playing) rather than describing self-deception as a
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failure to do something (namely, "proper" enquiry): they offer 
a positive account rather than a purely negative one. So far I 
have left this positive account at a rather abstract level, 
without giving examples of how role theories may be applied. 
However, the descriptions of Mr Negligent, Mr Mobile and Mr 
Radical, given in an earlier chapter, may give some indication 
of how role theories may be applied.
In the next few chapters I shall suggest how Radical 
Interpretation theories of self-deception can complement Role 
theories. Then I shall add an account of Marx's theory of 
ideology, which ties together the approaches of Role theories. 
Radical Interpretation theories, and my "Process theory" of 
self-deception. I shall then be in a position to describe the 
Process theory with a mimimal amount of subsidiary information. 
For the arguments in favour of the Process theory will have 
been presented in the chapters leading up to it.
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One of my motives for writing this thesis is dissatisfaction 
with some prevailing metaphors in epistemology. One might 
suppose that these metaphors are old, dead, and therefore 
inconsequential. I can show that this supposition is not 
correct by altering the metaphors and demonstrating the 
consequences. Metaphors may die but their influence lives on. 
For they give a structure to discourse which makes some 
questions and some answers obvious while "masking" others.
In this chapter I aim to replace a metaphor and indicate how 
this alteration alters the "obvious" questions and answers. 
This metaphor is the "scales of judgement". It describes 
judgement as an act of weighing. I shall replace it with the 
metaphor of the "chemical reaction". Both metaphors have a 
common theme. They are both concerned with the notion of 
equilibrium. I shall say something about each metaphor in 
turn.
A D i f f e r e n t  M e t a p h o r :
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1. The Scales Of Judgement
When the scales pans are empty, the scales of judgement are in 
equilibrium. When evidence is piled upon the scale pans, the 
equilibrium is disturbed and the scales tip to one side or the 
other. When the scales tip, a judgement is made, "coming down 
on one side of the argument".
The metaphor makes judgement into a mechanical matter. One may 
be selective about what evidence to put on the scales; one may 
avoid evidence, one may even fabricate evidence; but, once 
sufficient evidence is placed upon the scales its weight 
compels the judgement to take place. The evidence is 
"compelling". It exerts force upon the scales. The scales 
may waver before they tip. If the evidence weighs very little 
then there may be insufficient "weight" to tip them. If the 
evidence is evenly distributed between the two scale pans then 
the scales may stay in equilibrium and not tip. But whatever 
the outcome, once the evidence is on the scale pans, the 




a liar (for example) must maintain. If the liar wishes to 
deceive others without deceiving himself, then he must preserve 
the secret,inner train of thought. If he does not preserve it, 
then he will fall victim to the deception, for he will forget 
what he "really" thinks, and be convinced by his behaviour just 
as other people are. The liar must be duplicitous, for 
singleness - integrity - will leave him sincere and as deceived 
as anyone else; he may even be deceived though nobody else is.
The deceiver of others dissimulates: the self-deceiver 
simulates. This does not mean that the simulation goes 
undetected by others. For the state of mind enjoyed (or 
endured) by the self-deceiver may be attainable in no other way 
than by such a simulation. The self-deceiver may be deceived 
through the lack of duplicity; but other people observing him 
are always in a "double" situation: there is the self­
deceiver, and the observer, and they are two. The observer is 
not deceived by the integrity of the simulation, for he is not 
integral to the unity of the self-deceiver.
So we might propose as a rule that those who set out to deceive 
others are duplicitous, while those who deceive themselves 
"have integrity" - they are not divided enough to criticise 
themselves with an interpretation independent of the self- 
deception. This explains why self-criticism does not destroy 
the deception, but not how the deception is created.
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Every belief, not just self-deception, is a simulation, a play, 
a pretence. And some forms of belief have pretence-like 
limitations. Someone may adopt a provisional belief, thinking: 
"I'll try this out, I'll gamble upon it working. If it works, 
well and good. I'll carry on with it. If it doesn't. I'll 
scrap the idea and think of something else".
As soon as we get into the game of provisional belief, our 
description of it becomes open to objections which show how 
unlike belief it has become. Someone who has such a lack of 
commitment to the "belief", one can argue, does not really 
believe at all. Yet he is not merely speculating. There is 
some commitment, a willingness to gamble something upon the 
truth of the "belief"; and if we follow this route, are not 
all beliefs, perhaps at some extreme limit, provisional? We 
gamble upon them, but there may be circumstances in which we 
would abandon even our most strongly-held beliefs. What is 
"provisional" and what is not, may be a matter of degree.
Role Simulation theories explain self-deception while escaping 
the problems and paradoxes of Role Dissimulation theories (and 
Avoidance theories in general). For they do not require that 
the self-deceiver "knows" what he is doing.
What is wrong with Role Simulation theories? My answer is, not 
much. However, what they rely upon is explanation by
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assimilation: they suggest that self-deception can be 
understood by treating it as a variety of pretence. But does 
that make everything clear? I suggest not. For our 
understanding of pretence is not clear. "Simply pretending" is 
by no means as simple as Mounce's article might lead us to 
believe.
Also, we might assimilate in the reverse direction: instead of 
explaining belief as a variety of pretence, we might explain 
pretence as a variety of belief, or even as "suspension of 
disbelief". Better than either, we might consider some 
characteristics of both belief and pretence, and "contrast and 
compare", bringing them into a wider arena which includes 
belief, pretence, and other interesting human activities.
the procedures by which we establish truth and falsity 
have, in the case of the self-deceiver, been tampered with 
by desire, so that what we have is a different game, 
parasitic upon the first, but differing from it at a 
number of points [ ... ] since it is within the proper game 
of establishing truth or falsity that the terms knowledge 
and ignorance get their sense and since the self-deceiver 
does not play the game properly, one can say him, neither 




It is often pleasant to renew acquaintance with an old friend, 
and here is one of our oldest friends, which I shall label 
"reason versus". In Plato it was reason versus the appetites; 
in Descartes it was reason versus those passions which led us 
to misuse our power to make judgements at will; here it is 
reason versus desire. Reason establishes the proper procedures 
for establishing truth and falsity, but desire tampers with 
them. All of which would be upset if reason were an expression 
of desire, or if there were such things as passionate reason or 
reasonable passions, or if reason were an appetite, one among 
many. Can desire "tamper" in something which it instigated in 
the first place? And if desire or passion or appetite did not 
instigate enquiry, is "reason" capable of doing so? I lump 
together desire, passion and appetite here, because I think 
that they play similar roles in all these accounts: they are a 
foil and a counterpoint for the ballet of reason, they are what 
need not be accountable or reasonable, for no-one is demanding 
that they should be. But desire has its logic just as reason
has, and "reason", observed in actual instances of reasoning.
can be thoroughly unreasonable, not because it has been
"tampered " with by "external" forces. but because it never
existed independently of them.
I take it that Mounce’s "proper game of establishing truth and 
falsity" is the activity of enquiry. So Mounce's argument is 
that if someone is not engaged in enquiry then we cannot say of
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them either that they know or that they are ignorant. This is 
a peculiar restriction upon how we are to talk. For it seems 
unexceptionable to ask if someone is ignorant or if they know, 
even if they are not "playing the proper game" of enquiry. We 
can ask whether the theatregoers know that what they are
watching is a play and not an unscripted event in "real life": 
do they know, or are they taken in? They are not doing
enquiry, I take it, yet they know that they are watching a 
play. They are not deceived by the pretence they are engaged 
in. So why is this instance all right but self-deception not 
all right? The question is rhetorical - they are both equally 
all right.
So what shall we say about self-deception - knowledge or 
ignorance?
The self-deceiver will at one moment manifest what seems 
ot be knowledge and at the next what seems to be
ignorance. From this we infer that he is moving from one 
category to the other ... the trouble is that on this 
interpretation the self-deceiver is not a self-deceiver in 
the normal sense at all. He is merely a man who is
ignorant of what at a former time he knew. (p67)
Why all this mereness? Mounce goes on to argue that the 
semblance of knowledge is not real knowledge, and the semblance
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of ignorance is not real ignorance. But I want to reply: the 
knowledge may be real knowledge; in cases of self-deception 
there is nothing "mere" about being "ignorant" of what one 
formerly knew: it is an achievement, like the old joke ("I 
wasn't born lazy, I had to work at it"). Some are born 
ignorant, some achieve ignorance, and some have ignorance 
thrust upon them: we shouldn't confuse the cases by inserting 
those little words 'mere' and 'simply' into our sentences.
But in any case I have reservations about the idea that someone 
who formerly knew can become ignorant. One may forget, but 
forgetting is not quite ignorance. One may mis-remember, but 
that kind of mistake - if it is a mistake -is not quite 
ignorance. Ignorance, once lost, is not so easily regained. 
But perhaps this is just a bit of legislation about how we 
should speak, and Mounce and I can agree to differ. 
Nonetheless I wanted to mark that difference between Mounce's 
use of words and mine, lest it misleads the reader elsewhere in 
this thesis.
The claim that believing is a variety of pretending is at odds 
with the claim that "belief at will is impossible". Williams 
[1973], Winters [1979], and Hampshire [1971] are among those 
who allege the impossibility of belief at will. Pretending is 
something one can do - more or less - at will, and believing is 
supposed not to be like that.
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The word, 'pretend', certainly has an etymology capacious 
enough to hold both belief and deceit. Among the many meanings 
listed in the Shorter OED (Onions [1983]) are: to put forward, 
allege, claim, profess, to put oneself forward in some 
character, to feign to be or to do something, to feign in play, 
to make believe, to put forward as a reason or excuse, to use 
as a pretext, to allege; now esp. to allege or declare with 
intent to deceive (a leading current sense), from pre + tend 
or stretch.
Lets be clear about the status of this claim that "belief is a 
form of pretence". It is not a claim about how we use words, 
but a recommendation about how to use words, like the claim 
"whales are mammals" put forward at a time when whales were 
usually described as fish. The point is to draw attention to 
the continuities between pretence and belief, that what 
distinguishes belief from pretence is the limitations and 
conventions surrounding pretence.
Role Simulation theories are not-know theories of self- 
deception. They escape the paradoxes of self-deception because 
they do not require that the self-deceiver knows what he is up 
to nor do they require that the self-deceiver is "merely" 
pretending or "merely" ignorant. Unlike Negligence theories, 
they offer an account of what the self-deceiver does (namely, 
role-playing) rather than describing self-deception as a
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failure to do something (namely, "proper" enquiry): they offer 
a positive account rather than a purely negative one. So far I 
have left this positive account at a rather abstract level, 
without giving examples of how role theories may be applied. 
However, the descriptions of Mr Negligent, Mr Mobile and Mr 
Radical, given in an earlier chapter, may give some indication 
of how role theories may be applied.
In the next few chapters I shall suggest how Radical 
Interpretation theories of self-deception can complement Role 
theories. Then I shall add an account of Marx's theory of 
ideology, which ties together the approaches of Role theories. 
Radical Interpretation theories, and my "Process theory" of 
self-deception. I shall then be in a position to describe the 
Process theory with a mimimal amount of subsidiary information. 
For the arguments in favour of the Process theory will have 
been presented in the chapters leading up to it.
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One of my motives for writing this thesis is dissatisfaction 
with some prevailing metaphors in epistemology. One might 
suppose that these metaphors are old, dead, and therefore 
inconsequential. I can show that this supposition is not 
correct by altering the metaphors and demonstrating the 
consequences. Metaphors may die but their influence lives on. 
For they give a structure to discourse which makes some 
questions and some answers obvious while "masking" others.
In this chapter I aim to replace a metaphor and indicate how 
this alteration alters the "obvious" questions and answers. 
This metaphor is the "scales of judgement". It describes 
judgement as an act of weighing. I shall replace it with the 
metaphor of the "chemical reaction". Both metaphors have a 
common theme. They are both concerned with the notion of 
equilibrium. I shall say something about each metaphor in 
turn.
A D i f f e r e n t  M e t a p h o r :
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1. The Scales Of Judgement
When the scales pans are empty, the scales of judgement are in 
equilibrium. When evidence is piled upon the scale pans, the 
equilibrium is disturbed and the scales tip to one side or the 
other. When the scales tip, a judgement is made, "coming down 
on one side of the argument".
The metaphor makes judgement into a mechanical matter. One may 
be selective about what evidence to put on the scales; one may 
avoid evidence, one may even fabricate evidence; but, once 
sufficient evidence is placed upon the scales its weight 
compels the judgement to take place. The evidence is 
"compelling". It exerts force upon the scales. The scales 
may waver before they tip. If the evidence weighs very little 
then there may be insufficient "weight" to tip them. If the 
evidence is evenly distributed between the two scale pans then 
the scales may stay in equilibrium and not tip. But whatever 
the outcome, once the evidence is on the scale pans, the 




2. The Chemical Reaction
A standard notation for a chemical reaction looks like this:
AB + CD AC + BD
A, B, C and D are chemical elements or combinations of elements 
which can in turn be combined in various ways. The symbol 
' \ ^ ' indicates an equilibrium between two ways of combining 
A, B, C and D. So, for example, if we mixed together AB and CD 
then some of the mixture would react together to form different 
combinations AC and BD. There would be an equilibrium between 
the mixtures shown on either side of the symbol 1 * ->' .
This equilibrium can be changed by various means. For example: 
altering the temperature or pressure under which the reaction 
takes place; introducing other substances into the mixture; 
or removing some combinations from the reaction as they are 
formed. So, for instance, if we remove AC and BD as they are 
formed, then some of the remaining combinations AB and CD will 
react together in order to "restore the equilibrium", forming 
more of AC and BD. If we continue to remove AC and BD then 
eventually we shall remove everything: we will have tipped the 
equilibrium so as to produce AC and BD only. Instead of 
speaking of the weight of evidence (as we do when using the 
metaphor of the scales), we may, using the chemical
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metaphor,speak of the stability or instability of evidence 
under varying conditions. Substituting one sort of equilibrium 
metaphor for another may seem a small change, but it can have a 
considerable effect upon the way we think about judgements.
Altering the equilibrium of a chemical reaction is somewhat 
like "tipping the scales", but there is a difference. Provided 
there is sufficient evidence and it is not evenly distributed 
between the scale pans, the scales will automatically tip down, 
making a judgement about any evidence presented. The tipping 
of a chemical equilibrium is more complicated: the outcome 
depends upon many factors (temperature, pressure, presence of 
other substances, removal of substances as they are formed, 
etc). So there is a question which the "scales of judgement" 
metaphor helps us to overlook while the "chemical reaction" 
metaphor makes it almost unavoidable, namely: if one has 
acquired "the evidence", what else has to happen to alter the 
equilibrium so that one "comes down on one side" of an 
argument?
Also, the metaphor alters our picture of evidence. In the 
"scales of judgement" metaphor, evidence is placed upon one 
scale pan or the other and the contents of one pan does not 
interfere with what the other pan contains. This is not so in 
the "chemical reaction" metaphor. AC and BD (the evidence 
shown on one side of the equilibrium notation) come into
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existence because some of A3 and CD (the evidence on the other 
side) have ceased to exist. For AC and BD are made out of AB 
and CD. AB and CD are transformed into AC and BD. What this 
means is that when there is more than one interpretation of 
data, one interpretation is constructed at the expense of 
another. We cannot "weigh" one interpretation against another 
upon the scales of judgement, for they are not independent of 
each other: in the "chemical reaction" metaphor, one 
interpretation (AC + BD) eats up another (AB + CD). What we 
can do is to observe the equilibrium between the two 
interpretations. It becomes important to answer the question 
mentioned above, namely: what has to happen to alter the 
equilibrium so that one "comes down on one side" of an 
argument? This is important because the answer tells us how 
one makes a judgement - which the metaphors are intended to 
(figuratively) describe.
I have partially answered the question in previous chapters. 
As long as one is engaged in "idle speculation" with no urgent 
need to take action, one can alter the equilibrium at will: 
the interpretation is not fixed, one can waver between one 
interpretation and another. However, adopting a role and 
making use of the interpretation fixes it, making it belief­
like. This is like using up AC and BD, removing them from the 
chemical reaction so that more of AB and CD are transformed
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into AC and BD: ultimately the equilibrium is tipped entirely 
to one side.
The "scales of judgement" metaphor makes this seem like an 
unwarranted interference in the operations of judgement. Doing 
something to alter the equilibrium is like putting one's finger 
upon a scale-pan while weighing the evidence: it introduces 
bias. This consequence of using the "scales of judgement" 
metaphor disappears when we use the "chemical reaction" 
metaphor. For the chemical reaction metaphor does not imply 
that the operations of judgement would occur automatically, 
like the operations of weighing-scales when weighty objects are 
put into the scale pans. It does not imply that there is any 
natural equilibrium between two different interpretations of 
the same data, irrespective of circumstances. The tipping of 
the equilibrium depends upon many things other than the 
properties of the evidence (the "weight" of the evidence). 
Making up one's mind is not merely a matter of being swayed by 
the "weight" of evidence. It is more like deciding what the 
evidence is to be, what is to count as evidence. This is not 
an unwarranted activity but one which inevitably enters into 
the process of making a judgement.
This leads to another change in the sort of questions we ask. 
For instead of asking what it is about evidence that compels 
belief, we may ask what it is about us which makes us apt to
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interpret data one way rather than another. I suggest that 
this opens up a much more fruitful line of enquiry than the 
claim that belief is compelled by a property of evidence, 
namely "weight" - whatever that may be.
The chemical reaction metaphor also enables us to remove some 
questions which the scales of judgement metaphor invites us to 
ask. For example, how do we know which scale-pan to place 
evidence upon when we "weigh" it - in other words, how do we 
know to which side of the argument an item of evidence belongs? 
In the chemical reaction metaphor the question is answered 
automatically: because interpretations are not independent, 
items of evidence can only exist within their "side" of the 
equilibrium: they cannot float over to the other side of the 
equilibrium because moving to the other side of the equilibrium 
destroys them and converts them into something else.
I have sketched out how a change of metaphor can alter the 
questions we ask and the answers we give. I have also 
indicated how the "scales of judgement" metaphor, in 
particular, can (and does) influence the epistemological 
treatment of judgement, a process by which we arrive at 
beliefs. In doing so, I have set the scene for the following 
chapter, in which I discuss "Radical Interpretation" theories 
of self-deception. The change of metaphor shifts the emphasis 
from the question, "what is it about evidence that compels
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belief?" to, "what is it about us that makes us apt to 
construct evidence in one way rather than another?".
I do not want to forget that the "chemical reaction" metaphor 
is only a metaphor. By this I mean that it is only one 
metaphor among others, not that it is "merely" a metaphor and 
therefore in some way inferior to a more "literal" description 
of the way we acquire beliefs. Although we can and often do 
try to give literal descriptions in place of metaphorical ones, 
a literal description does not replace a metaphor: it 
translates a metaphor. Our metaphors are never replaced 
(except by other metaphors). Literal descriptions preserve the 
metaphors which they translate, for the metaphors (however 
"dead" and "merely decorative" they may seem to be) remain 
active and effective, guiding discourse and determining which 
questions we ask and answer, which questions we notice and 
which questions we overlook (because the metaphor prevents the 
question arising or seems to answer it automatically).
The role of metaphors in the process of enquiry is an important 
one for radical interpretation theories. For example 
Nietzsche, that most radical of radical interpreters, argues 
that,
truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they 
are illusions; worn-out metaphors which have become
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powerless to affect the senses; coins which have their 
obverse effaced and now are no longer of account as coins 
but merely as metal. (Nietzsche [1964], "On Truth and 
Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense", p80)
Nietzsche is not removing the distinction between truths and 
falsehoods here: he is not arguing that truths are falsehoods. 
Glossing what Nietzsche writes, one could say: truths and 
falsehoods are both illusions: but truths are reliable 
illusions, falsehoods are unreliable illusions. True (cf 
'troth') is still distinguished from falsehood (cf 'fail'). Or 
one could say, with the physicist Niels Bohr,
there are two kinds of truth, small truth and great truth. 
You can recognise a small truth because its opposite is a 
falsehood. The opposite of a great truth is another great 
truth. (Niels Bohr, quoted in Von Oech [1990], pll9)
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Discovery consists of looking at the same thing as 
everyone else and thinking something different. (Albert 
Szent-Gyorgyi, quoted in Von Oech [1990], p7)
The ability to "discover" by innovative thinking may also be 
used for the purposes of self-deception. People who "think 
something different" from everyone else are idiosyncratic, 
radical interpreters. They run the risk of being 
misunderstood, dubbed as self-deceivers, charlatans, or liars. 
If the interpretation is radical enough then they are likely to 
be told that they do not understand the meanings of words, that 
they are abusing language, that what they have to say is 
"merely figurative" and not to be understood literally. They 
are transgressors, acting against established norms (for 
otherwise they have not been very innovative). Furthermore, 
from the standpoint of the norms which they have transgressed, 
all these allegations may be true. If there are norms of 
discourse which fix what can be said or thought, then by 




Since (allegedly) evidence compels belief, and since evidence 
is constructed by a process of interpretation, there is a very 
simple and obvious way to change one's beliefs: change the 
interpretation. With this powerful ability one needs no 
elaborate strategies in order to be self-deceived. There is no 
need to avoid data, one needs no special acts of mentation to 
ignore evidence that one knows or believes. One needs only the 
normal processes by which beliefs are acquired. "The" evidence 
will not trouble the self-deceiver, since he does not perform 
the process of interpretation needed to construct it. Instead 
he constructs another interpretation which, though false, can 
be instrumentally effective - not effective for all purposes, 
but effective for his specific purposes. This interpretation 
can then be fixed by adopting a role. Used as a belief, it 
becomes more like a belief and can become exactly like a 
belief. Being exactly like a belief, it is a belief.
Understood in this way, self-deception is not paradoxical. For 
there is nothing paradoxical about fixing an instrumental 
understanding by using it as one would use a belief - which is 
the self-deceiver's "strategy". If anyone still objects to my 
calling this "belief", then I am prepared to give them the word 
'belief'. Much good may it do them. For they will have 
divorced the word from the normal processes by which we acquire 
beliefs - the- processes which I have described.
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Avoidance theorists argue that to do what I have described is
"merely pretending" to believe. Role theories provide an
answer to the objection. The role one adopts fixes the
interpretation one uses, and a fixed interpretation is a
belief. We can stop fixing an interpretation by shedding the 
role.
In an earlier chapter I described three "strategies" of self- 
deception. These were the strategies of Mr Negligent, Mr 
Mobile, and Mr Radical, who fix their beliefs by sustaining, 
adopting, or inventing a role. These strategies are not unique 
to self-deception, however. It is not always self-deceptive to 
fix one's beliefs by one's role; the beliefs may be true, 
after all.
In this chapter I discuss what roles fix: interpretations.
Mr Negligent would assuredly be among those who argue that 
beliefs are generated by "the" evidence, that one cannot 
believe at will, and, therefore, that Mr Radical's efforts are 
'.'merely pretending to believe". For "the" evidence, i.e. the 
evidence which is already available, is constructed by "the" 
interpretation, i.e. the one which is already established and 
which it suits Mr Negligent to use.
Page 246 Self-Deception
Radical Interpretation/20
Mr Radical's reply is that when Mr Negligent argues against 
radical interpretation he is arguing against himself. For Mr 
Negligent's own interpetation was, once upon a time, 
constructed by the process which he now castigates, namely 
radical interpretation. His appeal to "the" evidence is a way 
of giving preference to an interpretation solely because it is 
established, while making out that it is not an interpretation 
at all.
Self-deception proceeds by the normal strategies for acquiring 
beliefs, but it does so in a way which is not truth-regarding. 
The process of interpretation is a way of identifying, 
selecting, and ordering data. Different interpretations do 
this in different ways. So for example if A and B are two 
people using rival interpretations, then A ignores and 
disorders data which B identifies, while B ignores and 
disorders data which A identifies. One interpretation is used 
to organise data at the expense of another which it disorders.
To A, B will seem to be using a way of misunderstanding; and 
since A is not using B's interpretation, he will not understand 
by means of B. Likewise, to B, A will seem to misunderstand. 




My point is that self-deception is not merely a way of 
misunderstanding. It is also a (false, but instruraentally 
effective) way of understanding, with the aim of achieving some 
goal. Other people may regard the self-deceiver as aiming to 
misunderstand, but from his own point of view what he is doing 
is to understand in an effective way. The self-deceiver is not 
merely ignorant, nor merely mistaken, nor merely pretending, 
nor does he "really" (deep down) have true beliefs or knowledge 
which he is masking or avoiding. Self-deception is none of 
these things. It is false understanding, adopted because it is 
instrumentally effective for the self-deceiver's purposes.
Nietzsche makes the same point but reverses the stress. I 
argued that the self-deceiver's "misunderstanding" is also a 
kind of understanding. Nietzsche argues that understanding is 
also a way of misunderstanding. By doing so he calls into 
question the whole enterprise of truth-seeking, arguing that, 
"the will to truth is a will to error", "perhaps our truths are 
only our unrefutable errors", and so on.
Nietzsche makes some interesting remarks about this state of 
affairs. I shall summarise some of these remarks and then 
defend them in detail.
(a) The argument goes as follows. Every interpretation - 
every way of understanding - is also a way of misunderstanding.
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To pursue a gregarious and social way of life, we need 
agreements, rules of discourse by which to understand one 
another. Therefore there are conventions of public language 
which govern what can be said - and also, what can be thought, 
and what can be counted as true. If we break these rules we 
run several risks. The greatest of these is the risk of 
madness: we may deprive ourselves of any stable means of 
understanding. Also, by contravening the rules we risk being 
identified as liars (people who abuse the conventions in a 
harmful way).
However, the rules make some things unsayable and unthinkable; 
and this too may be harmful. For every interpretation - every 
means of understanding - is also a way of misunderstanding. 
Not only does it hide something from us, it also causes us to 
forget that it is hidden by our own activities - for we are the 
interpreters, radical or conventional. When we follow the 
conventions in order to understand, we forget that we are also, 
simultaneously, misunderstanding.
Furthermore, the conventional rules could not have been created 
by rule-following. They must have been made by rule-making in 
the absence of rules, or by rule-breaking if there were other, 
earlier rules which have been replaced. Conventional 
interpretations originate in radical interpretations.
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Nietzsche offers a history of how radical interpretations are 
conventionalised so that we "forget" their origins, forget that 
they begin - and continue - not as "reason" but as "faith". 
They are not justified in advance: we "leap" to them. Once an 
interpretation is in place, we can construct a justifying 
discourse. The interpretation provides the mechanism by which 
a justification can be created. The justification works 
because it presupposes the preliminary and still unjustified 
work done by radical interpretation: it is constructed by 
"reason" working upon the results of "faith".
If the conventions of ordinary language force us to 
misunderstand, then so much the worse for ordinary language: 
we shall have to use extraordinary language instead. If we are 
not to be caught within the misunderstandings created by a 
single interpretation then we must be able to weave between 
interpretations. One interpretation enables us to notice and 
understand what another interpretation makes indetectable or, 
if detectable, then unintelligable. Nietzsche commends the use 
of a "plural style" - which he describes as a combination of 
"scepticism and arrogance"; such a style enables us to 
construct interpretations ("arrogance") and to dismantle them 
again ("scepticism").
It is worth recalling that Sartre describes this combination as 
"bad faith" - "sliding" between "cynicism" and "good faith".
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Most commentators have taken Sartre's account of bad faith to 
be a description of self-deception. Nietzsche's own position 
seems to be that self-deception inevitably accompanies truth­
seeking, so that he is only recognising a situation which 
applies to all those who seek truth: truth-seeking and self- 
deception are inextricably bound together: "the will to truth 
is a will to deception". We interpret, so we must be engaged 
in the dual process which is both understanding and 
misunderstanding. We cannot help forgetting the status of our 
truths (metaphors) and that we are their artistic creators; 
but we can make this forgetting active. "Sliding" is a way of 
doing so, for Nietzsche's "sliding" is also a "weaving" between 
one interpretation and another. Nietzsche's argument leads to 
the conclusion that the desire to stabilise a single 
interpretation is characteristic of self-deception. To avoid 
this we can weave between interpretations, dismantling 
deceptions even while (unavoidably) building new ones.
This outlook alters the goals one has in doing enquiry. 
Instead of aiming for established, secure truths, one will aim 
for a continuing process which destabilises errors.
(b) Now I want to elaborate upon this summary argument. I 
shall do so by picking out several themes in turn, discussing 




(1) Nietzsche's description of "madness and faith" - and (in my 
terminology rather than Nietzsche's), order and disorder;
(2) Nietzsche's claim that convention fixes beliefs and causes 
us to forget that they arise from processes of interpretation
(3) thinking the "unthinkable"
(4) Nietzsche's description of the phases in the life cycle of 
a metaphor
(5) Nietzsche's "will to truth"
(6) Nietzsche's strategy
(7) Nietzsche's "Forgetting".
Theme number (8) puts themes (1) through (7) together again.
(1) Nietzsche's "Madness" and "Faith": Order and Disorder




The greatest danger that always hovered over humanity and 
still hovers over it is the eruption of madness - which 
means the eruption of arbitrariness in feeling, seeing, 
and hearing, the enjoyment of the mind's lack of 
discipline, the joy in human unreason. Not truth and 
certainty are the opposite of the world of the madman, but 
the universality and the universal binding force of a 
faith; in sum, the nonarbitrary character of judgements 
(Nietzsche [1974], pl30)
The search for understanding is a search for order, the 
construction of an ordering. From another point of view, it is 
a disordering. Understanding is achieved at the cost of 
another misunderstanding. Unable to stop interpreting - for to 
do so is madness - we seem bound to cling to our 
interpretations. What we can do, though, is to weave through 
several interpretations, allowing one to supply the lack in 
another.
Here is an illustration of the claim that an interpretation 
distributes order and disorder. Suppose that we are plotting a 
graph. We may be able to plot our data as a straight line 
graph providing that we are willing to use a logarithmic scale: 
we can exhibit the orderly nature of the line by making the 
scale less obviously orderly. Einstein's wonderful question 
("if you could sit on a ray of light, what would you see?")
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ordered things relative to the speed of light, taken as a 
constant, so that space and time are interpreted as "relative"; 
Newton's mechanics ordered things in a different way, so that 
space and time ware absolutes and velocities relative - making 
the constant speed of light a "mere contingent fact". 
Different interpretations distribute order and disorder 
differently.
We only understand what is orderly. So if order (an ordering) 
is established by making something else disorderly, then 
interpretations not only enable us to understand but also 
enable us to misunderstand (or: disable us so that we cannot 
understand). A self-deceiver interprets; he thereby is able 
not to know what bystanders think he "must know", and to 
misunderstand what they think he "must understand". There are 
no special strategies of self-deception, only special aims and 
motives which the self-deceiver has for doing what we all do, 
namely interpreting.
"Look at things this way and you can understand how orderly 
they are". So if you look at things a different way (choose a 
different scale for the graph, choose different physical 
constants) you cannot see order - or only order of a different 
sort. Since we only ever see the order, we are liable to 
assert: that is how the world is - rather than: that is what 
we have made of it. Thereby asserting not only that there is
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an orderly interpretation, but that beyond it there is an 
orderly world to justify the interpretation.
he has distinctly convinced himself of the eternal 
rigidity, omnipresence, and infallibility of nature's 
laws: he has arrived at the conclusion that as far as we
can penetrate the heights of the telescopic and the depths 
of the microscopic world, everything is quite secure, 
complete, infinite, determined, and continuous. Science 
have to dig in these shafts eternally and 
successfully and all things found are sure to have to
harmonise and not to contradict one another. How little
does this resemble a product of fancy, for if it were it
would necessarily betray somewhere its nature of
appearance and unreality. ("On Truth and Falsity in their 
Ultramoral Sense", Nietzsche [1964], Ill.ii. 379)
Nietzsche, however, argues it i^s a product of fancy. Our 
truths are instrumental, we use them because they work, and we 
abandon them when they do not work.
if each of us had for himself a different sensibility, if 
we ourselves were only able to perceive sometimes as a 
bird, sometimes as a worm, sometimes as a plant, or if one 
of us saw the same stimulus as red, another as blue, if a 
third person even perceived it as a tone, then nobody
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would talk of such an orderliness of nature, but would 
conceive of her only as an extremely subjective structure. 
(Nietzsche [1964], III.ii.379)
All obedience to law which impresses us so forcibly in the 
orbits of the stars and in chemical processes coincides at 
the bottom with those qualities which we ourselves attach 
to those things, so that it is we who thereby make the 
imnpression upon ourselves. (Nietzsche [1964], III.d.i.380)
waking man per se is only clear about his being awake 
through the rigid and orderly woof of ideas, and it is for 
this very reason that he sometimes comes to believe he was 
dreaming when the woof of ideas has for a moment been torn 
by Art. (Nietzsche [1964], III.ii.381)
Stressing the role of interpretation does not commit one to the 
claim that all interpretations are equally good or equally bad. 
We do not have to like any one particular ordering, especially 
if we suffer the disorder it wreaks:
the institutions of a society may well be at odds with its 
norms. To maintain these institutions may be fatally 
destructive. ... Theorists become revolutionaries only 
when their theories are able to articulate a deep 
dissatisfaction which the theorists did not invent. And
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at this point it is the refusal to destroy and recreate 
social institutions which is destructive of social life 
itself. The true nihilists in history were all kings: 
Charles I, Louis XVI, and Tsar Nicholas. The 
revolutionaries in their societies had to save social life 
from their rulers' destructive maintenance of the existing 
order. (MacIntyre [1967], p229 - 230)
In doing so, they articulated movements which disordered, 
disrupted, and remade not only the social institutions but the 
ways of understanding available within their societies.
(2) According To Nietzsche, Convention Fixes Beliefs
Nietzsche argues that interpretations are constructed by 
figuration. Some interpretations are fixed by convention. 
When the conventions become habitual we "forget" that they are 
invented. We regard them as being beyond our power to change 
("belief at will is impossible") but what fixes them is the 
massive agreement of public institutions which coerce us into 
consenting, and the attempt by the supporters of those 
institutions to monopolise the process of understanding by 
insisting that it can proceed only by means of the instituted 
norms. Nietzsche's courage is to speak against those 
institutions, defending the task of thinking what those 
conventions would make unthinkable. The next section gives an
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example of how an interpretation can make something 
"unthinkable".
(3) Thinking The Unthinkable
At one time it was illegal to belong to a trade union in
Britain. Those who controlled the laws used their power to
define trade unionists as criminals, by making the Combination 
Acts into law. Had they been able to control the moral 
vocabulary too then they could have made it true by definition 
that criminals should be prosecuted. Having power to enforce 
the law, they could (and did) prosecute trade unionists.
Their power to define vocabularies would have denied their 
opponents (and themselves) any language in which to utter - (or 
think) their opponents' case. The case would therefore have 
become undetectable to them. The domination of the vocabulary 
would have made some things unthinkable and unsayable - which 
is precisely what a self-deceiver might hope to achieve when he 
tries to "mask" or "conceal" something which he does not want 
to believe.
The Combination Acts are no longer on the statute books; and 
the struggle to dominate the moral vocabulary (or vocabularies) 
is still in progress. So we are able to think differently from 
those legislators. But perhaps other struggles have been
Page 258 Self-Deception
Radical Interpretation/20
fought and won, or have not yet begun: if so then there are
things which are unspeakable and unthinkable in our language. 
What are they? I cannot say or think what they are. To do so, 
I would need some other language (in which case, who will 
understand me?) or I would need to proceed through paradoxes 
and contradictions - in which case I could be shown to be 
misusing words, twisting them, and uttering falsehoods.
Nietzsche argues for the opening of struggles to think what 
cannot (according to the prevailing social norms) be thought, 
or uttered:
Is language the adequate expression of all realities?
(Nietzsche [1964], III.ii.373)
He argues that knowledge, truth and belief are constructed by 
interpretation. Interpretation constructs justifications. It 
is a leap into faith, a faith which resists opposition because 
it defines discourse, making some things unspeakable and 
unthinkable. Some understandings are constructed only by 
speaking against the conventional manner, which is the truthful 




(3) Phases In The Life-Cycle Of An Interpretation
Nietzsche describes successive phases in the processes by which 
metaphors become "truths". The phases are as follows:
Phase 1: the "artistic" creation of a metaphor.
That impulse towards the formation of metaphors, that 
fundamental impulse of man, which we cannot reason away 
for one moment - for thereby we should reason away man 
himself - is in truth not defeated nor even subdued by the 
fact that out of its evaporated products, the ideas, a 
regular and rigid new world has been built as a stronghold 
for it ... This impulse constantly confuses the rubrics 
and cells of the ideas, by putting up new figures of 
speech, metaphors, metonymies. (Nietzsche [1964], 
III.ii.379)
Phase 2: In order to satisfy the human need for a social and
gregarious mode of existence, we agree to all use the same 
metaphors. The metaphors are thereby conventionalised: in
phase 3 they will become "common currency".
man both from necessity and boredom wants to exist 
socially and gregariously, he must needs make peace and at 
least endeavour to cause the greatest bellum omnium contra
Page 260 Self-Deception
Radical Interpretation/20
omnes to disappear from his world ... that which 
henceforth is to be "truth" is now fixed; that is to say, 
a uniform valid and binding designation of things is 
invented and the legislation of language also gives the 
first laws of truth: since here, for the first time, 
originates the contrast between truth and falsity. 
(Nietzsche [1964], III.ii.372)
Phase 3: the conventionalised metaphors are then naturalised. 
They become "truths":
truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they 
are illusions; worn-out metaphors which have become 
powerless to affect the senses; coins which have their 
obverse effaced and now are no longer of account as coins 
but merely as metal. (Nietzsche [1964], III.ii.377)
The common currency, the shared metaphors, have become debased. 
The conventional value of the metaphors (like the value of a 
coin) has been displaced by a seemingly natural value (like the 
value of metal).
Phase 4: once the convention of truthfulness is established, 




The liar uses the valid designations, the words, in order 
to make the unreal distinction appear as real ... He 
abuses the fixed conventions by convenient substitution or 
even inversion of terms. If he does this in a selfish and 
moreover harmful fashion, society will no longer trust him 
but will even exclude him. (Nietzsche [1964], III.ii.372)
Phase 5: the conventions become habitual. One forgets that
they are conventions. This is a double forgetting:
forgetting that the truths are metaphors
forgetfulness of oneself as an "artistically creating 
subject".
Only by forgetting that primitive world of metaphors, only 
by the congelation and coagulation of an original mass of 
similes pouring forth as a fiery liquid out of the primal 
faculty of human fancy ... in short only by the fact that 
man forgets himself as an artistically creating subject: 
only by this does he live with some safety, repose and 
confidence. (Nietzsche [1964], III.ii.378)
Habituation makes this forgetfulness possible:
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The very relation of a nerve-stimulus to the produced 
percept is in itself no necessary one; but if the same 
percept has been reproduced millions of times and has been 
the inheritance of many successive generations of man, and 
in the end appears each time to all mankind as the result 
of the same cause, then it attains finally for man the 
same importance as if that relation between the original 
nerve-stimulus and the percept produced were a close 
relation of causality: just as a dream eternally
repeated, would be perceived and judged as though real. 
But the congelation and coagulation of a metaphor does not 
at all guarantee the necessity and exclusive justification 
of that metaphor. (Nietzsche [1964], III.ii.379)
Nietzsche adds:
by this very unconsciousness, by this very forgetting, he
arrives at a sense for truth. Out of the antithesis.
"liar", whom nobody trusts, whom all exclude, man
demonstrates to himself the venerableness, reliability, 
usefulness of truth. (Nietzsche [1964], III.ii.376)
He could have added: the "illusions" of metaphor become guilty 
by association with the liar.
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What would happen if we could emerge from our double 
forgetfulness and, recognising the conventions for what they 
are, reassert ourselves as creative artists and our truths as 
mutable, chosen instruments?
if he does not mean to content himself with truth in the 
shape of tautology, that is, with empty husks, he will 
always obtain illusions instead of truth. (Nietzsche 
[1964], III.ii.373)
Nietzsche appears to recommend that we should embrace these 
illusions by making our "forgetting" active: by choosing to 
forget rather than letting forgetfulness befall us. We can 
recognise that we are the artistic creators of the illusions. 
We can realise our freedom to create without doing harm and 
without being harmed.
The driving force of the will to truth is the impulse to create 
metaphors, a fundamental impulse of man.
The construction of truth, of self, of responsibility, of 
society, not only makes illusions - it makes these illusions 
come true. There are selves, there are truths, we do live 
socially and gregariously. The illusion lies in our 
forgetfulness of how they are created, and in the way they are
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taken to be objective rather than being understood (or 
misunderstood) "only in their relation to man".
(5) Nietzsche's "Will To Truth"
The "will to truth" is ambiguous in Nietzsche's texts. It is a 
will to discover truths using the public conventions; but it 
is also a will to utter and think something within that 
language, in defiance of the conventions. Someone who defied 
the Combination Acts and its supporting moral vocabulary might 
argue that trade unionists are not criminals, that they ought 
not to be prosecuted, but he would have been arguing against 
the legal and moral vocabularies, and therefore against the 
"truth". He might succeed in altering the law and the moral 
vocabulary, and thereby succeed in making something true which 
had been made false by convention. Upholders of that 
convention could resist that "misunderstanding" and "misuse of 
words".
If we understand 'truth' in the narrower sense (truth is 
constructed within a vocabulary), then what is true depends 
upon who has the power to define the vocabulary. In the 
broader sense, truth is extra-linguistic, and the search for 
truth is an attempt to make something speakable and thinkable 
even if it has always been ruled unspeakable and unthinkable. 
Nietzsche suggests that our "truths" (in the narrower sense)
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may be only our unrefutable errors (i.e. not truths in the 
broader sense). An established vocabulary is vulnerable to the 
eruption of another vocabulary able to overthrow it by making 
the formerly unspeakable into a conventional truth. The 
defeated may rise up and seize power - including the power to 
define.
Challenges to established truths have always proceeded by 
appeal to a "higher" truth, aiming to show the inadequacy of 
the established truths, and thereby to establish the higher 
truth - a more secure establishment. But this new 
establishment will, in turn, be guarded against the eruption of 
unspeakable truths. The aim to establish truths then seems 
inherently self-deceptive, since it is content to leave 
something unspeakable, and unthinkable. An interpretation 
which does not leave anything unthinkable would be disordered, 
chaotic, madness. A rule must rule something out, for 
otherwise it is not a rule. In any case we can never say that 
our interpretations are secure against the eruption of 
something it makes unthinkable, for we cannot find out anything 
about the unthinkable without convention-breaking.
If we cannot think the unthinkable, then it seems we have no 
alternative to our (thinkable) interpretation. But it is only 
unthinkable while we respect the conventions of the
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interpretation. We can break them. We can construct 
interpretations "at will".
Some radical interpretations gain agreement and become the 
conventional, shared ways of understanding. Mr Radical's 
interpretation, for example, may become orthodox in the future. 
The formerly radical interpretation becomes the property of a 
new Mr Negligent. So it turns out that radical interpretation 
and conventional interpretation are two phases of a single 
process. This undermines Mr Negligent's claim that radical 
interpretation is mere pretence; but it also undermines Mr 
Radical, since it suggests that what he aims for is to become 
the future Mr Negligent: his criticism of Mr Negligent turns
into criticism of his own goal.
(6) Nietzsche's Strategy
To defer forgetfulness, Nietzsche tells us, the "genuine 
philosopher" plays "the dangerous game", putting himself at 
risk. He weaves between madness and faith, and so, in a way, 
weaves them together. The game combines "scepticism and 
arrogance". Scepticism destroys faith, arrogance constructs 
it.
Mounce [1971] notes that the self-deceiver plays upon the edges 
of the "proper games" of knowledge and ignorance (so that self­
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deception cannot properly be described as either knowledge or 
ignorance). Nietzsche claims that is where the "genuine 
philosopher" is to be found.
We could argue that Nietzsche is merely self-deceived. Yet he 
tells us what he is doing. A self-deceiver ought not to be 
able to do that. Nietzsche is "merely" pretending to be 
"merely" deceived. If we assume so quickly that pretending to 
be deceived is genuine self-deception, then we have accepted 
the claim of role theories, that pretending to believe can 
become belief, and Nietzsche's claim that the will to truth is 
a will to deception. For Nietzsche is re-enacting by "active 
forgetfulness" the processes by which truths and knowledge are 
constructed. In bad faith he simulates good faith, the will to 
truth.
Via "scepticism and arrogance" Nietzsche describes the 
construction of truth and knowledge (and falsehood, error and 
ignorance) as an activity of figuration and forgetfulness.
(7) Nietzsche's "Forgetting"
Nietzsche puts in question all the prominent expressions which 
have been used in descriptions of self-deceptions 'belief',
'truth', 'knowledge', 'will', 'responsibility', 'self'
perhaps the only word which escapes his corrosive scepticism is
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'deception'. However he does not commend unmitigated
scepticism:
How wonderful and new and yet how gruesome and ironic I 
find my position vis-a-vis the whole of existence in the 
light of my insight! ... I suddenly woke up in the midst 
of this dream, but only to the consciousness that I am 
dreaming and that I must go on dreaming lest I perish - 
... Among all these dreamers, I, too, who 'know', am 
dancing my dance. (Nietzsche [1974], pll6)
We cannot help forgetting. What we can do is to make that 
forgetting active:
To close the doors and windows of consciousness for a 
time; to remain undisturbed by the noise and struggle of 
our underworld of utility organs working with and against 
one another; a little quietness, a little tabula rasa of 
the consciousness, to make room for new things, above all 
for the nobler functions and functionaries, for
regulation, foresight, premeditation (for our organism is 
oligarchically directed) - that is the purpose of active 
forgetfulness, which is like a doorkeeper, a preserver of 
psychic order, repose, and etiquette; so that it will be 




cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no present, without 
forgetfulness. (Nietzsche [1969], p57-58)
To believe our truths, we must "forget" that they are the 
artifacts left by our own activity, interpretation. The 
paradoxes of self-deception are transformed into paradoxes of 
knowledge and belief in general: "the will to truth is a will 
to deception". But the way in which the paradoxes are 
introduced also dissolves them by drawing attention to the role 
of interpretation: using one interpretation to achieve order 
disrupts another.
When we find out that some belief is false, we realise that the 
belief was "fabricated": that we made it up (or somebody, a 
deceiver, made it up for us). But the beliefs we hold true are 
fabricated by exactly the same techniques. Otherwise we would 
have a very convenient way of distinguishing truths from 
falsehoods. Attempts to define a "method" for justifying 
beliefs have exactly that aim: to find the techniques by which 
to construct only truths, never falsehoods. I suggest that 
such a method has not been found, and if it were found it could 
only be justified by results. So if we can distinguish truths 




(8) Bringing The Strands Together
Radical Interpretation theories give a non-paradoxical account 
of self-deception by committing a sort of philosophical heresy: 
they blur a sharp distinction. However, once we have blurred 
the distinction, we can sharpen it again, in a different (and, 
to my mind, better) way. The distinction is between
interpretations - products of an arbitrary, free activity, 
performed at will - and belief - a doxastic attitude which is 
allegedly fixed by evidence and not acquired at will. Radical 
interpretation theories argue that beliefs are interpretations. 
It is possible to arrive at beliefs by radical interpretation 
because all beliefs are acquired by interpretation.
The lack of a stable interpretation, Nietzsche tells us, is 
madness. We cannot avoid madness by reasoning, for until we 
have a stable interpretation there is nothing to which 
reasoning can appeal. Even the law of non-contradiction, which 
assigns the value, 'false' to all sentences of the form, 'P and 
not-P' , requires that 'P' identifies the same item in both of 
its occurrences: this is impossible without a stable
interpretation. So, for the sake of gaining stability, we need 
to make a leap of faith, and interpret.
However, a stabilised interpretation has its dangers too. 
Using an interpretation does not enable us to detect the
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disorder it creates, only the order. Sticking to one 
interpretation is dangerous because it does not enable us to 
know what we are missing. Self-deception exploits this. To 
mitigate the way in which interpretations disable us, we must 
challenge the stable interpretation. The means to do so is the 
"impulse to metaphor". We can construct another interpretation 
by the same means which enabled us to construct the first.
If we destabilise our interpretations, we risk madness. We 
also risk the penalties attached to convention-breaking: we 
may be dubbed liars or told that we are merely misunderstanding 
the conventions of the public language. Since these 
conventions govern the use of the word 'true', we may be 
accused of "falling away from the proper procedures for 
establishing truth and falsity", i.e., accused of negligent 
self-deception.
However the radical interpreter is not merely mistaken (i.e. 
using the conventions ineptly) nor is he merely lying (abusing 
the conventions): he is challenging the conventions. This is 
where Bohr's distinction between great truths and small truths 
comes in: the radical interpretation may be another "great 
truth" or it may be a falsehood. The aim of radical 
interpretation may be to achieve another understanding, or 
(like a self-deceiver), to achieve a misunderstanding of the 
conventional interpretation. We can test which is the case in
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any instance by testing the interpreter's willingness to 
"weave" between interpretations. If he is unwilling to 
contemplate both interpretations then he is avoiding 
understanding. However, willingness to "weave" may indicate 
self-deception by "inconstancy": the practice labelled "using 
double standards" may be self-deception by inconstancy (or it 
may be a way of deceiving other people only), for the two ways 
of understanding are also two ways of misunderstanding.
Let us see how the arguments of this chapter fit into the 
overall theme of this thesis, namely giving an account of self- 
deception .
Self-deception seems to combine two epistemic states which are 
inconsistent with each other - such as knowledge and ignorance, 
or true belief and error, depending upon how one characterises 
self-deception.
This can lead us to be sceptical about whether self-deception 
ever occurs. No-Such-Thing theorists argue that every attempt 
to provide a non-paradoxical account of self-deception 
collapses: either it collapses into a description of mere 
mistake (and so it is not a description of self-deception) or 
it collapses into a description of mere pretence (and so, 
again, it is not a description of self-deception).
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I argue that there are no special techniques of self-deception. 
For example, self-deception is not achieved by a schism which 
splits the self-deceiver into two or more parts.
Self-deception exploits some characteristics of the usual ways 
in which we arrive at beliefs. It is not some unusual or 
abnormal way of arriving at beliefs; but nor is it wholly 
explained by assimilating it to various mental operations 
("focussing", "ignoring", etc) with which we are all familiar. 
For although these operations may be familiar, assimilating 
self-deception to them has the effect of making them seem as 
strange and paradoxical as self-deception. This may be no bad 
thing - perhaps we ought to be puzzled and astonished when we 
pay attention to these familiar operations - but it does not 
explain self-deception. If we think that it does, then our 
critical faculties have been successfully lulled to sleep. In 
that case then we have been offered - and have accepted - a 
"magic button". It is as if self-deception were explained by 
saying that it is achieved by pressing a button (labelled, 
"focussing", for example). We are left waiting for a 
description of the processes which take place when the button 
is pressed.
Dissociation theories appeal to such magic buttons. Negligence 
theories argue that self-deception is the failure to press such 
a magic button - a button labelled, "the norms of enquiry",
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"the proper procedures for seeking truth", and so on. There is 
no agreement as to what these norms and procedures are, so we 
can hardly explain self-deception by gesturing towards them.
We should pay attention to the processes by which the magic 
buttons work. This could be interpreted as a transgression - 
namely, attempting within a philosophical thesis to do 
"armchair psychology". However, I do not think that 
philosophers are entitled to expect psychology to answer 
philosophical questions - and we could not yet offer a 
philosophical account showing that self-deception can be 
characterised in a non-paradoxical way. So we were still at 
the mercy of No-Such-Thing theories of self-deception. They 
too were still vulnerable to a non-paradoxical account of self- 
deception .
My aim, therefore, was to construct a philosophical (not 
psychological) account of self-deception, with the promise that 
"the proof of the pudding is in the eating"; i.e. once we 
constructed such an account we would be in a position to 
discuss whether or not it is philosophical - not before.
Radical interpretation (RI) theories allow us to go one step 
beyond the "magic buttons" which have blocked the explanation 
of self-deception. RI theorists argue that beliefs, both true 
beliefs and false, are constructed by a process of
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interpretation. This process is often described with the 
qualifying word 'mere' - mere interpretation, mere supposition, 
mere pretence - and contrasted with genuine belief which is not 
"mere", which allegedly is not achievable at will, and which is 
compelled by the "weight" of evidence and the "force" of 
arguments. My response was to identify the magic buttons on 
offer. "Will" is the magic button which allows us to produce 
interpretations "at will"; evidence is the magic button which 
allegedly produces belief. Interpretation is notoriously 
"wilful", free, arbitrary, etc, yet, I have argued, evidence is 
constructed by interpretation. So we need not suppose that 
evidence is coercive.
Attempting to construct a philosophical account of self- 
deception is a way to wake ourselves up from "forgetfulness". 
For, to give a non-paradoxical account, we have to acknowledge 
the activities of radical interpreters. Otherwise we must be 
amazed when evidence, the allegedly irresistable force, 
encounters self-deception, the immovable object.
Interpretations construct orderings and disorderings of data. 
Self-deception can seem puzzling if we consider it to be only a 
construction of disorder, a way of not understanding. To make 
it less puzzling we need to consider what sort of order it 
constructs. This is a risk. We risk being "converted" to the 
self-deceiver's interpretation; and the explanation we produce
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may seem to be a defence of self-deception, since by aiming to 
make self-deception intelligable we risk making it acceptable.
If we are willing to weave between interpretations, we may 
apear to think that all interpretations are equally good or 
equally bad. Yet "weaving" between interpretations need not 
prevent us having preferences. It may enable us to detect 
areas of interpretation which have been "blocked off", and to 
detect structures of pain, craving and clinging which can 
explain the "distortions" and "diversions" in the self­
deceiver's thinking. Our own prefered interpretations may also 
be subject to the same influences (pain, craving and clinging).
A self-deceiver can "hide things" from himself or herself 
because every interpretation hides things. We cannot say what 
things our own interpretations hide from us except by "leaping" 
or "weaving" into another interpretation. The sorts of things 
that are hidden by self-deception are "unpalatable facts" such 
as one's faults, mortality, aims - and those of other people 
too. To make life tolerable, to avoid madness, to preserve a 
rewarding interpretation, a self-deceiver desires to leave some 
things hidden. Self-deception aims to stabilise an 
interpretation, to make it permanently immune to change. 
Truth-seeking continually disturbs this situation; the self­
deceiver's "discovery of truth" is a continual pacification.
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We can destabilise interpretations. For example, the "chemical 
reaction" metaphor of the previous chapter invites questions 
and answers different to those offered by the "scales of 
judgement" metaphor.
The instability of our moral discourse is another example of 
interpretations being disrupted by other, competing 
interpretations. If everyone had agreed upon a moral 
vocabulary then no-one would have questioned the status of 
moral judgements as descriptions, no-one would have argued that 
they are ("merely") prescriptions. The little word 'merely' is 
used to seperate areas of discourse (for example "merely 
pretending" is used to invite the addition, "and therefore not 
really believing").
Nietzsche argues that the ambiguous status of moral 
descriptions / prescriptions is matched by the ambiguous status 
of truths in general (hence he writes of "Truth and Falsity In 
Their Ultramoral Sense"). Truth and falsity are "ultramoral" 
because they are constructed, prescribed, by rules about what 
it is permissable to say. The power to prescribe what may be 
said and thought is used to limit and constrain what is said 
and thought. Someone who exercises this power in an 
idiosyncratic way risks being labelled a self-deceiver, a 
charlatan, a liar, or being dismissed as quite mad; and the 
risk is also that the label may be true. But (this is
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Nietzsche's anti-democratic impulse) the situation is no better 
when everyone agrees: the descriptions are still 
prescriptions.
The radical interpreter aims to make others understand 
something - and before that, to make himself or herself 
understand something - despite, and in contravention of, the 
currently prevailing norms of discourse. Figuration 
("metaphor") is a means to do this without explicit paradox and 
self-contradiction.
The arguments presented here may not be intuitively convincing. 
However I am not in search of intuitive convictions. My aim is 
to construct a theory which works. If this aim is achieved, I 
do not much care whether the theory is intuitively obvious or 
counter-intuitive. Indeed, if our intuitions generate 
paradoxes, the theory had better be counter-intuitive. Part of 
my argument is that we construct "obviousness". If we start 
to use a counter-intuitive theory, then our intuitions will 
start to come into line with our theory. The question is 
whether or not this theory will do the work we want such a 
theory to do.
How shall we test our theory about radical interpretation? One 
way is to ask if it removes the paradoxes of self-deception. I
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have argued that it does, and in later chapters I will test the 
theory against alleged examples of self-deception.
The radical interpretation theory fails if we can find a theory 
which does not originate in a process of radical 
interpretation. Since we cannot in practice work through every 
theory, determining its origins, the radical interpretation 
theory must remain a working hypothesis. In this thesis I can 
only give examples of how the hypothesis works. Radical 
interpretation theories remain vulnerable to a telling counter­
example, if one exists.
In the next chapter I give an example of the history of some 
metaphors. I claim that this history exemplifies the 
conventionalisation and naturalisation of metaphor which 
Nietzsche outlines. These metaphors are used to construct 
models of memory and understanding which contribute to the 
argument that the self-deceiver "must know", that evidence is 
not a product of interpretation, and so on. Paying attention 
to the metaphors gives us a key to unlock the progress of 
epistemology, or at least a way of picking the lock.
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There are two metaphors which are used repeatedly over 
thousands of years of our history, and are so common that to 
remove them from the record would make huge chunks of that 
history unintelligable.
These two metaphors do not seem to be compatible with each 
other, as I shall explain below. By reconstructing a way of 
linking them together which makes them compatible, we can gain 
an insight into the way that "belief at will" - including self- 
deception - happens. We can also illustrate Nietzsche's 
description of the phases in the history of a metaphor.
The first metaphor is the "scales of judgement". This metaphor 
is used to understand judgement as a way of weighing evidence: 
evidence is placed upon the scale pans and the scales tips down 
on the side of the pan which bears the weightiest evidence.
The second metaphor is "the mind's waxy essence". This 
metaphor is used to suggest that the mind is malleable and 
retentive, like wax. It retains impressions of the things 
which strike it. The impressions are made by something weighty
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(such as evidence) or something forceful (such as arguments). 
In particular, the wax retains "sense-impressions".
Here is a summarised history of the "wax" metaphor.
Cicero credits the metaphor to Simonides of Cheos (circa 556- 
468 BC), the "inventor of the art of memory":
he inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty 
(of memory) must select places and form images of the 
things they wish to remember and store those images in 
those places ... and we shall employ the places and the 
images respectively as a wax writing-tablet and the 
letters written on it. (Cicero [1948], De Oratore, II, 
lxxxvi, 351-4)
It seems that Simonides intended to provide a model for 
training memory. He aimed to model mnémotechniques upon the 
best available technology for recording, which in his time was 
the technology of writing upon wax tablets.
The metaphor was put forward, elaborated and criticised, by 
Plato. Here is what Plato says:
I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the 
mind of man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in
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different men; harder, moister, and having more or less 
purity in one than another .,. let us say that this tablet 
is a gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses; and that 
when we wish to remember anything which we have seen, or 
heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to the 
perceptions and thoughts, and in that material we receive 
the impression from them as from the seal of a ring; and 
that we remember and know what is imprinted as long as the 
image lasts; but when the image is effaced or cannot be 
taken, then we forget and do not know ...
And the origin of truth and error is as follows; When the 
wax in the soul of anyone is deep and abundant, and smooth 
and perfectly tempered, then the impressions which pass 
through the senses and sink into the heart of the soul, as 
Homer says in a parable, menaing to indicate the likeness 
of the soul to wax - these, I say, being pure and clear 
and having a sufficient depth of wax, are also lasting; 
and minds, such as these, easily learn and easily retain, 
and are not liable to confusion, but have true thoughts, 
for they have plenty of room, and, having clear 
impressions of things, as we term them, quickly distribute 




... but when the heart of anyone is shaggy - a quality 
which the all-wise poet commends, or muddy and of impure 
wax, or very soft, or very hard, then there is a 
corresponding defect in the mind - the soft are good at 
learning, but apt to forget; and the hard are the reverse; 
the shaggy and rugged and gritty, or those who have an 
admixture of earth or dung in their composition, have the 
impressions indistinct, as also the hard, for there is no 
depth in them; and the soft, too, are indistinct, for 
their impressions are easily confused and effaced. Yet 
greater is the indistinctness when they are all jostled 
together in a little soul which has no room. These are 
the natures which have false opinion; for when they see 
or hear or think of anything, they are slow in assigning 
the right objects to the right impressions - in their 
stupidity they are apt to confuse them and are apt to see 
and hear and think amiss - and such men are said to be 
deceived in their knowledge of objects, and ignorant. 
(Plato [1949], 191 - 195).
Accepted by Aristotle, the metaphor becomes the standard, 
conventional model for memory. It is no longer put in 
question. It becomes established in a powerful theory about 
the way memory functions:
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When a stimulus occurs it imprints as it were a mould of 
the sense-affection exactly as a seal-ring acts in 
stamping ... memory does not occur in those who are in a 
rapid state of transition ... it is as if the stimulus, 
like the seal, were stamped on running water ... in others
their worn-out condition ... and the hardness of the
receptive structure, prevent the sense-impression from
leaving an impression. (Aristotle, De Memoria, 450a - b,
in Sorabji [1972])
By the mid-eighteenth century the metaphor has become so 
habitual and so "natural" that Hume can talk about 
"impressions" without noticing any need to tell us that the 
impressions are in (not wax but) the mind. It seems to be 
forgotten that the metaphor is a metaphor. It has become 
conventionalised, naturalised, literalised, so that Hume's use 
of the word conforms, perhaps, to the primary, literal meaning 
of the word, and its original meaning has become secondary (but 
also literal). The word is now used as a non-f igurative 
expression.
Notice that this history matches what I called "phases in the 
life of a metaphor", with a high degree of precision. The 
metaphor ("the mind receives impressions") has become a 
conventional, obvious truth - true by definition, because the
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use of words like 'impression' have come to organise the ways 
in which we talk about the mind.
Going back a few years, we find that Locke uses the metaphor to 
describe the mind as a "tabula rasa", a blank tablet of wax 
which receives sense-impressions. Locke [1964] links the 
metaphor of the wax to the metaphor of the scales of judgement.
Putting these metaphors together provides a way of describing 
the operations of cognition: the wax receives and retains
impressions - like perception and memory - while the scales 
weighs up evidence - like judging something to be true or 
false. This combination of metaphors seems to leave little 
room for volition in the processes by which we gain beliefs. 
However, a third element is needed to harness the two metaphors 
together. For suppose that I use my senses to acquire
evidence: I position myself so that something makes a sense-
impression upon the malleable, retentive wax of my mind. But 
impressions do not seem to be the sort of things which can then 
be weighed upon the scales of judgement: impressions are
better described as absences of weight, the shape of where the 
wax used to be. So we need to explain how the sense-impression 
is linked to the scales of judgement.
Without this missing link the metaphors fail to mesh together, 
and we can discern the symptoms of this failure in the
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difficulties Locke has in his dispute with Leibniz. Locke 
denies that there are "innate ideas" in the mind, whereas 
Leibniz claims that there are. Locke argues that ideas are 
"abstracted" from sense impressions, and that therefore we have 
no need to postulate the existence of innate ideas. But what 
is the nature of this strange process, "abstraction"?
Impressions are particular: how can we "abstract" from them an 
idea which is not particular but general? Supposing we can 
"abstract" ideas, how can we put them together to form 
something which can be "weighed", something which is capable of 
being true or false? Abstracted, generalised impressions (i.e. 
ideas), whether taken singly or put together in clumps, do not 
seem to fit the requirement: a bundle of ideas is just a
bundle of ideas, not a truth-bearer.
Locke's problems can be traced back to the "missing link" 
between the wax and the scales. Descartes too uses the wax and 
scales metaphors, but he links them together via a third 
metaphor, the metaphor of the template.
Descartes argues that the understanding can act both as wax and 
as a seal - i.e. the template which forms the impressions in 
the wax:
in all these processes, the cognitive power is sometimes
passive, sometimes active; it plays the part now of the
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seal, now of the wax; here, however, these expressions 
must be taken as purely analogical, for there is nothing 
quite like this among corporeal objects. The cognitive 
power is always one and the same; if it applies itself, 
along with the imagination, to the common sensibility, it 
is said to see, feel, etc; if it applies itself to the 
imagination alone, as far as that is already provided with 
various images, it is said to remember; if it does this 
in order to form new images, it is said to imagine or 
conceive; if, finally, it acts by itself, it is said to 
understand. (Descartes [1970], pl69)
The understanding can be formed into a template which fits many 
impressions - perhaps like a sculpture which can make many 
different impressions, and can be fitted into the many 
different impressions. Such a template would organise the many 
impressions by showing how they can all fit different parts of 
the template.
Weighing-scales cannot tip themselves, but we can incline them 
by putting weight upon them. We can construct templates to fit 
the impressions; the templates can then incline the scales of 
judgement one way or the other, by their weight. For this 
reason Descartes can argue that the "inclination of the will" 




there is no need for me to be impelled both ways in order 
to be free; on the contrary, the more I am inclined one 
way - either because I have clearly understood it under 
the aspect of truth and goodness, or because God has 
disposed my inmost consciousness - the more freely do I 
choose that way
however much I may be drawn one way by probable 
conjectures, the mere knowledge that they are only 
conjectures and not certain and indubitable reasons, is 
enough to incline my assent the other way (Fourth 
Meditation, Descartes [1968]).
Descartes' method for enquiry arises from this organised 
construction of the metaphors. He offers: (a) a mathematical 
method for the construction of templates and (b) a way to avoid 
errors: we do so by not constructing templates ("ideas") which 
are not "clear and distinct".
"Clear and distinct" has been taken to be the symptom of yet 
another metaphor, the "optical metaphor", and so it is. 
Descartes often writes of "the light of reason", for example:
upon a great illumination of the intellect there follows a 
great illumination of the will (Descartes [1968])
Self-Deception Page 289
Mind's Waxy Essence/21
But his understanding of light converts it into a tactile 
phenomenon, so that the optical metaphor is guided by the 
tactile characteristics of the primary operation of the 
understanding - the interplay of the wax and the template. 
There is no doubt that Descartes does use the optical metaphor, 
writing of "seeing by the light of reason" etc. But consider 
what he writes on the subject of vision:
let us not deny anyone else’s view of colour, but let us 
abstract from all aspects except shape, and conceive the 
difference between white, red, blue, etc., as being like 
the difference between shapes such as these: [and 
Descartes offers some drawings of shapes] (Descartes 
[1970], pl67)
On "the external senses" he writes that,
their having sensation is properly something passive, just 
like the shape (figuram) that wax gets from a seal. You 
must not think that this expression is just an analogy; 
the external shape of the sentient organ must be regarded 




So also for the other senses. The first opaque part of 
the eye receives an image (figuram) (pl67).
There we have it: images are shapes. The metaphor of the 
impression in wax is Descartes' explanation of the optical 
metaphor.
One might argue that all this happened long ago, that since 
then we have outgrown such metaphors and learned to speak 
literally. So let us see if we have: if we have learned to 
speak literally then there should be no air of paradox about 
the following assertions:
There is no such thing as weighty evidence, there are no 
forceful arguments, I never find evidence compelling, no-one 
ever has any impressions of anything, nor does evidence ever 
sway anyone or incline them to one side or the other, evidence 
cannot tip the balance ... and so on.
All of these are metaphors. I suggest that remarks like, 
"there is no such thing as weighty evidence" is slightly 
shocking, and we are "inclined" to regard them as ("literally") 
false, rather than as the rejection of a metaphor. Once we 
notice these metaphors it also becomes evident how difficult 
(if not impossible) it is to avoid them.
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We can trace the metaphor of the scales down the years to that 
most literal-minded of philosophers, Carnap. We can actually 
watch the metaphor going under for perhaps the last time, 
leaving behind only a single bubble to remind us of its 
continuing activity. in the course of Carnap's seemingly very 
non-figurative discussion of probability, we find this aside:
In this point I am in agreement with Reichenbach, whose 
concept of weight corresponds to our concept of
probabilityl. (Carnap [1962] p237 - 8)
and Carnap quotes Reichenbach:
The man of practical life knows more about weights than 
many philosophers will admit (Carnap [1962], p238)
I take it that Carnap can only mean: "my literal-seeming
discourse does the same work as Reichenbach's metaphor". In 
that case, the figurative words have been excised from the 
text, but not their figurative operations. If I do not like 
the metaphor of assaying evidence, then I may speak of
assessing evidence instead: but I still mean "assaying", for I 
have not altered the way the discourse operates. I have only 
concealed the figurative operations in literal guise, or, to
put it another way, I have altered the appearance of my
figurative discourse to simulate "literalness". We might
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equally well say that the "literal" discourse dissimulates its 
figurative operations. I have a hunch that Carnap's discussion 
of probability could be mapped onto a mathematical description 
of weighing something upon the weighing-scales.
It is also worth tracing the ongoing history of the scales of 
judgement. The weighing scales found their way into the 
chemical laboratory and (it was bound to happen sooner or 
later) chemical reactions came to be interpreted in terms of 
their equilibrium (an idea drawn from the operations of 
balancing, e.g. balancing weights upon the scales). Chemical 
equilibria, as I have argued previously, provide a metaphor for 
human judgement which is, in many ways, better than the "scales 
of judgement" metaphor. They have to be quite complicated 
chemical reactions to provide an apt metaphor for judgement. 
Some of the most complicated reactions take place in the human 
body and the human brain. However, if we push the metaphor 
very far in this direction, we are in danger of making the 
metaphor so realistic that it ceases to be a metaphor. Perhaps 
it is no coincidence that physical / electrochemical events 
within human beings should be complicated enough to match the 
complexities of the processes by which judgements occur. 
Perhaps the physical events within human bodies are the only 
processes complicated enough to embody processes of judgements. 
Then the development of the "chemical equilibrium" metaphor 
would be not so much a metaphor as a re-description (within a
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different discipline and for different purposes) of the 
processes of judgement.
Templates ("innate ideas") are constructed. By invoking the 
metaphor of the template, we also make this constructive 
activity central to the processes by which we acquire beliefs.
Descartes aims to make the activity of construction even more 
salient. In the mnemonic systems developed since Simonides' 
time there was an active technology of memory: techniques were 
developed to connect ideas by "chaining" them together or 
hanging them upon "pegs". The place system of memory which 
Simonides used gave a way of ordering ideas, so that one could
"find them back". The active part was making use of the
techniques. Making use of this training was, in some ways,
cumbersome (though not so cumbersome as being unable to
remember at all). Lully's art of combinations was perhaps the 
leading edge of mnemonics by the time of Descartes: Descartes 
dismisses it in a single disparaging sentence:
the art of Lully, for talking without judgement about 
matters one is ignorant of. (Descartes [1968], p20)
Descartes has much bigger ideas. As he writes, in a fragment 
which we have from Leibniz' copy of it (and the fact that 
Leibniz recorded it is not insignificant either) :
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The sciences now have masks on them; if the masks were 
taken off they would appear supremely beautiful. On 
surveying the chain of the sciences one will regard them 
as not being more difficult to retain in one's mind than 
the number-series is.
In the year 1620 I began to understand the foundations of 
a wonderful discovery. (Descartes [1970], p3)
This seems puzzling. For if we take just the natural numbers, 
for example, the series is infinite. How, then, could one 
retain them in one's mind? I take it that the point Descartes 
is making is that we do not need to retain the numbers, for we 
have a mathematical method for generating the numbers.
Descartes' wonderful discovery is a methodical technique for 
generating ideas - templates to fit the impressions upon the 
wax. For during the Renaissance, and leading up to Descartes' 
crucial role in developing the thought of the modern world, a 
central strand of discovery showed that we do not need to 
retain memories in the "wax" of the mind. For, building upon 
the Medieval rise of science, enquirers were learning to "read" 
what Galileo calls "the book of nature", and claiming that the 
book is written in the language of mathematics.
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Descartes' guiding question (e.g. in the Meditations) is: what 
is the correct way to acquire true beliefs (and avoid 
falsehoods)? Translated into the metaphors I have mentioned, 
the question is answered as follows: we have to use a 
mathematical method to manufacture templates (ideas) which fit 
the impressions.
Descartes outlines the steps in the process - analysis into 
simple components, enumeration, ensuring completeness, and 
"orderly arrangement". How we do this orderly arrangement is a 
matter of free choice according to Descartes, but evidently he 
thinks that whichever way we do it, the result will be the 
same, for the example of orderly arrangement which he gives is 
the various techniques for finding all the anagrams which can 
be generated from a (finite) set of letters. Descartes' 
remarks warn us that these are phases of a process, for he 
mentions that enumeration, ensuring completeness, and orderly 
arrangement are all parts of one activity - i.e. they are not 
successive steps in the process - implying that other elements 
in his description are successive steps.
This is rather like making castings using the lost wax process: 
the simple elements are collected, enumerated, and put together 
in an ordered whole so that we can produce the template of the 
thing which caused those impressions.
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So instead of having to retain all the impressions, we can 
regenerate them by using the templates (ideas).
The constructed idea has deep foundations (which fit the 
impressions), it is tightly constructed so that there are no 
gaps. But, we might object, there may be many ideas which 
"fit" the impressions. However, Descartes uses a mathematical 
model for the process of making templates, and the possibility 
of there being many ideas which "fit" would not show up in a 
model based upon the mathematics of his time. Mathematics has 
developed since: we now have the exemplars of (for example), 
alternative geometries (most famously used by Einstein) and, 
most recently. Chaos theory, describing processes which do not 
oscillate and do not tend towards stability (notice that the 
notion of "tending towards a limit" is crucial in the 
differential calculus developed by Leibniz and Newton, 
Descartes making a contribution towards that development). The 
usefulness of computability as a model for human understanding 
takes on a different meaning once we realise that, for some 
processes, a sufficiently powerful computer might be able to do 
the computation, but we cannot.
Gleich [1988] points out that the sort of mathematics available 
led practitioners of the physical sciences to concentrate on 
the solvable problems, leaving aside chaotic systems: the 
maths available led to force-fitting the data to the available
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techniques, with the promise that other processes could be 
decribed by elaborating those techniques further - which was 
false. So that the physical sciences selected the data which 
suited them - namely those which fitted the mathematics 
available. Gleich adds that as a result we fooled ourselves 
into overlooking the existence of chaotic systems.
Descartes' method tells us that to find the theory that fits, 
we should start with the simplest one. If we adopt the (brave) 
assumption that we have a method for knowing which is the 
simplest theory, then the method can be performed mechanically, 
by feeding asssumptions into a theorem-generating machine and 
fitting the resulting predictions to the "impressions".
Descartes proposes that instead of recording impressions upon 
the wax, we need only to understand the construction techniques 
for beliefs: we can then construct, rather than retrieve from 
memory, any belief we require, as easily as mathematical 
procedures enable us to construct any member of a number 
series.
This at least was Descartes' dream. The metaphors explain the 
structure and sequence of Descartes' Meditations (Descartes 
[1968]). The sequence of the arguments is as follows.
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1. The wax must exist in order for there to be any impressions 
(the mind is like wax) - this is the metaphorical structure of 
the cogito ("I think therefore I am").
2. The authenticity of the impressions is guaranteed by the 
impression of a template so perfect that it cannot be forged 
(the idea of God is so perfect that I cannot invent it, and the 
perfection needed to produce it guarantees that God, being 
perfect, is not a deceiver).
3. The authenticity of impressions means that they deceive me 
only if I confuse them - i.e. construct templates which order 
impressions in the wrong way, or if they are confused (one 
impression stamped over another one, perhaps) - or if the 
impressions are too faint for me to be able to ensure my 
template fits them (I cannot be deceived by ideas which are 
clear and distinct).
4. We can avoid error by not constructing templates which are 
not clear and distinct. If the templates do not exist then 
they cannot incline the scales of judgement towards falsehood. 
By confining ourselves to what is clear and distinct we ensure 




5. There is a mathematical procedure for constructing 
templates: we reduce the materials to their simplest 
components, make sure that none are missing, and try to put 
them together in the simplest way. If they do not fit together 
this way, we try the next simplest way - until they fit 
together. The simplest one that fits (clearly and distinctly) 
is true.
Descartes' own text, however, is constructed not mathematically 
but metaphorically. If we consider the operations he must 
perform in order to construct the coqito, we can also explain 
why the connecting metaphor of the "template" disappears from 
Locke's model of cognition. Remember that the force driving 
both Descartes and Locke is the search for certainty: the old 
certainties have crumbled. They need a justification for a new 
order (and ordering) of things. The individual "subject" of 
experience has risen to prominence, and with it the problem of 
subjectivity. Descartes actually takes steps to construct this 
individual subjectivity: for he isolates himself in the famous 
"stove-heated room" of the Meditations, ensuring that the 
individual is thereby crystallised out of the flux of society. 
The isolated individual, rather than the social individual, 
becomes the unit of thinking. This isolating activity is 
needed to create the problems of subjectivity, for if thinking 
were to go on between individuals - e.g. in a conversation - 
rather than within one - as in soliloquoy - then a doubt as to
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the existence of other individuals cannot arise: for they 
become the means by which I think and the subject of thought 
would not be Descartes' 'I' but 'we': instead of "I think, 
therefore I am" there would be, "we think, therefore we are". 
The problems would then be problems of intersubjectivity ("how 
do we know?" rather than subjectivity ("how do I know?"). 
Descartes constructs the conditions which make such doubt 
possible; but he could just as easily go back into society 
again, and thereby destroy his doubts.
Locke's way of overcoming the problem of subjectivity is to 
show that it allows objectivity: our ideas are aligned to 
external objects, provided we do not tamper with the "scales of 
judgement". Therefore a hint that our choices affect the 
processes of cognition is a threat to the project. The thought 
that we might construct the templates which link wax and scales 
is definitely a threat of that sort. It gives a major role to 
our constructive activity. Therefore the activity of 
constructing templates must be excised from the explanation.
Over the years, the models of rationality have developed. The 
Pre-Socratic notions of rationality were modelled on harmony 
and balance, the tension of the bowstring and the bow, the 
tuning of the lyre. Pythagoras, using mathematical techniques, 
found a measure of musical harmony. Next the model of 
rationality comes to encompass the precision of weighing and
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measuring, one of its strands developing into the assessment 
(assaying) of probabilities - as found in Carnap's work.
I suggested that the aim of Simonides' "wax" metaphor was to 
enable human memory to be trained on the model of the best 
recording techniques then available - writing. With the 
development of photographic techniques it becomes possible to 
expand the optical metaphor - used by Descartes and taken over 
by Locke - and use it to model memory, the "retentive" quality 
of the mind, as well as its "receptive" qualities of 
perception. Photographs then offer a model for understanding, 
for they are so "natural" and "lifelike".
In the next chapter I shall discuss how Marx puts the optical 
metaphor to use in a way which subverts the aims which 
originally sustained it (namely the aims of establishing the 
veracity and certainty of one way of understanding, and thereby 
to justify it). After discussing Marx, I will be able to draw 
together the claims made in the last few chapters.
In this chapter I have tried to show how Nietzsche's "working 
hypothesis" may be applied to the history of one web of 
metaphors. I suggest that using the hypothesis enables us to 
understand much that would otherwise be puzzling. For example, 
Descartes' "proof" for the existence of God has seemed to many 
people an artificial intrusion into the main thrust of his
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argument, but understood via the "wax" metaphor it becomes part 
of the pattern of the metaphor's operations. So that it is 
understandable even if we do not agree with it.
Nietzsche's working hypothesis allows us to propose ways in 
which understanding and misunderstanding may be constructed 
rather than passively received - through the "impulse to 
metaphor" and its radical interpretations which, far from being 
coerced or constrained by evidence, are the preconditions for 
our being able to construct evidence from data. Reading the 
texts in this way enables us to open them with a key.
It is remarkable that the same metaphors should keep surfacing 
over and over again, in the course of thousands of years. It 
seems rather too much of a coincidence. One explanation is 
that the metaphors are apt: they happen to fit (like a 
template) the non-figurative ways in which we discuss 
cognition, for example. Another option is to ask why they are 
so apt: might it not be the case that the metaphors fit 
because they guide cognitive discourse, giving rise to it in 
the way Nietzsche suggested? My suggestion is that the 
metaphors of wax, scales and template are only a small 
selection from a mutually-supporting system of metaphors which 
has grown, developed, and always guided our thinking. But 




The texts of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and Locke are aimed 
to make something obvious. Suppose that we accept their 
proclaimed aim, to make the truth obvious. The same kind of 
metaphorical operations could go on in other texts, in order 
to make something obvious which is not true. For if we can 
construct evidence, (and we do, through the impulse to 
metaphor), we can choose what to make evident, i.e. what to 
make obvious.
We might then want to ask how we distinguish truth-seeking from 
self-deception. I suggest that we cannot distinguish self- 
deception by its characteristic operations: for they are 
precisely the same kinds of operations which are performed when 
seeking truth: the figurative construction of "obviousness", 
storytelling, "leaping" to conclusions", selective data- 
gathering, focussing attention, etc. Self-deception cannot be 
distinguished by the objects of attention: self-deceivers 
describe the same world as truth-seekers. If we are to 
distinguish the two, then we must pay attention to their aims 
and motivation. But someone who is self-deceived may believe 
his motive to be the disinterested search for truth - for he is 
self-deceived. How could a self-deceiver come to recognise 
that he was self-deceived? And if this is a predicament for 
the self-deceiver, it is just as much a predicament for "us 
truth-seekers". For our beliefs about our motives 
(disinterested search for truth, etc) will be exactly like a
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self-deceiver's beliefs about his motives. So one wonders how 
the distinction is to be made. If it is not made, then the 
truth-seeker may find himself reflected in the activities of 
the self-deceiver. The result, for someone who wants to be 
sharply distinguished from self-deceivers (and don't we all) is 
paradox.
What was the guiding thought of Simonides, Plato, Aristotle, 
Descartes and Locke, if it was not to show that our way of 
understanding is justified, true, and certain because it is 
modelled upon the best technology we have available? And that 
if it does not live up to that technology, then it ought to do. 
There could be no better prelude to Marx's theory of ideology, 
the claim that we are deceived by participating in a mode of 
production which (a) requires us to adopt its instrumental 
theories in order to participate and (b) subjugates us to the 
products of our own labour and to the mode of production 
itself. Marx argues that ideology is deception, that we 
participate under duress, and that we can escape from that 
particular deception only by altering the mode of production - 
or at least altering the way we participate by struggling 
against it. To this I would add that, if Marx is correct, to 
participate willingly in that mode of production is self- 
deception. For in that case, one is not only deceived, but 
also responsible and willing to be deceived.
Self-Deception Page 305
I d e o l o g y
My theory about self-deception applies to individuals. Marx's 
theory of ideology applies to whole societies and social 
classes. Writing on this large scale, Marx describes many 
features which I described on a small scale. Self-deception 
and ideology are closely connected. It is worth making the 
connection because the self-deceptions of individuals are not 
immune to the social circumstances within which they pursue 
their lives. The approach used by Marx to describe ideology 
underlines my claim that self-deception is (i) constructed by a 
process of interpretation and (ii) fixed by a role. The roles 
described by Marx are social (class) roles, the interpretations 
are those instrumental beliefs used by individuals to 
participate in a mode of production (such as capitalism). My 
theory, in turn, aligns with Marx's approach by illustrating 
how it may be used to dissolve the paradoxes of self-deception. 
Marx's theory offers a viable alternative to the false model of 
belief-formation which leads to the paradoxes, and so does 
mine. The two theories give each other mutual support.
To explain what Marx's theory of ideology contributes to the 
description of self-deception, I shall begin with some 




Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by 
religion, or anything else you like. They themselves 
begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as 
they begin to produce their means of subsistence - their 
food, shelter, and clothing. (Marx [1977], pl60)
Marx asserts that production is the basis of all societies. We 
need to produce and reproduce. We develop and alter the ways 
we do so, and these ways of organising production determine the 
way in which society is organised.
The form of a particular society is guided by the development 
of the forces of production (e.g. technological advances which 
increase our power to produce) and the relations of production 
between classes of people (e.g., in a capitalist society, the 
distribution of power between capitalists and workers).
Marx describes consciousness as a social products it too is 
guided by the mode of production. An ideology is a way of 
understanding (or misunderstanding) which is guided by the 
needs of the mode of production within a specific society.
So, for example, in a capitalist society the need to accumulate 
capital governs the ideology. Human knowledge and
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understanding are factors of production, and the factors of 
production are shaped and developed to serve the mode of 
production. So it makes sense to regard enquiry as a 
production process too, namely the production of human 
knowledge and understanding.
Capitalist production divides society into two classes, 
capitalists and workers; the relations between them are 
governed by the need to accumulate capital. Capitalists must 
attack the wages and conditions of workers, or be driven out of 
business and cease to be capitalists. Any capitalist who does 
not strive to maximise the exploitation of workers falls 
victim to others who do. For the capitalists who do so 
successfully will be able to control production at a lower 
cost. Capitalists are in competition with each other and with 
the workers who create capital.
To participate in the mode of production we have to adapt to 
the roles available within it. The roles adopted require us to 
act in ways determined by the needs of the mode of production. 
This also requires us to think in ways determined by the mode 
of production, for in order to perform those functions we need 
an instrumental understanding of the role. But the mode of 
production benefits capitalists at the expense of workers. 
Therefore, to participate, workers are obliged to adopt an 
instrumental understanding which damages their own interests.
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This understanding need not be true in order to be effective. 
Under capitalism, Marx argues, it is false ("false 
consciousness"). Workers encounter a conflict between the 
ideology and their daily experience. They participate in order 
to gain benefits, yet by participation they enhance the power 
of capitalists who attack those benefits.
The worker becomes poorer the richer is his production, 
the more it increases in power and scope ... the 
depreciation of the human world progresses in direct 
proportion to the increase in value of the world of things 
... the object which labour produces ... confronts it as 
an alien being, as a power independent of the producer 
(Marx (1977], p78)
The situation can change. Competition between capitalists 
forces them to try to take more from workers - cutting pay and 
increasing working hours. As the rewards of participation 
diminish and the penalties increase, workers may cease to 
participate. By strikes, civil unrest, and ultimately by 
revolution they may struggle to overthrow capitalism. As a 
result their roles alter: they start to lose illusions which 
were fixed by the roles they formerly played as participants.
I suggested that self-deception is "ideology on a small scale". 
We can map Marx's remarks about ideology onto my remarks about
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self-deception. An ideology breaks down when the rewards of 
participation in the mode of production diminish. Self- 
deception breaks down when the rewards of the role which fixes 
it diminish.
Lets take a more detailed look at what Marx says about 
ideology.
2. Marx's Theory Of Ideology
If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside- 
down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises as 
much from their historical life-process as the inversion 
of objects on the retina does from their physical life- 
process. (Marx [1977], pl64)
that is just the paradox of ideology: it is not just
nonsense or error but "false understanding", a coherent, 
logical, rule-governed series of errors. This is the 
point Marx captures in his stress on ideology as a kind of 
optical inversion. In one sense, the inversion makes no 
difference at all; the illusion is perfect. Everything 
is in the proper relation to everything else. But from a 
contrary point of view the world is upside down, in chaos, 




Ideology and self-deception are connected. One may participate 
to a greater or lesser extent in an ideology, and with a 
greater or lesser degree of willingness. An ideology has its 
agents - the professional ideologists - and its victims, the 
people who are deceived by it, willingly or not. The willing 
victims of ideology exemplify self-deception: it suits them to 
be deceived. The unwilling victims of ideology are, of course, 
deceived but not self-deceived.
Self-deception is like ideology, but practiced on a small 
scale: as well as the large-scale factors which may influence
the thinking of whole classes of people, there are the small- 
scale factors which arise through the idiosyncratic 
circumstances of individuals.
Marx uses the camera obscura as a metaphor; but it does not 
originate with him. It had earlier been used for quite other 
purposes. Locke used the metaphor as a model of human 
understanding, to oppose the rationalist claim that ideas are 
innate or self-generated by the mind, by suggesting that ideas 
originate in the objective, material world "outside" the mind.
Marx, however, claims that,
consciousness is ... from the beginning a social product
[my emphasis], (Marx [1977], pl67)
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Our understanding of the material world is not given direct but 
is mediated by social circumstances which we do not choose: 
"Man makes history, but not in circumstances of his own 
choosing."
Marx criticises Feuerbach for supposing that,
the sensuous world around him is ... a thing given direct. 
(Marx [1977], pl74)
Marx uses the camera obscura metaphor to assert that there is 
no such "direct" access. Our understanding is generated by the 
social machinery which constructs it. This machinery is 
developed by a person's "historical life-process". It is not 
guaranteed to construct true beliefs: it may (and does) 
construct false beliefs.
When we stress the ultimate analogy of the physical eye 
[with the camera obscura - BC], we naturalise this machine 
and treat it as a scientific invention that simply mirrors 
the timeless, natural facts about vision. But suppose we 
reversed the stress, and thought of the eye as modelled on 
the machine? Then vision itself would have to be 
understood not as a simple, natural function to be 
understood by neutral, empirical laws of optics but as a 
mechanism subject to historical change. Vision would
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comprise not just the physiology of lenses and retinas but 
a whole field of ideological attentiveness - a 
preselected, preprogrammed grid of features and structures 
of perception, (Mitchell [1987], pl75)
Allegedly the camera cannot lie. But what we see through the 
camera is culturally and historically conditioned. The camera 
mimics a particular way of seeing so well that it can be used 
to deceive. Yet because the artifice is so effective, the 
products of the camera are extolled as natural and lifelike.
Because the camera obscura mimics the "natural" way of seeing 
so effectively, the metaphor seems to support the claim that we 
have direct access to an objective, material world.
Marx draws attention to the fact that the camera is a product 
of a particular historical development of technology. If the 
camera is really so akin to understanding, then we may also 
consider understanding to be, like the camera, a product of a 
particular historical development of technology and a 
particular mode of production. The camera obscura is an 
artifice. It is not the guaranteed vehicle of truth. 
Likewise, human understanding is an artifice, moulded by social 
circumstances. Its veracity is not guaranteed: consciousness 
may be false consciousness. So we need to pay attention to the 
mechanism by which the appearance of veracity is produced:
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we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, 
nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, 
in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from 
real, active men, and on the basis of their real life- 
process we demonstrate the development of the ideological 
reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms 
formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, 
sublimates of their material life-process, which is 
empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. 
(Marx [1977], pl64).
The connection of ideas to material life-processes is 
guaranteed for Marx by the means he chooses in order to explain 
ideology: but the veracity of the ideas is not guaranteed. 
Like the images of the camera obscura, everything may be in its 
proper relation to everything else though all are upside-down.
The ideology of a ruling class makes claims to universality and 
objectivity. Like Locke's camera obscura, it gives the 
appearance of being the (sole) "natural" way of understanding 
the world ( misunderstanding it, in Marx’s view).
Capitalismcreates ideologies. It also creates two social 
classes, the ruling (capitalist) class and the working class. 
Members of the ruling class dominate (by definition) . 
Therefore they influence and to some extent control the life-
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processes of the working class. Members of the working class 
use the available means to form their outlook. The dominance 
of the ruling class ensures that the means most readily 
available is the ruling class ideology. This way of 
understanding is shaped to serve the interests of the ruling 
class, with which the workers are, wittingly or unwittingly, 
in conflict. So when they look through this "camera obscura", 
their understanding is formed in a way which serves the 
interests of their enemies. By trying to use the ideology to 
further their interests, they actually damage their own 
interests. This can only be described as a misunderstanding. 
At best they may fail to "understand" in the manner made 
available. At worst they may obediently misunderstand. If 
they fail to "understand" then they are invited to accept the 
opinions of the experts who do understand. And those who do 
understand (or rather, "understand") are those whom the 
instrument is designed to serve. They "understand" with ease, 
because it is designed to serve their interests. The 
"understanding" prospers because it benefits the ruling class.
Marx's theory maps onto a Role theory of self-deception. It 
offers examples of how roles "fix" beliefs. Commodity 
fetishism (discussed below) is an example of such a belief. 
Marx also highlights the extreme difficulty of stepping out of 
some roles - it may take a revolution to do so in any 
consistent and lasting way - and so it casts doubt upon the
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possibility of radical interpretation occurring independently 
of radical action (such as revolution).
Marx describes consciousness as a social product: it is not
consciousness that determines being, but social being that 
determines consciousness. Human knowledge and understanding 
are factors of production, and the factors of production are 
shaped to serve the mode of production. So it makes sense to 
regard enquiry as a production process: in a capitalist
society this process is controlled to produce forms of 
understanding which serve the interests of capitalists. So the 
dominant ideology is an instrument which is not well adapted to 
the needs of workers.
Suppose a member of the working class attempts to use the 
ideology. Some possible outcomes are listed below.
a. He may be able to alter his situation so as to become a 
capitalist. The ideology will then work to his advantage: he 
can use it instrumentally in order to understand (or 
misunderstand) the situation in a way which he finds rewarding. 
But this can only happen to a few individuals since it takes 
many workers to support one capitalist.
b. He will succeed in using the ideology as an instrument for 
understanding, without ceasing to be a member of the working
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class. However by using it he misunderstands, and thwarts his 
own interests.
c. He will use the ideology, but because it is not well 
adapted to his needs, will be unable to make sense of the 
results. In order to function within the mode of production, 
he will be forced to accede to the wisdom of "experts" who do 
understand. These "experts" will be the agents of capitalism, 
for whom the ideology makes perfect sense because it serves 
their interests.
d. He will reject the ideology and try to construct another 
form of understanding. Since, according to Marx, consciousness 
is a product of the individual's historical life-process, this 
will be the understanding of a member of a defeated class 
subject to capitalism. The only effective way to create an 
understanding by and for the working class is to alter the 
historical life-process, through the self-emancipation of the 
working class. Unlike the ideology of the ruling class, this 
understanding will serve the needs of workers struggling to 
overthrow capitalism.
Capitalist ideology may be false yet still be an effective 
instrument. False understanding can be found in all sorts of 
societies of the past; many of these societies were very 
stable and, in their time, very powerful.
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Marx gives many detailed descriptions of the workings of
ideologies. in order to fulfil his promise to explain the
development of ideology from the life-processes of human
beings. In this chapter I can only give the flavour of what he 
says. One such illustration is his description of "commodity 
fetishism" (Marx [1977], p435 - 441).
3. "Commodity Fetishism"
Marx describes commodity fetishism as an illusion created by 
the capitalist mode of production. Commodity fetishism 
"reifies" the social relations between classes so that they are 
perceived indirectly, through their effects upon the market 
value of commodities. Social relations between people are 
misperceived as relations between commodities. Workers who 
fall victim to this misunderstanding are made less able to 
protect themselves in the conflict with the ruling class. For 
they do not recognise the real factor governing commodity 
prices, namely the conflict between social classes. Without 
recognition of the conflict, they are poorly situated to 
emancipate themselves.
The ruling class, in turn, are unable to avoid the courses of 
action dictated to them by the needs of competition, which is 
forced upon them by the logic of capitalist production. 
Capitalists must maximise the exploitation of workers in order
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to accumulate capital, or fall victim to others who do so and 
who thereby control production at a lower cost to themselves.
Commodity fetishism asserts falsely that the value of a 
commodity is determined by its relation to other commodities, 
this value being measured by the workings of a free market. 
Marx argues against this that the values of commodities are 
determined by relations between people. These are the 
relations between producers of commodities, and the relations 
between social classes which are in conflict with each other. 
He calls the relations "social relations of production" for the 
mode of production creates and sustains them and they also 
influence the way in which production takes place. So, for 
example, capitalism divides people into the (large but hitherto 
defeated) working class and the (small but dominant) ruling 
class, the "agents of capital" or capitalists.
Capitalists can drive down the cost of production by making 
workers work harder, for longer hours, for lower wages. 
Workers can act to improve their wages and conditions, e.g 
through strikes. The balance of this struggle decides the cost 
of production, the rate of profit to the capitalist, and the 
market value of commodities.
Marx opposes to commodity fetishism a labour theory of value: 
the value of a commodity is the amount of socially necessary
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labour time needed to produce it. Two remarks are in order 
here:
1« Clearly the labour time is not socially necessary if nobody 
wants the commodity.
2. The amount of labour time spent when using an outdated 
technology is not all socially necessary, for it could have 
been reduced using the more advanced technology available.
By participating in capitalism we are obliged to use the false 
theory (commodity fetishism), if only instrumentally. For if 
we participate, we are obliged to buy and sell commodities at 
the market price. Capitalist ideologies use commodity
fetishism to explain that price. It prevents the price being 
decided by the labour time needed to produce the commodity, for 
capitalism alienates commodities from their producers. 
Therefore the price must be determined independently of the 
labour time. The result is a theory which cannot take account 
of the factors dictating the values assigned to commodities, 
i.e. the social relations between people. Nonetheless, 
commodity fetishism is instrumentally effective for the purpose 
of ensuring that capitalist production functions smoothly, to 
the benefit of capitalists and the detriment of workers.
To participate in the mode of production, we have to use the 
theory which makes its workings intelligable. If we want to
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predict the price of a commodity in a capitalist market, for 
example, we had better not use Marx's labour theory of value, 
for it says nothing directly about the market price; and the 
data needed to apply the theory is not readily available, since 
capitalist ideology has no use for it. On the other hand, if 
we want to understand the social relations of production, we 
had better not use commodity fetishism, for it has little to 
say directly about those relations. However, commodity 
fetishism only appears to work because of the social relations 
of production. If those relations break down, because people 
cease to participate and actively oppose the mode of production 
- by revolution, for example - commodity fetishism breaks down 
and the real factors determining market values become apparent.
While the mode of production is functioning, commodity 
fetishism appears to work successfully. To make sense of 
capitalism in a way which allows one to participate, one has to 
use the false theory. If one used a true theory, one would 
understand that the ideology of capitalism is unintelligable, 
irrationality upon a grand scale, but one would not be equipped 
to participate. The result is a compromise. Workers have two 
sets of ideas, one set derived from the dominant ideology and, 
contradicting it, another set drawn from their own experience 
of class conflict. The balance between the two depends upon 
the balance of the struggle between the classes.
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A capitalist ideology (of which commodity fetishism is a part) 
is shaped to make sense of capitalism, enabling one to 
participate in it. Marx offers a rival interpretation, 
designed to help workers to overthrow capitalism. This 
conflict between commodity fetishism and Marx's labour theory 
of value illustrates my earlier claim that an interpretation 
constructs order and disorder at the expense of rival 
interpretations, and also how a role may fix an interpretation.
If we use commodity fetishism without any mental reservations, 
then we are deceived. We may be unwilling, involuntary dupes, 
or it may suit us to be willing dupes of the theory - deceiving 
ourselves for the sake of the rewards of participation. If we 
have a mental reservation, it may nonetheless suit us to allow 
or encourage others to be deceived. If we do so, we are liars, 
colluding in the deception of others.
Another option is to oppose commodity fetishism. Marx suggests 
that this can only be done effectively by changing our 
practice, joining the struggle of the working class to 
emancipate itself. The shifting balance of the struggle 
between the workers and the ruling class governs the market 
value of commodities, including that commodity called labour.
Marx concludes that since (i) the working class has an 
incentive to alter its understanding, while the ruling class
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does not, and (ii) consciousness is formed by the historical 
life-processes of individuals in society, therefore (iii) the 
only effective way to destroy the dominant ideological 
illusions is to change the historical life-process of the 
working class, by class struggle. So Marx's position is that a 
working-class ideology can only be developed through the 
struggle of that class for self-emancipation. It cannot be 
delivered to them by anyone else, for no-one else has the 
motivation to do so or the material circumstances which force 
them to struggle against capitalism.
Also, the situation (including the understanding) which would 
be created via that emancipation cannot be known in advance. 
For the historical life-processes needed to generate it do not 
yet exist. Therefore the reflective construction of "Utopias" 
is idle, and Marx condemns it.
We might suppose that Marx's criticism of capitalist ideologies 
is that they are insufficiently disinterested, but that is not 
quite it. Part of the criticism is that they claim to be 
disinterested when they are not. Part of the claim is that no 
ideology can be disinterested: it cannot exist unless it 
serves, or at least is compatible with, a mode of production. 
The criticism is that the interests represented are too narrow: 
we need a mode of production which does not betray people's 
interests. This mode of production will create, for those who
Self-Deception Page 323
Ideology/22
participate in it, an instrumental understanding which enables 
the mode of production to function.
All previous historical movements were movements of 
minorities in the interest of minorities. The proletarian 
movement is the self-conscious independent movement of the 
immense majority in the interests of the immense majority. 
(Marx [1977], p230)
A working class ideology would represent a wider interest than 
a ruling class ideology: the widening of the sphere of
interest would tend towards a limit, the classless (or one- 
class) society. There would be no other viewpoint from which 
to disagree with the (only) ideology of the (only) class. This 
limit is intersubjective, not objective.
If we had such a mode of production its ideology would be less 
misleading. Notice some of its features:
the ideology would be overtly ideological, not
naturalised: it would not conceal its status as a social
product which could be revised
- the ideology would be recognised as a socially constructed 
instrument, designed to serve the interests of a wide range of 
people, not disguised as a "discovery". The aim of the
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instrument would be recognised, not concealed, and it would 
serve the interests of all the people in the society
human choices with regard to how something is to be 
understood would be recognised to be (a) possible and (b) 
legitimate.
These features are reminiscent of the radical interpreter's 
suggestion that we should retain our awareness of our own 
activity as "artistic creators" of interpretations.
Marxists, then, would reject the view that there is or ever 
could be an objective point of view - an understanding which is 
constructed without any of the machinery of a historical life- 
process, and which is disinterested, and which is independent 
of anything we do or think. We as historical creatures cannot 
attain such an understanding, so it is pointless (and self- 
deceptive) to aspire to it.
Ideology provides us with a model for many aspects of self- 
deception. Lets notice, in particular, the claim that ideology 
is not just nonsense or error, but false understanding: 
"everything is in its proper relation to everything else, but 
it is upside-down". This coincides precisely with the claim 
that self-deception is not merely a mistake nor merely a 
pretence but false understanding.
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Marx's theory allows us to think about understanding and 
misunderstanding in a way which does not make self-deception 
paradoxical. It does not oblige us to respond to the paradoxes 
of self-deception by arguing that there is something wrong with 
the description, 'self-deceived'. It enables us to say instead 
that there is something wrong with models of understanding 
which make self-deception appear to be paradoxical.
Marx emphasises something which is not usually salient in 
discussions of self-deception. The form that self-deception 
takes will be strongly influenced by the social circumstances. 
The self-deceiver's interpretation is not going to be 
unrestricted and free, as Nietzsche sometimes appears to 
suggest. It is fixed by a role, and the roles available within 
society are not controlled by one individual. So one society 
will make some forms of self-deception much easier than would 
other societies. Different modes of production will encourage 
different beliefs. Some situations will make dishonesty and 
self-deception much more inviting than others. e.g. Mr 
Negligent relies upon his social position and some prevailing 
traditions to sustain his beliefs, and he reaps rewards for 
doing so. Mr Radical must work much harder to deceive himself, 
but has less incentive to be "negligently" self-deceived.
Self-deception, like ideology, will preserve the "proper 
relations between things, but turn them upside down". The
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beliefs which observers think inconsistent will seem consistent 
to the self-deceiver. For a very simple reason. If we have no 
independent means of checking the "camera obscura", then 
upside-down is the only way we can perceive things to be: no 
other way of understanding can get in to disturb us. The only 
way of changing that situation is to amend the machinery which 
produces the understanding. This means a change to the 
historical life-process, with results which cannot be predicted 
in advance of the change. If one could predict the form of 
that different understanding, one would already have it, so it 
would not be a prediction of something in the future but an 
experience of something already present which generated it.
Self-deception, like ideology, is instrumentally effective (for 
the self-deceiver1s purposes) without being true. It relies 
upon the processes which produce understanding (and 
misunderstanding), and the roles which fix the products of 
these processes by using them as beliefs.
Marx goes very far in the direction of the "process theory" of 
self-deception which I develop in a subsequent chapter of this 
thesis. For he (a) recognises the role of interpretation in 
the construction of "consciousness" (b) recognises that roles 
fix interpretations (for "consciousness is a social product" 
and participation in a mode of production such as capitalism 
causes "false consciousness"), and (c) he pays attention to the
Self-Deception Page 327
Ideology/22
processes by which consciousness is formed - the "historical 
life-processes" of individuals. Marxist analyses of these 
life-processes could be regarded as detailing in their minute 
particulars instances of the processes which I identify in the 
Process theory. My process theory, in turn, can be regarded as 
corroborating Marx's approach by showing how it enables us to 
dissolve the alleged paradoxes of self-deception.
In the next chapter I offer a model for understanding and 
misunderstanding - the "manufacturing process" model - which 
does not generate paradoxes when applied to instances of self- 
deception. This model is intended to link Marx's theory of 
ideology with Role theories and Radical Interpretation theories 
of self-deception. Following that, I shall give an example of 
how the model may be used to describe an instance of self- 
deception .
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To understand self-deception we need to take note of the 
processes by which beliefs are generated. I do so now. 
Firstly, let us name this process. I call it interpretation. 
Enquiry is one special variety of interpretation.
I also want to displace the models of understanding which have 
been extant historically - the optical metaphor, the "scales of 
judgement" model and its associated metaphors such as "weight" 
of evidence, "force" of arguments, and so on. To do so I take 
manufacturing processes as a model. These processes have been 
extensively studied. We can distinguish several elements in 
such processes:
raw materials
resources (time, energy, etc) 
tools
finished (or partly-finished) products 
by-products.
A manufacturing process may have several phases. We can map 
the elements of enquiry onto the manufacturing process:
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raw materials = data 
resources = time, energy, etc 
tools = theories / hypotheses 
finished products = evidence, beliefs
by-products = moods, emotions (perhaps - lets see as we 
continue this discussion).
The raw materials may be the finished (or partly-finished) 
products of other processes. So, for example, when a court of 
law engages in interpretation, some of the raw materials it 
takes in may be the testimony of witnesses - the products of 
the witnesses' processes of interpretation.
The tools - theories, for example - may be very general or 
designed for a specific task. Scientific theories are intended 
to be universal, applying to every specific instance. Bohr's 
theory of the atom, for example, is intended to apply to the 
constituents of every single table, tree, human being, planet, 
and so on. A theory about the causes of monetary inflation in 
the Middle Ages is much more specific; and a theory about why 
King Canute ordered the waves to retreat is more specific 
still. As a rule, interpretations use both general and
specific tools. A parallel case in manufacturing would be, 
perhaps, a bottling plant: this includes both very specific
tools (for bottling) and very general tools (the levers, 
screwdrivers, hammers etc used to maintain the plant).
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We have a choice as to which of the things produced we count as 
finished products, and which we count as by-products. In the 
"mapping" above I treated evidence and beliefs as finished 
products; this is because for my current purposes I am 
interested particularly in beliefs (with a view to broadening 
our ideas about self-deception). Suppose, though, that a self­
deceiver were more interested in sustaining a particular mood 
or emotion: then he might count beliefs and evidence as by­
products, the primary aim of the process being to manufacture 
(or continue manufacturing) a mood or emotion.
I have mapped enquiry onto the manufacturing process. 
Interpretation is a broader k.ind of process: the finished 
products may be actions rather than evidence or beliefs, for 
example. Also, a manufacturing process does not occur in 
isolation from many other manufaturing processes: they will 
all interact within an economy. The nature of the process and 
the techniques used will reflect the development of that 
economy. And the economy will interact with other economies. 
Similarly, beliefs are not generated in isolation from the 
production of other beliefs. The processes which generate 
beliefs are not independent of the culture in which the person 
lives.
There are other factors which contribute to a manufacturing 
process. The process will require a good deal of organisation
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and design; there must be a market for its products; the 
motivation must exist to perform the process; and so on.
There are various ways in which a manufacturing process may go 
wrong. There may be a lack of raw materials. This is like not 
having enough data to form an opinion.
There may be inadequate resources. This is like being too 
rushed, or too tired, to think about the data.
There may be insufficient or inadequate tools. This is 
comparable to those situations in the history of science where 
mathematics was not sufficiently developed to enable a 
particular understanding of the physical universe to be 
developed, or to the situation of people in the Middle Ages who 
did not have a sufficiently well-developed economic theory to 
identify the causes of monetary inflation.
The manufacturing process may be halted by an inability to
remove the by-products (e.g. the storage space becomes choked
with rubbish so that there is nowhere to put the finished
products). A parallel case in the process of interpretation
might be some kinds of disaster planning: if the contemplation 
of some kinds of catastrophe fills us with overwhelming 
emotions then we may be unable to assess the data in a way 
which suggests those catastrophes may be the outcome of our
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situation. Conversely, if we are able to contemplate some 
situations without emotion then perhaps we are not assessing 
them properly either.
There may be no market for some finished products: they may be 
"neither use nor ornament". They may not be capable of 
performing the function for which they were intended (false 
theories; meaningless theories; inconsistent theories - like 
unworkable or self-defeating instruments).
The process may go wrong through lack of motivation: the 
production line is sabotaged or goes slow, or the goods 
produced are faulty, because the motivation is lacking. This 
is like the "epistemic negligence" I mentioned in an earlier 
chapter.
The manufacturing process may also go wrong because it is out 
of kilter with the rest of the economy. This is like the 
situation where someone acquires sets of inconsistent beliefs, 
or has theories which are incommensurable: incommensurable 
theories do not contradict each other (not overtly, at least) 
but they cannot be made to work in conjunction with each other.
There may also be too much motivation, so that resources are 
used to overproduce one kind of item, starving the rest of the 
economy so that other items are not produced. This is like
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"obsessive" concern with a problem - or some details of a 
problem - which overshadows consideration of a broader view.
The process may also go wrong because the wrong kinds of items 
are manufactured. Even if there is a market for them, they may 
be destructive.
The design of the process may also be inadequate; if no design 
takes place, the process is likely to be incoherent too.
Having sketched in how the manufacturing model is supposed to 
apply to interpretation, let us see how self-deception fits in 
with the model.
Firstly, what about the claim that "the self-deceiver must know 
what he is up to?"
There are two common reasons for making this claim:
the self-deceiver must know about the strategy of self- 
deception in order to guide and control it
the self-deceiver must know that he is deceived because of 
the amount of counter-evidence - evidence, that is, which 
goes against the deception.
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With regard to the counter-evidence, this is not available to 
the self-deceiver unless he performs some process to create the 
evidence. If he does not perform such a process, "the" 
evidence is not available to persuade him.
What he does have is the data from which the evidence may be 
constructed. But data is not evidence e.g. I may have 
knowledge by acquaintance with a rock, but that does not imply 
that I have knowledge about the rock - e.g. that it is 20,000 
years old: to acquire that sort of knowledge I would have to 
do some interpreting.
Knowledge about the strategy used to deceive oneself is not 
available unless the self-deceiver performs some process to 
acquire that knowledge. This process will be additional to the 
self-deceptive process it is to interpret. The self-deceiver 
may not perform this additional process. He may not reflect 
upon what he is up to. If he does so reflect, he may not 
construe it in the way that our interlocutor would like: he 
may not use the theory our interlocutor does, and so not create 
the conclusions which the interlocutor wishes to draw.
A process which fails through lack of raw materials would be 
akin to ignorance (no data available); but if the lack of raw 
materials is due to sabotage, lack of motivation, etc, then it 
is more like wilful ignorance - self-deception by avoidance or
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epistemic negligence. Similar considerations apply to a lack 
of tools and resources: it may be due to "sabotage".
If the market requires truth, then that is what will sustain 
the manufacturing process. Other market desiderata may be a 
desire for some kinds of comfort, or success.
Someone who is deceived may find out that what he believes is 
not true, when the product fails, perhaps in a spectacular 
manner. but what if (for his purposes, which may not include 
truth as a desideratum) the product does not fail? There is no 
reason why the process should not continue, even if it is self- 
deceptive .
Circustances are not always inimical to self-deception. One 
stock example which regularly appears in discussions of self- 
deception is the cuckold who is deceived about his wife's 
adultery and who wants to be deceived about it (Karenin, the 
deceived and self-deceived husband of Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, 
is an example). Often circumstances will work in his favour: 
others will be more than willing to deceive him and he will go 
along with being deceived. The product of this manufacturing 
process will fail only if the social support given by others 
also fails, or if the motivation for it fails - in which case 
the "market" for the belief collapses.
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The aim of the process is not always to produce a belief. 
Sometimes the beliefs are by-products rather than primary 
products. Here is an example.
Suppose that many years ago Smith did me an injustice. As a 
result, I still harbour feelings of hatred and resentment 
against him. I would like to hit him, but he has since died. 
I also do not want to feel resentment against someone who is 
now dead. However Jones, my neighbour, resembles Smith; I 
notice that he has many mannerisms like Smith's. I pick a 
quarrel with Jones and hit him. I tell myself, "he deserved 
it; he's just like Smith".
I am not claiming that this process is rational. In the 
example, I had my reasons, but they were not good reasons. The 
aim of the process, actually, was to hit Smith; this aim was 
not fulfilled: instead I hit Jones who, in my mind, was a 
representative of Smith. What happened? I formed an 
interpretation, using Smith as a model for understanding (or, 
probably, misunderstanding) Jones. Smith's characteristics 
were mapped onto Jones; firstly his mannerisms - which fit, 
and so "justify" the rest of the process - then the things 
which I resent - which may or may not fit. The belief that 
"he's just like Smith", was a by-product of the interpretation. 
This by-product also catalyses the remainder of the process: 
it explains why, "he deserves it". It provides the rationale
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for hitting Jones. I succeed in venting my resentment, for the 
time being; but since the ultimate aim of the process is not 
satisfied, it is quite likely to happen again, in an equally 
unsatisfactory manner. The aim of the process was not to form 
the belief: the aim was to express my resentment by some 
means, justified or not. I could not express my resentment 
without the belief, or something like it - except perhaps by 
simply "going berserk", "lashing out" - in which case I am 
taking the universe and everyone in it as representatives of 
Smith.
Also, I need not be conscious of the belief, nor of the process 
of interpretation. Perhaps I find myself "falling into" an 
argument with Jones, and simply know that I am going to hit 
him. Or perhaps I curtail the process: I manage to resist 
hitting him; I wonder why I resent him so much, and so on. In 
this case the self-deception takes place but it is not carried 
through to achieve its goal.
When the process is not aimed at belief, we may acquire beliefs 
as by-products without ever considering whether they are true 
or not.
How would the model of understanding used by Locke (for 
instance) handle a case like this? The answer is, I think, 
that it cannot. Locke provides a model of understanding, not
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of misunderstanding. He makes some moves in this direction: 
he suggests that one can weigh evidence against the prospect of 
gain, for instance; and there is the suggestion of "tampering 
with the evidence"; but that does not capture what is going on 
here. In the example, 'I' was not tampering with evidence but 
constructing it. The choice of interpretation is explained by 
emotions (frustrated rage), desires (for revenge) and motives 
(to vent my frustration and rage). These did not alter the 
evidence. They were motives for constructing the evidence.
It may be objected that the model of the manufacturing process 
is so general that it is meaningless: what does it exclude? 
My reply is: what ought it to exclude? Human understanding 
can be very flexible and adaptable. Actually the manufacturing 
model does exclude quite a lot: there will be constraints upon 
understanding just as there are constraints upon manufacturing; 
and the constraints are just where we would expect them to be, 
for example lack of raw materials (data); lack of tools 
(theories) or inadequate tools (inadequate theories); 
inadequate design (negligence), competition (other processes 
give results better suited to the market), lack of motivation 
(results in shoddy goods and shoddy beliefs), etc.
A p-ocess which is self-deceptive will generate products 
(beliefs) which do not match the criteria for truth (whatever 
they may be) or which match them only accidentally: the
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products will however match other criteria, and the beliefs may 
serve the aim of the process precisely because they are false, 
in circumstances where truths would thwart the process.
The Process theory of self-deception may look like rather a 
"thin" account of self-deception. Having asked how self- 
deception occurs, I have answered, "by a process". This may 
seem to be just another "magic button" of the kind I criticised 
in earlier chapters.
There is more to it than that. Self-deception is not any old 
process. It is a process of interpretation, and this chapter 
has modelled that process upon manufacturing. Consider how 
"thin" the rival interpretation is. It offers, for example, 
the "scales of judgement" model, asserting that there is an 
input (evidence) and an output (conclusions) with a process of 
"weighing" (unexplained) in between, the conclusions being 
determined by the "weight" of evidence (also unexplained). In 
the manufacturing model evidence is a product, not an input. 
The form it takes is related to all the inputs (not just data) 
as well as the "economy", that inter-related set of 
interpretations in which the person is engaged. It allows us 
to explain the influence of "background assumptions" without 




The manufacturing model fits self-deception into a model of 
enquiry which matches the descriptions given by people engaged 
in enquiry (such as Szent-Gyorgyi's assertion that "discovery 
consists of looking at the same thing as everyone else, and 
thinking something different"). The alternative is an 
unworkable model of discovery in which evidence "compels" us to 
draw conclusions, yet some people are "compelled" to discover 
new conclusions while others are "compelled" to draw old 
conclusions.
Data (not evidence) is a crucial input to enquiry but, as 
Marx's labour theory of value makes abundantly clear, raw 
materials (data) are worthless until someone expends labour 
upon them. This is what the Process theory captures. Data do 
not constrain interpretation any more than apple trees 
constrain us to make cider. Data leaves us free to do what we 
like with them. But we are constrained in other ways.
Radical interpretation is a struggle against circumstances: 
against lack of tools (theories), lack of time, tiredness, lack 
of imagination, perhaps also mental anguish and the "economy" 
within which manufacturing occurs. This economy can assert 
itself when we try to create a new interpretation: a hostile 
psychic environment becomes apparent in one's own fears and 
prejudices, one's "sleepwalking" (as Koestler calls it), and 
trained incapacities to alter one's ways of thinking. The
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hostility of other people may stifle discussion and the free 
flow of thought.
The misadventures which may befall a manufacturing process are 
not all occult psychic events. They occur in public, out in 
the open. The manufacturing model may be false, but it 
certainly is not empty. It makes a wealth of knowledge about 
processes available to be applied to the process of 
interpretation and to the particular case of self-deception. 
This knowledge is transferred from manufacturing. The metaphor 
is overt and unfamiliar. In my view this makes it better than 
the covert and familiar metaphors already "built into" our 
present model of enquiry.
A manufacturing process may be unsatisfactory in various ways. 
It may build ramshackle houses (compare the "foundational" 
theories of justification) or leaky rafts (compare the 
"coherence" theories of justification). The manufacturing 
model encompasses both of these ways of talking and makes them 
special instances of something more general. It acknowledges 
that jerrybuilders exist. They do not need any special 
strategies to pursue their odious activities. Sometimes they 
inhabit the ramshackle structures they have fabricated.
In earlier chapters I suggested that the "strategies" which 
allegedly characterise self-deception are not different to
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those used in "normal" truth-seeking; rather, in self- 
deception the strategies which are used in truth-seeking are 
used with different motives. The manufacturing model captures 
this suggestion. Instead of regarding truth-seeking as a 
primary mode of understanding, and self-deception as a 
perversion of truth-seeking, we can now regard truth-seeking as 
one mode among others. This is surely correct: we do not gain 
the bulk of our beliefs by explicitly seeking out truths: we 
acquire them as a part (a crucial part) of all the other things 
we do, as the old saying suggests: "experience is what you get 
when you are looking for something else". We learn by trying 
to participate in the culture we are born into. We learn that 
to participate fully, we need to find out about things: so we 
ask, and, if we are in luck, gain an understanding (if we are 
not in luck then we gain a misunderstanding). Finding things 
out for ourselves comes later, when we have acquired some 
techniques for finding things out.
The model of the manufacturing process ties together the themes 
of interpretation and role-playing. The process of 
interpretation is guided by the role it performs: it links the 
raw materials (data), the market (the need for an 
interpretation which enables some specific goals to be 
achieved, such as guiding action to achieve a preferred 
outcome), the constraints of other processes (other 
interpretations) and the ways they use data and fit in with the
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market). The products and by-products of the process are also 
inextricably linked together. So, for example, some 
interpretations "go with" some emotions and conflict with 
others. Using other models of understanding, there is little 
scope for overcoming the cognitive / affective divide, and the 
explanation of the link between beliefs and emotions is 
glaringly absent. The manufacturing model leaves room for this 
explanation.
What happens to the paradoxes, in this model? The self­
deceiver is not inexplicably resistant to "the" evidence; 
rather, the self-deceiver generates evidence (and beliefs too) 
which is compatible with his other aims. The self-deceiver may 
or may not "know what he is up to". His understanding of the 
process may be prevented or modified by the existence of the 
process. It may be, like ideology, false understanding. 
Though false, it can still be operationally effective. Indeed, 
it probably is effective for his purposes precisely because it 
is false. The self-deceiver can be in control of the process, 
and responsible for it, without having true beliefs about it.
Let us use an example to see how this works. The example is 
taken from Cook [1987]. Cook, incidentally, offers it as an 
example of "deciding to believe without self-deception".
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Nick is a creationist: he believes that the world was created 
by God in 4000BC. He also wishes to study biology at 
university, and he realises that, given the ascendency of the 
theory of natural selection, his creationist beliefs are going 
to cause him problems in advancing his chosen career in 
biology. He therefore decides to deceive himself into 
believing that the theory of natural selection is true. Six 
years later, he emerges from university triumphantly, laughing 
at the resolve he made to deceive himself: he had no need to 
deceive himself, for the theory he wanted to believe is so 
obviously true.
I want to extend this example a little, as follows. Whatever 
Nick may believe, his folks back home, who are also 
creationists, are horrified at what they see as Nick's shocking 
self-deception. Now take the story forward a few years. Nick 
retires, loaded with honours, at the end of a long and 
successful career as a biologist. He goes back to his roots, 
to his family; soon he realises that, after all, creationism 
is true. To the horror of his former colleagues, he repudiates 
the theory of natural selection. His former colleagues regret 
this development which they regard as a very salient example of 




Notice how convenient it is for Nick, at each stage of his 
career, to have beliefs which enable him to participate and 
achieve what, in that environment, is regarded as success. It 
is tempting to suggest that, whichever theory is true (and they 
might both be false), Nick is a self-deceiver throughout the 
whole story.
So it is not obvious to me that Nick achieves his desired 
beliefs without self-deception. I accept that he has achieved 
beliefs at will. The fact that he regards them as obviously 
true does not alter my opinion, in fact it reinforces it: that 
is just what one would expect a self-deceiver to think. For 
how does Nick achieve his beliefs? I think the story might go 
as follows: suppose that Nick imagines (pretends) at the 
outset that the theory of natural selection is true, and then 
asks what else has to be the case. Starting from that point of 
view, he perceives that Creationism must be false. Why then 
should anyone believe it? There are motives for believing it: 
one may want the comforts of religion, one might want the 
freedom from doubt and the purity of purpose which can be 
available when one sticks rigidly to a spelled-out and 
extensive code of conduct, and so on. When one starts from the 
theory of natural selection, and then interprets everything 
else from that perspective, all "the evidence" must be 
consistent with it, because the evidence is generated by using 
the theory to interpret: the tools used shape the products of
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interpretation. The forms of life which exist, and which the 
fossil record shows to have existed in the past, all fit in 
with the theory. This is hardly a surprise, for that is what 
the theory was designed to do.
Similarly if one starts from Creationism, and uses that to 
interpret, then the evidence constructed will be consistent 
with Creationism. Why would anyone believe in natural 
selection? It is a very powerful theory enabling one to make 
all sorts of correct predictions; it may free one from the 
restrictions and obligations which emerge from accepting a 
strict literal interpretation of the Bible. Some 
interpretations of data become very salient, for example the 
suggestion that random mutations of species could not have 
developed the forms of life now existing in the time alleged to 
have been available for the processes of natural selection to 
occur. This fits in very well with the thought that perhaps 
natural selection needs some assistance from a designer - a 
Creator. This interpretation may be a lot less salient in the 
mind of someone who accepts the mainstream view of natural 
selection. For he may regard it as a rather minor matter which 
will be resolved when our physical theories are better 
developed. I am offering no wagers about which one is right 
(and they might both be wrong).
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One cannot put the evidence emerging from these two theories 
side-by-side in a single interpretation: one of them will 
always undermine the other. There is no neutral standpoint 
from which to interpret, since the evidence produced by one 
theory uses up the data which is needed by the other theory. 
One cannot gain access to the data in a theory-neutral way. 
Both interpretations use a theory (though not the same theory 
as each other) and so cannot be distanced from that theory. 
What one can do is to try out one way of interpreting and then 
the other. But to do either of them justice takes considerable 
time and effort, and one must approcah each of them with an 
"open mind" and some degree of patience, assuming that the 
things one does not yet understand will become clearer as one 
continues.
If one is not prepared to be "gullible", at least in the short 
term, then one will not have given the theory a fair chance: 
one will have simply judged it from the preconceptions and 
prejudices one already had. To give the theory a fair chance, 
rational criticism must be preceded by uncritical immersion.
There are dangers in uncritical immersion in a theory. 
Brainwashing (or "re-education") works by discouraging 
criticism and encouraging immersion.
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Suppose, for example, that someone tells you that normal 
perception is inherently deceptive: to gain a true view of the 
world, one must take drugs which are "mind-expanding"; then 
one will be able to see the flying saucers which are invisible 
to normal perception and which really control everything. You 
take the drug, and you realise that the flying saucers really 
control everything. When the drug wears off, the realisation 
wears off as well. There is no neutral standpoint from which 
to choose between the perceptions one has as a result of 
ingesting the drug, and the perceptions one has after the drug 
has worn off. In your undrugged state, you can explain why 
such perceptions should emerge when one has ingested the drug; 
and soon after ingesting the drug, you can explain why the 
flying saucers, which are now so obvious, were invisible 
before. Without the drug, you can see that the drug inhibits 
your critical faculties and so prevents you making a proper 
judgement; with the drug, you can see that normal 
consciousness filters out lots of data which would otherwise 
undermine it.
The drug suspends disbelief in the flying saucer theory; 
critical consciousness suspends belief in it. The only reason 
scepticism has something to criticise is because we are already 
immersed in all sorts of theories which we learn when we learn 
our culture - through immersion.
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Without immersion in a new theory, however, we "know" in 
advance that theories which rival our current theories must be 
false.
I think it rather unlikely that drugs alter specific beliefs in 
this way; but I think it very likely that drugs used within a 
cultural context can alter or enhance specific beliefs; and 
also that a cultural context can affect beliefs with or without 
drugs being used. The drug may make one more receptive to the 
cultural (or sub-cultural) messages. We participate in the 
culture by (partial or total) immersion. Thereby we gain an 
understanding (maybe a misunderstanding) of its practices 
(including the ways of talking).
The self-deceiver has an operationally effective understanding 
of what he is doing. This understanding is, however, when 
measured against the desiderata of truth (by "weighing the 
evidence"), a misunderstanding.
How do the other theories of self-deception fit in with the 
manufacturing model of understanding?
1. Schism theories.
There is no schism. If anything, the self-deceiver is all too 
well integrated. If there were a schism, then one part of the
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self-deceiver would be free to criticise the self-deceiver's 
activity from a rival point of view.
2. Disconnection theories.
There is no disconnection. The self-deceiver’s motives may 
well belie his beliefs: but the beliefs allow the self­
deceiver to misinterpret the motives: the interpretation
effaces its own motivation. Jean-Baptiste Clamence, the 
protagonist of Camus' novel The Fall, tells us that:
I realized, as a result of delving into my memory, that 
modesty helped me to shine, humility to conquor, and 
virtue to oppress. I used to wage war through peaceful 
means and eventually used to achieve, through
disinterested means, everything I desired. (p64)
With hindsight he recognises that his desire was to both 
dominate and to achieve popularity.
The surface of all my virtues had a less imposing reverse 
side. (p64)
Yet at the time, he sincerely believes them to be virtues: he
believes himself to be virtuous: the strategy effaces its own
motivation. But is Clamence self-deceived, or merely mistaken
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about himself? The answer depends upon the extent to which he 
is responsible for the strategy: if he is responsible, then he 
is responsible for being deceived about himself. If not, then 
he is simply mistaken. The strategy implies an understanding 
while its operation produces a different understanding - a 
misunderstanding. But this misunderstanding is not a mistake: 
it is a strategy. If it were a mistake, Clamence could not 
have pursued the strategy so unerringly to success. Clamence 
chose the strategy: he chose the mode of understanding 
(misunderstanding) in order to pursue his goals. Therefore he 
is responsible. Or, to put it the other way round: this 
misunderstanding arises from an underlying (instrumental, and 
not truth-regarding) understanding: the misunderstanding is 
the surface of the understanding. The misunderstanding is part 
of the strategy of someone who understands. Once again we have 
to note how well it suits the self-deceiver to misunderstand.
3. Role theories
The self-deceiver plays a role: he generates the role. The 
role is not merely a mask spread over the "real person within": 
the role is the real person, manufactured by the strategy of 
self-deception. The self-deceiver really misunderstands. Take 
the case of Clamence again:
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I have never been really sincere and enthusiastic except 
when I used to indulge in sports and, in the army, when I 
used to act in plays we put on for our own amusement. In 
both cases there was a rule of the game which was not 
serious but which we enjoyed talcing as if it were. (p66)
By comparison:
living among men without sharing their interests, I could 
not manage to believe in the commitments I made
I lived my whole life under a double code, and my most 
serious acts were often the ones in which I was the least 
involved. Wasn't it this, after all, for which, on top of 
my blunders, I could not forgive myself, which made me 
react most violently against the judgement which I felt 
forming, in me and around me, and that forced me to seek 
an escape? (p66).
For Clamence, the role becomes unlivable:
the engine began to have whims, inexplicable breakdowns.
(p67)
I pulled myself together, of course. What did one man's 
lie matter in the history of generations? (p67)
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None the less the discomfort grew. (p68)
This is like the manufacturing process choked by its own by­
products. For Clamence, the by-products include actions which 
do not fit in with his misunderstanding of himself as a man of 
virtue, and emotions (spite, rage, resentment) which are 
inappropriate to the role he has adopted. The misunderstanding 
ceases to be operationally effective: Clamence starts to
experience things in a way which is not controlled by the 
process of self-deception: the interpretation sets off its own 
refutation:
compliments became more and more unbearable to me. It 
seemed to me that the falsehood increased with them so 
inordinately that never again could I put myself right.
A day came when I could bear it no longer (p69)
I didn't want their esteem because it wasn't general, and 
how could it be general when I didn't share in it? Hence 
it was better to cover everything, judgement and esteem, 
with a cloak of ridicule. I had to liberate at all costs 
the feeling that was stifling me (p70)
Role theories relate to the design of a manufacturing process, 
and to the market requirements. The manufacturing process is
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fixed by finding a market. Without a market it cannot survive. 
This is comparable to Marx's claim that ideology arises from 
the requirements of a mode of production.
4. Negligence Theories
Negligence theories relate to the market requirements of a 
manufacturing process: e.g. they criticise the self-deceiver
for "falling away from the proper procedures for gaining 
truth": a sort of lack of epistemic quality control. They
criticise the self-deceiver for being insufficiently oriented 
towards the truth.
5. No-such-thing theories.
These theories gain credence from the claim that self-deception 
is paradoxical. Since I have provided a theory of self- 
deception which is not (so far as I am aware) paradoxical, I 
give these theories no credence.
6. Radical Interpretation Theories.
These theories relate to the tools and techniques used in the 
manufacturing process, and to the prior manufaturing process 
which constructs them. 'Interpretation' names the process. 
Nietzsche tells us that the technique used is the artistic
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creation of metaphors ('metaphor' being his label for 
figuration in general). Metaphors are tools which can be put 
to all sorts of uses. The design of the process, aimed at a 
market, fixes and spells out how the metaphors are to be used. 
In doing so it "literalises" the metaphors by drawing 
consequences - just as one can spell out the meaning of a 
sentence by listing the inferences which can be drawn from it.
The manufacturing process constructs order. By using raw 
materials and resources it also prevents them being available 
for use in other processes.
The manufacturing process model also gives us a way of 
explaining the differences between various kinds of enquiry. 
For example, a modern scientific theory is constructed and 
developed by an immense collaborative effort by many 
individuals, whereas philosophical enquiries tend to be pursued 
by individuals without much collaboration. Very few 
philosophical essays are produced by a team rather than by an 
individual, for example. Why is this? Questions cease to be 
philosophical when a methodology is established for answering 
them. The methodology forms the basis for collaborative work. 
Without it there is no agreed convention and so individuals, of 
necessity, "go their own way". Philosophical schools and 
traditions mark the early development of a methodology. 
Whereas a scientist who goes his or her own way will be unable
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to participate in the scientific community, will be deprived of 
funding and collaboration. This bears out Nietzsche's remark 
that metaphors become "truths" through agreements which 
conventionalise them, and the conventions are needed as a basis 
for a social and gregarious way of life. When scientific 
theories break down, the basis for collaboration is lost, and 
scientists' activity tends towards metaphor-making and becomes 
more like philosophy ("natural philosophy"). Philosophers tend 
to shun metaphor when they are aiming to achieve agreement. 
Verificationism is perhaps the most readily identifiable 
"school" or "movement" in twentieth-century philosophy, and it 
is renowned for its dislike of figurative language. This 
dislike marks the aim to enable collaboration by sticking to 
the literal, spelled-out meanings, i.e. to not disturb the 
metaphors which are most well-established.
To conclude this chapter I summarise a defence of the Process 
theory.
1. The Process theory incorporates elements of Radical 
Interpretation theories Role theories and Negligence theories 
in a way which allows us to explain the attraction of the other 
(Avoidance) theories of self-deception - namely Dissociation 
theories and Schism theories.
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2. The Process theory explains self-deception by putting it in 
the context of the "normal" processes of enquiry.
3. It lists the "factors of production" which are linked 
together in the process of enquiry - the inputs, the tools 
used, the "market" for its products, and so on. By connecting 
these factors it allows us to characterise the varieties of 
self-deception and to contrast and compare them with related 
activities such as wishful thinking, mistakes, lies, pretences 
and those mysterious failures of will which are labelled 
"akrasia".
4. The Process theory emphasises the role of "will" and 
responsibility in enquiry - aspects of the process which 
distinguish some deceptions as self-deceptions.
5. The Process theory disarms the "must know" problems which 
give rise to the paradoxes of self-deception. It leaves no 
glaring gaps about "what happens instead" of the "normal" ways 
of doing enquiry.
6. A remaining problem is the question of how are we able to 
assign responsibility to someone for being deceived - and 
therefore, how we are able to argue that he or she is self- 
deceived. The self-deceiver is "deemed" to be responsible; 
but we do not know if that is true or not. What we can do -
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and the Process theory enables us to do it quite systematically 
- is to build up a case for someone being responsible, by 
reference to his use of the available "factors of production".
7. The Process theory provides a situation in which two 
philosophical traditions can meet and communicate. These are 
the "Anglo-Saxon" tradition (critical, analytical, literal­
minded, rigorous, with an emphasis upon justification) and the 
"Continental" tradition (imaginative, figurative, gymnastic, 
with an emphasis on creativity). These are stereotypes but, I 
fear, easily recognisable ones. They also, interestingly 
enough, mirror the work, done by researchers such as Sperry 
[1961] on the functions of the left brain and the right brain. 
It is worthwhile to persuade them to communicate with each 
other. For otherwise, both are impoverished and disabled.
8. The theory does not refer to "occult" psychologistic 
entities or processes, e.g. "unconscious intentions", which may 
be inferred but cannot be observed. All the processes to which 
the theory refers can occur in a publicly observable way. For 
example the creative construction of metaphors can be observed 
in brainstorming sessions. These are not commonplace in the 
contemporary practice of philosophy; perhaps they should be.
The thesis is not, therefore, an attempt to do "armchair 
psychology"; but it may be objected that the thesis is not
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psychological enough. Research in other disciplines can solve 
puzzles in philosophy, so why insulate this thesis from the 
influence of psychology? I do not disagree: there is room for 
fruitful cross-fertilisation between the two disciplines. 
However, I do not claim to be qualified to carry out a research 
programme in the field of psychology, so it is pointless for me 
to attempt it. For my aims, the description of "unconscious" 
entities is superfluous in the description of self-deception, 
as Silver, Sabini and Macini [1989] makes clear:
For the unconscious processing of information to be self- 
deception it must meet exactly the same criteria that the 
conscious processing of information must meet to 
constitute self-deception ... we suspect that the reason 
psychologists believe that unconscious processing is key 
was not that they discovered that unconscious processing 
played a prominent role, but because they believed that 
unconscious processing was conceptually required. Once we 
abandon this belief, we can probably dispense with 
unconscious processing as a constituent of self-deception 
altogether. (p223)
9. The Process theory places the issues of self-deception in a 
broader context which allows us to open other questions about 
the various forms of enquiry (such as: "why do scientists tend 
to work in teams while philosophers tend not to do so?").
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10. The Process theory raises challenges to some long-standing 
epistemic theories. It disrupts the metaphors built into the 
traditions of epistemology ("weight" of evidence, etc) and puts 
in question old-established theories about justification 
(foundationalist theories, coherence theories). It favours the 
"pragmatic" claim that, far from commencing with a sound basis 
on which to build knowledge, we have to start from wherever we 
are, which forces us to make a "leap" (justified, if at all, by 
its results: "the proof of the pudding is in the eating"). 
Reasoning is a secondary, critical, evaluative process which 
cannot commence until an (unjustified) leap has been made.
This does not mean that reasoning has no role to play; but it 
does explain why reasoning can be blocked by a choice of 
interpretation, and why "weaving" between interpretations is 
beneficial. Reasoning at its best works in harness with 
imagination / figuration. The Process theory emphasises the 
importance of "artistic creativity" in philosophy and in 
enquiry generally, without demoting the "literal-mindedness" 
which views metaphors with suspicion, insists on spelling them 
out and analysing them, and so on. My regard for that activity 
is exemplified in my practice of trying to spell out the "magic 
buttons" used in explanations of self-deception. However, we 
need something to spell out, that is why we are forced to 
"leap".
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It is time to try out my account of self-deception on an 
example. I have chosen Gosse [1964] because:
(a) it is biographical and autobiographical (subtitled, "A 
Study Of Two Temperaments"), not fiction, (b) it describes an 
alleged case of self-deception in fairly extensive detail, (c) 
it describes (alleged) self-deception in a person whom the 
author knows intimately over a long period: his father.
I shall explain why these points are important.
(a) Fictional examples of self-deception may be "life-like", 
but that only means they appeal to our intuitions about 
what"life-like" fiction should do. Like fiction, biography is 
interpretation, and not guaranteed to be true. But, we hope, 
it ¿.s at least intended to be true, which we do not demand of 
fiction.
(b) It helps to have plenty of detail. A very sketchy 
description allows us to explain away the alleged self- 
deception ("perhaps he is just mistaken", "perhaps he is just
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pretending", etc). The details explain why 'self-deceived' was 
the preferred description.
(c) Intimate knowledge of his father gives the son a wealth of 
background information about goals, motives and interests: we 
have as good an insight as possible into "what makes him tick". 
This is about the best we can obtain in the way of an example 
drawn from life.
To give the flavour of the book, here are several quotations:
This was the great moment in the history of thought when 
the theory of the mutability of species was preparing to 
throw a flood of light upon all departments of human 
speculation and action. (p65)
So, through my father's brain, in that year of crisis, 
1857, there rushed two kinds of thought, each absorbing, 
each convincing, yet totally irreconcilable. There is a 
peculiar agony in the paradox that truth has two forms, 
each of them indisputable, yet each antagonistic to the 
other. It was this discovery, that there were two 
theories of physical life, each of which was true, but the 
truth of each incompatible with the other, which shook the 
spirit of my father with perturbation. It was not, 
really, a paradox, it was a fallacy, if he could only have
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known it, but he allowed the turbid volume of superstition 
to drown the delicate stream of reason. He took one step 
in the service of truth, and then he drew back in an 
agony, and accepted the servitude of error. (p65)
The famous Vestiges of Creation had been supplying a 
sugar-and-water panacea for those who could not escape the 
trend of evidence, and who yet clung to revelation. (p65)
Let it be admitted at once, mournful as the admission is, 
that every instinct in his intelligence went out at first 
to greet the new light. It had hardly done so, when a 
recollection of the opening chapter of Genesis checked it 
at the outset. He consulted with Carpenter, a great 
investigator, but one who was as fully incapable as
himself of remodelling his ideas with regard to the old, 
accepted hypotheses. They both determined, on various 
grounds, to have nothing to do with the terrible theory, 
but to hold steadily to the law of the fixity of
species.(p66)
To avoid confusion between the two Gosses, I shall call the 
biographer "Gosse Junior" and his father, "Gosse Senior".
Any example we may choose poses a problem, which anyone who 
shares the views of Gosse Senior can readily point out: any
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such example suffers the disadvantages of perspective: 
to suppose that what the narrative describes is true: 
suppose that Gosse Senior really is deceiving 
("accepting the servitude of error") and not, in 





The problem is not that the doctrine of the fixity of species 
may turn out to be true. Even if it is true, Gosse Senior 
could be deceiving himself into believing it. The problem is 
that the description of his intellectual processes depends upon 
an interpretation of his motives and upon allocating 
responsibility for those processes: "he allowed the turbid 
volume of superstition to drown the delicate stream of reason" 
etc (my emphasis). The interpretation may be false. Perhaps 
he did not allow anything: perhaps he was overwhelmed by the 
"turbid volume" and so was not responsible.
What we can say, though, is that i^ f the interpretation of 
motives and the allocation of responsibility is correct, then 
Gosse Senior was deceiving himself. And upon that assumption, 
we can go on to see how my process theory acounts for the self- 
deception. Gosse Junior describes its several phases:
1. "every instinct in his intelligence went out at first to 
greet the new light". So this is not a case of culpable 
ignorance or avoidance: if self-deception is achieved by
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avoidance, then Gosse Senior lost the chance of deceiving 
himself at the outset.
2. "It had hardly done so, when a recollection of the opening 
chapter of Genesis checked it at the outset". But by then, for 
the Avoidance theorist, the opportunity had been missed.
3. "There is a peculiar agony in the paradox that truth has 
two forms, each of them indisputable, yet each antagonistic to 
the other." Gosse Senior could not have undergone this agony 
if he had deceived himself by a schism, or by partitioning 
belief in each theory into a seperate role which he alternated 
from time to time. This is not to say that schism was not an 
option for Gosse Senior, only that it was not the sole option 
and, as it turns out, it was not the option he adopted.
4. "He consulted with Carpenter ... They both determined, on
various grounds, to have nothing to do with the terrible
theory, but to hold steadily to the law of the fixity of
species" . This looks like avoidance. but, as we shall see,
Gosse Senior does not stick to his decision. Instead:
5. "My father, after long reflection, prepared a theory of 
his own." In other words, the two antagonistic truths are to 
be reconciled by means of an interpretation. The data is to be
Page 366 Self-Deception
Father and Son"/23
reinterpreted so that the unacceptable evidence is not 
generated.
It was, very briefly, that there had been no gradual 
modification the surface of the earth, or slow development 
of organic forms, but that when the catastrophic act of 
creation took place, the world presented, instantly, the 
structural appearance of a planet on which life had long 
existed. (p67)
Gosse Junior goes on to say:
In truth, it was the logical and inevitable conclusion of 
accepting, literally, the doctrine of a sudden act of 
creation; it emphasised the fact that any breach in the 
circular course of nature could be conceived only on the 
assumption that the object created bore false witness to 
past processes, which had never taken place. For 
instance, Adam would certainly possess hair and teeth and 
bones which it must have taken many years to accomplish, 
yet he was created full-grown yesterday. (p67)
Charles Kingsley reacted like Gosse Junior: he could not,
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give up the painful and slow conclusion of five and twenty 
years' study of geology, and believe that God has written 
on the rocks one enormous and superfluous lie. (p68)
This is clearly not the proposal which Goss» Senior was making: 
he was not suggesting that God is misleading us, but that we 
can mislead ourselves. The way we do so is by not taking 
account of the truth revealed by the inspired writing of 
scripture.
I think that the remarks made by Kingsley exemplify part of the 
the misapprehension about evidence which I have pointed out 
already. Rocks do not mislead us. We may mislead ourselves 
with regard to them by misinterpretation. Rocks are data, not 
evidence: we create evidence by interpreting data. So I feel 
obliged to defend Gosse Senior on this one point. Gosse 
Senior's theory certainly does invite us to say that e.g. the 
fossil record is misleading; but equally, there are scientific 
theories which imply that all sorts of things are misleading, 
including the illusions so often referred to in works of 
philosophy - the stick in water which looks bent although it is 
really straight, the optical illusions used by psychologists to 
study perception, and so on.
Gosse Senior would be entitled to argue that the only people 
who are misled are those who choose to be misled, namely those
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who reject a theory which explains why we are misled by the 
appearance. If we use a theory about fossils in order to say 
that some rocks existed before the creation of the universe (as 
dated by the Bible, interpreted by Gosse), then we are misled 
by applying a theory where it does not fit: applying a theory 
about the development of geological and organic systems to the 
moment of creation, indeed to an (impossible) time before the 
creation of the world.
This is the only point on which I wish to defend Gosse Senior. 
The example matches up with my criteria defining self- 
deception .
Firstly, the self-deceiver must not know what he is up to. 
Gosse Senior does know that he is attempting to reconcile two 
antagonistic theories. He also knows, in detail, what the two 
theories say. "It was not, really, a paradox, it was a 
fallacy, if he could only have known it". Gosse Junior is 
offering a plea of mitigation here: his father did not know 
what he was doing; "but he allowed the turbid stream of 
superstition to drown the delicate stream of reason". He did 
not know what he was doing, but he was capable of knowing. "He 
took one step in the service of truth, and then he drew back in 
an agony, and accepted the servitude of error". So what 
prevented him going further was "agony". His motive was the 
agony of rejecting a literal interpretation of scripture.
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Notice how rational Gosse Senior's approach was. He was faced 
with a new theory. Its predictions (or retrodictions) could be 
extrapolated back into the past. But there is always a danger 
with such extrapolations: the further we take them, the more 
we risk extending them beyond their proper scope, and the more 
other factors may interfere. For example, on more than one 
occasion economists have failed to predict economic booms and 
slumps because they extrapolated current trends.
Gosse Senior is prepared to extrapolate the predictions back to 
the beginning of the universe; he also believes that he knows 
from an independent source (interpretation of scripture) that
the universe is not infinitely old. that it had beginning,
recorded in the Bible as the moment of the Creation. He
therefore claims that the theory cannot be extrapolated back 
further than that.
Kingsley argues that Gosse Senior is thereby committed to a 
claim that "the rocks tell a lie". Gosse Senior can reply that 
we are not obliged to adopt an interpretation which misleads 
us. Indeed, the revelation contained in scripture (which Gosse 
Senior interprets literally) should prevent us being misled. 
We are only misled if we wilfully reject scripture. It would 
be a strange sort of lie if its author also gave us the means 
to avoid being misled by it.
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Consider how a Negligence theorist would interpret this 
example. In what way does Gosse Senior "fall away from the 
proper procedures for gaining truth" or "fail to play the 
proper game of knowledge and ignorance"? Gosse Senior 
approaches the dilemma in a very rational way. Admittedly he 
does not (for example) go out and seek for more evidence. But 
given the state of his knowledge, it is not clear how much more 
evidence he needs, nor how, supposing he gained extra evidence, 
it could alter his situation.
Arguably he is at fault in keeping his literal interpretation 
of scripture immune from criticism. He does not subject it to 
further evaluation. But he believes that he has independent 
grounds for the interpretation: Kingsley never puts those 
grounds in question; and Gosse Senior has found a way to 
reconcile that interpretation with the theory of natural 
selection which supposedly contradicts it. There is no fault 
of logic in his resolution of the dilemma. His critics find it 
implausible. But "it seems implausible" is not a very good 
argument without some reasons to back up the impression of 
implausibility. The (inadequate) only reason offered is that 
his resolution makes God (or "the rocks") a liar.
What is going on is a clash of interpretations. The 
disagreement is not about the data: every side agrees on the 
data. They disagree upon the import of the data.
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Suppose that Gosse Senior had drawn his restriction upon the 
extrapolation of natural selection not from Biblical literalism 
but from, for example, a theory of physics. I do not believe 
that he would have been dubbed a self-deceiver in the same way; 
for what is at issue is not what is alleged to be at issue, but 
the relative authority of different grounds for belief; and 
physics would have been granted high authority as one of the 
"hard" sciences; unless there was something extremely dubious 
about the theory from physics, his "resolution" would have been 
granted more respect. However Biblical literalism was not 
accorded the same respect; perhaps for good reasons; but 
these good reasons are not made apparent in remarks like 
Kingsley's.
My point is that the procedures followed by the self-deceiver 
do not differ strikingly from those of someone who is not 
deceived at all, or someone who is just mistaken. Gosse is 
following the proper procedures for gaining truth, but from a 
different perspective than his critics. Gosse is playing the 
proper game of knowledge and ignorance. Undoubtedly he has his 
motives which lead him to try some interpretations rather than 
others; so, I suspect, have his critics. Perhaps they are 
just luckier than he is, in that their motives happen to square 
nicely with the situation - i.e. they pursue the truth because 
it suits them to do so, just as he moves away from the truth 
because it suits him to do so. I do not see how this makes him
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any more reprehensible than anyone else. He is doing exactly 
the same sort of things as they are, but starts out from a less 
fortunate position.
Schism theories and Dissociation theories have little chance 
of explaining this example. Gosse Junior, who knows his father 
intimately, argues that his father does not know the truth 
about which he is deceived. His father "draws back in agony" 
from that knowledge, knows of the theory of Natural Selection 
but does not believe it, and instead develops his own theory. 
Could Gosse Junior have misdescribed the situation? A Schism 
theory forces us to postulate a seperate agency within Gosse 
Senior, unknown to the deceived part of him, and also 
undetected by his son. We could argue that the son was 
deceived by the very fact that he was too close to his father, 
and therefore unwilling to detect a schism. But to do so 
seems pointless. The proposed seperate agency explains nothing 
that cannot be explained in other ways. Our only reason for 
proposing it is attachment to a Schism theory because (we 
allege) it is the only way to avoid the paradoxes of self- 
deception. But the allegation is false. We have a non- 
paradoxical and effective explanation which does not force us 
to postulate a schism.
Dissociation theories fare no better. The suggestion that 
Gosse Senior might have disconnected his belief in natural
Self-Deception Page 373
"Father and Son"/23
selection from his actions, emotions, and other items of 
mentation, does not square with his son's description of an 
agonised and earnest struggle to reconcile scripture with the 
theory. This is not dissociation but agonised association.
The same reasons militate against our describing this case as 
the adoption of a dissimulating role. Gosse Senior aims to 
reconcile two theories, not to defer or mask a belief.
The example looks much more like radical interpretation. Gosse 
Junior describes the process of constructing an interpretation, 
which Gosse senior publishes in a book. This interpretation is 
fixed by a role (a role simulation) : Gosse Senior uses it to 
interpret data and to guide his emotions (he is pleased with 
his interpretation, and dismayed when it is soundly rejected by 
public opinion). He also uses it to guide action, continuing 
both his religious activities and his scientific researches.
One last suggestion remains: perhaps this is not a case of 
self-deception at all. Perhaps Gosse Senior is merely 
pretending to believe or is simply mistaken. Yet the agonised, 
elaborate construction of an interpretation is not a simple 
mistake, indeed it seems not a mistake at all. Some of Gosse 
Junior's remarks make it seem like a mistake ("could he but 
have known it", for example); other remarks make it look like 
a deliberate pretence ("he drew back", he "accepted the
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servitude of error") and sometimes both aspects appear together 
("He consulted with Carpenter, a great investigator, but one 
who was as fully incapable as himself of remodelling his ideas 
with regard to the old, accepted hypotheses. They both 
determined, on various grounds, to have nothing to do with the 
terrible theory, but to hold steadily to the law of the fixity 
of species"). "Incapable" suggests a mistake, "they both 
determined" suggests a deliberate act and so not a mistake. 
However, neither description fits the example well: Gosse is 
not simply mistaken; he is not merely pretending. He can be 
described, in a way which is neither paradoxical nor 
misleading, as self-deceived.
Radical interpretation, role simulation, and the process theory 
of self-deception suffice to achieve this description. Gosse 
constructs his theory by a process, radical interpretation, and 
fixes it by role simulation. I have given an adequate 
description of an instance of self-deception. In this case, at 
least, my theory of self-deception works.
The line of enquiry favoured by Gosse Junior and Kingsley was, 
for Gosse Senior, blocked. It was agonising for him to take 
that route, so he looked for another way - and found it. 
Notice that if the agony were very great then we might decide 
not to call Gosse Senior a self-deceiver. For while there are 
some things we expect people to face up to, there is a limit to
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what we expect: if someone cracks under relentless torture, we 
are unlikely to blame them. Whereas if someone cracks under 
the hint of some possible slight miscomfort, we may well blame 
them. Gosse Senior, I take it, was somewhere between these two 
extremes, and so somewhat responsible. He "allowed" 
superstition to overcome reason.
Instead of using the new theory, facing up to the agony and 
pursuing the truth (as his son saw it), Gosse Senior 
constructed a different interpretation. His various roles 
fixed the interpretation. His religious practices fixed his 
way of interpreting scripture, his scientific investigations 
fixed his commitment to the methodology and powerful means of 
classification which the new theory made available - and, his 
son tells us, Gosse Senior was above all a collector and 
classifier. His interpretation was closely tied by his 
emotions:
he found it unthinkable that he should modify his belief 
in the literal truth of the Bible, even when scientific 
evidence seemed directly to contradict it ... In the 
longer term, it no doubt helped to explain his 
increasingly unreasonable religious fervour, which 




This summarises a process which Gosse Junior illustrates with a 
bookful of circumstantial detail. Gosse Senior was the self- 
appointed minister of a small community of fundamentalist 
believers. If he had been tempted to waver in his religious 
beliefs, this role must surely have made it more difficult to 
do so. He was also a scientific researcher with connections at
the Royal Society and the British Museum. If he had been
tempted to abandon the commitment to scientific method, this
role must surely have made it more difficult. The two major
themes of his life were in conflict, and by constructing his 
theory he tried to prevent them dashing each other to pieces; 
but in consequence,
by a strange act of wilfulness [namely, constructing and 
publishing his theory], he closed the doors upon himself 
forever. (p66)
His public role as scientific enquirer was destroyed, though he 
continued his scientific investigations.
He had been the spoiled darling of the public, the 
constant favourite of the press, and now ... he could not 
recover from amazement at having offended everybody by an 




Gosse Senior needed his theory in order to sustain his two 
roles, and (putting it the other way round) his two roles 
demanded that he develop such a theory. He created it by 
interpretation, but the two roles fixed it, and made other 
options "unthinkable". This was not because the roles were 
comfortable pretences, but because they were major parts of his 
personal identity. The roles were no facade. They did not 
mask something more real: they were the reality.
Gosse Senior was a radical interpreter, and he was punished for 
it. Alongside him, I suggest there were many negligent self­
deceivers, who went along with an interpretation because it was 
easy, because it suited them, and because their roles 
(different to those of Gosse, and lived out in different 
circumstances) fixed their beliefs in different, easier, and 
more socially acceptable ways. I suggest there were also 
plenty of mobile self-deceivers who moved from a fundamentalist 
interpretation of the Bible to the new theory of natural 
selection as it became established, as they recognised the 
opportunities and advantages associated with the roles which 
fixed the new theory.
Page 378 Self-Deception
;H y b r i d  T h e o r i e s
I have discussed the "pure strain" theories of self-deception. 
Now I should mention some representative "hybrids". The 
classification is tentative because in many cases I am not sure 
to what extent a writer's allusion to a "pure strain" 
explanation is explicit and intentional rather than implicit 
and unintentional. This is not surprising since the
classification is mine rather than theirs and was created after 
they were writing. Some influential works have not been cited 
in the body of this text. I have listed them seperately in the 
bibliography, to assist others who embark upon a survey of this 
literature.
1. Negligence and Schism Theories Combined
Fingarette [1969] suggests that the unity of an integrated self 
is achieved by using an acquired skill, "spelling out", in 
order to make oneself aware of one's "engagements" - the 
projects one is engaged in. Self-deception occurs when someone 
neglects to spell out an "engagement" and therefore does not 
integrate it into consciousness. So I regard Fingarette's 




2. Negligence and Role Simulation Theories Combined
Plato combines a Negligence theory and a Role Simulation 
theory: self-deception is mis-integration rather than dis­
integration since the self-deceiver by negligent "injustice" 
makes reason subservient to other elements of the soul, using 
reason to pursue the (unjust and unreasonable) role or, for 
example, an oligarch.
Peterman, criticising Avoidance theories, argues that
negligence alone is sufficient to explain self-deception.
3. Negligence and Radical Interpretation Theories Combined
Butler's sermon on "self-deceit" suggests that negligence is a 
necessary condition for self-deception but not that it is 
sufficient: negligence allows moral vice to extend to the
intellect, for without a proper examination of conscience one 
is almost inevitably deceived by "self-love". I suggest that 
Butler combines a Negligence theory with a Radical
Interpretation theory (self-love alters the way in which one 
interprets one's actions).
Mele [1983] offers a Radical Interpretation theory:
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the following is a characteristic and jointly sufficient 
conditions of a central case of S's entering self- 
deception in acquiring the belief that p.
(i) The belief that p which S acquires is false.
(ii) S's desiring that p leads S to manipulate (i.e., to 
treat inappropriately) a datum or data relevant, or at 
least seemingly relevant, to the truth value of p.
(iii) This manipulation is a cause of S's acquiring the 
belief that p.
(iv) If, in the causal chain between desire and 
manipulation or in that between manipulation and belief- 
acquisition, there are any accidental intermediaries 
(links), or intermediaries intentionally introduced by 
another agent, these intermediaries do not make S 
(significantly) less responsible for acquiring the belief 
that p than he would otherwise have been. (Mele [1983], 
p370)
Condition (i) is incorrect: the belief may be true; (ii) is
also incorrect, for the negligent self-deceiver may adopt the 
belief that p, not because he desires that p, but because the 
belief is an effective instrument for achieving his desired 
goal. Nonetheless, the core of Mele's argument is correct. 
Mele lists "some common ways in which a person's wanting that p 
may contribute self-deceptively to his believing that p":
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"negative misinterpretation", "positive misinterpretation", 
"failure to focus", and "one-sided evidence-gathering". The 
terminology itself indicates that Mele's is a Radical 
Interpretation theory. Mele also emphasises (p371) that "the 
chief virtue" of C is that it is (in my terminology) not an 
Avoidance theory but a Not-Know theory.
Mele's treatment of self-deception is made easier by (i), and 
also by his implicit appeal to epistemic norms ("to treat 
inappropriately", quoted above, implies that there is also an 
appropriate way to treat data - a way which conforms to the 
norms). I have denied myself this, but, I claim, the result is 
both more enlightening and more disturbing.
Fingarette writes that the cognitive aspects of self-deception 
have been over-emphasised at the expense of the volition-action 
aspects, and that he is restoring the balance. Non-cognitive 
accounts of self-deception follow Fingarette's lead (e.g., 
Hamlyn [1971], Whisner [1983], Solomon [1978], de Sousa 
[1978]). De Sousa, following the remarks of Broad [1971], 
argues that emotions can be construed as cognitions or 
judgements. This is perhaps ironic in view of Fingarette's 
argument. De Sousa argues that to accept an unexamined 
emotional "ideology" is self-deceptive, and inauthentic:
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in what I have been calling "self-deceived" emotions the 
self usually connives rather than originates. We are 
responsible only to the extent that we are generally 
motivated to conform to the social and gender role 
assigned to us and that we allow ourselves to be taken in 
by the feigning this necessarily requires. (De Sousa 
[1978], p693)
De Sousa combines a negligence element with a radical 
interpretation element (indicated by his reference to an 
"ideology" of the emotions). The references to "conniving", 
"originating" and "feigning" may also indicate a process 
element.
4. Radical Interpretation and Role Simulation Theories 
Combined
I have traced one line of theories, from schism to radical 
interpretation. In sections 5 onwards I consider a second 
trail, which leads from Dissociation theories to Role 
Simulation theories. When we put the ends of the two trails 
together we find the hybrid theories put forward by Nietzsche 
and Marx: radical interpretation explains how one can perform 
role simulation, and role simulation explains how radical 
interpretations can be "fixed" as beliefs.
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5. Dissociation and Negligence Theories Combined
Bach [1981] exemplifies Dissociation theories, arguing that the 
self-deceiver dissociates what he believes from what he 
"thinks". Self-deception is a feat of directed consciousness, 
with the self-deceiver focussing on some items while ignoring 
others. I agree with Heilman [1983], who criticises Bach:
it is puzzling that one could think that not-p on a 
sustained, recurrent basis, [while believing that p].
[Bach] is content ... with letting a kind of psychological 
causation (motivation) account for this phenomenon 
psychological processes and concepts are supposed 
philosophically unproblematical. Lest we forget, "self- 
deception" itself may be taken as a "psychological 
process": this has certainly not stopped philosophers
(including Bach) from raising questions about it.
Pugmire [1969] finds the dissociation in a different place. 
Pugmire distinguishes between "the truth" and "the glaring 
truth". A self-deceiver may know the truth without ceasing to 
be deceived, but "the glaring truth" can destroy the deception. 
Heilman's questions are just as pertinent when applied to 
Pugmire: how could one perform this feat of sustained
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attention or inattention to something so important that it 
drives one into self-deception?
The relation between the dissociated items was always 
conceptually peculiar in Dissociation theories. It performed 
the dual (not inconsistent) roles of linking the items while 
keeping them apart. The initial tenuous bridge between a 
belief and consciousness becomes, in Pugmire's account, a broad 
highway. "Dissociation" is giving way to quite a different 
account of self-deception, in which what matters is not wha_t 
one believes but how one believes it - teetering on the brink 
of becoming a Role Dissimulation theory. If a self-deceiver is 
to achieve the precarious feat of directed attention, as 
required by Bach and Pugmire, then adopting a role is an 
obvious way to make the task easier (indeed by adopting a role 
one makes it much less precarious). Hamlyn [1971] is even
closer to this brink, arguing that one may be self-deceived by 
witholding one's genuine emotions, without masking the true 
belief which gives reason for having those emotions. This can 
be characterised as a Dissociation theory (the self-deceiver 
dissociates what he believes from his emotions); or it can be 
characterised as a Role Dissimulation theory (the self-deceiver 
plays a role to evoke some chosen emotions despite their 




Demos offers a Role Dissimulation theory. He points out that 
someone who intentionally pretends to himself is only behaving 
as if he believed, "make-believing" rather than genuinely 
believing, and he knows that he is doing so. Demos suggests 
that self-deception occurs when the self-pretender begins to be 
unwittingly taken in by his own performance and begins to 
"believe his own lies": role dissimulation becomes Role
Simulation. The dissimulation is the voluntary element of 
self-deception; it paves the way (negligently?) to an
involuntary outcome. Demos implies, without spelling out, 
something which is crucial to explaining self-deception: a
process of radical interpretation ("self-pretence").
6. Dissociation and Role Theories Combined
Martin [1979b], commenting on Factor [1979], suggests that four 
features are typical of self-deceiving forms of self-pretence:
(1) the pretence is engaged in with the purpose of evading 
a confrontation of an unpleasant reality that one is 
responsible for facing
(2) although the person knows he is engaged in this 
evasion, he refuses to admit as much to himself, and this 
involves witholding his genuine emotions towards the 
reality he is fleeing.
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(3) while the person knows that he is pretending to 
himself, he does not sincerely confess this to himself.
(4) in both (1) and (2) the avoidance of the self­
admission does not require coming to believe the opposite 
of what he knows.
This epitomises Dissociation theories. They soften the 
"Avoidance" requirement, that the self-deceiver must both 
believe that p and believe that not-p, suggesting instead that 
the belief is disconnected from other items. In Martin's 
theory, the disconnection is between:
- knowing that he is engaged in an evasion, and admitting it 
to himself
- knowing that he is pretending to himself, and sincerely 
confessing this to himself
knowing about the unpleasant reality that one is 
responsible for facing, and confronting that reality 
(Martin in one of his examples writes of an instance 
where, "his refusal to confess his emotions and pretence 
to himself is not a matter of belief, but rather of 
impeding and stifling his emotions" (p442).
Self-pretence certainly would seem to militate against anything 
so solemn as "making sincere admissions to oneself"; so it
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could at least delay awareness of what one knows about oneself. 
And "delaying awareness" could fall within the scope of self- 
deception .
Martin [1979a] adds that self-pretence,
can also be engaged in with the intention of fleeing a 
painful situation or aspect of oneself that it is one's 
proper business to explicitly recognise and deal with. 
Here make-believe is an exercise in hiding from oneself, 
whether or not it eventually leads to a self-deceiving 
belief.
7. Missing Hybrids
The diagram on the following page summarises the connections 
between the hybrids I have mentioned. Notice that there are 
some missing links. Other theories make schism theories 
redundant, so they rarely combine with schism theories. 
Dissociation theories, in particular, postulate a connection 
between the dissociated elements in the self-deceiver, so they 
actually deny that there is a schism. Radical Interpretation 
theories make Dissociation theories redundant, and so do not 
combine with them. Role Dissimulation explains how
Dissociation occurs - and so makes it redundant. Role 
Simulation theories make it unnecessary to postulate a "masked"
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element in the self-deceiver - making Dissociation theories 
redundant. No-Such-Thing theories, naturally, are inconsistent 
with all the other theories.
8. Kipp [1980] gives a No Such Thing theory, distinguishing 
"ameliorists" who depict self-deception as "ignorant 
mistakenness", "euphemists" who depict self-deception as "mere 
dishonest pretence" and "literalists" who depict the self­
deceiver as someone who both does and does not believe 
something and who "fools" or "persuades" himself. Kipp argues 
that "self-deceivers",
are trying to fend off, through deceptive pretence, what 
they regard as defeat, or unacceptable loss of face, in a 
not entirely unreal, socially-staged power struggle, or 
status-seeking contest, whose goal is to appear, in the 
eyes of others, a maximally enviable existential success. 
(Kipp [1980], p315)
taking an uncritically charitable view of certain motives 
and behaviour is what most decisively misleads people into 
concluding that literal self-deception must be possible. 
(p317)
Kipp suggests that"self-deception" needs an audience. For 
example, a widowed recluse receives news that her son has been
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killed, but "deceives herself" into believing that he has not. 
In the absence of an audience to witness this,
the mother would have to be seen as distractedly grief- 
blind rather than as literally self-deceived. (p316)
I think that a more important consideration would be that if 
one cannot help being bereaved, one can at least avoid feeling 
bereaved. For this purpose, self-pretence may be sufficient.
Some hybrids are absent from the diagram. Role Simulation and 
Radical Interpretation theories make other "pure strains"
redundant and so do not need to be combined with them. Schism 
theories have few hybrids for the opposite reason: the other
theories make Schism theories redundant. No-Such-Thing
theories, naturally, do not combine with Such-Thing theories 
(i.e. all the other theories). Dissociation theories have lots 
of adherents and lots of hybrids. The reason is that (a) they 
appeal to us because they evoke our intuitions about what it 
is correct to say about self-deception, yet (b) they allude to 
an explanation of self-deception which they fail to spell out, 
so they need to be supplemented by other elements.
A.O. Rorty, in various articles (e.g. [1972], [1980]) suggests
that the unity of the self has been over-emphasised and that
selves are loose federations of various elements. Rorty's
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work, in particular, contains some allusions to a role element 
in the description of self-deception.
6. Fox [1973] and [1976] provides a hybrid of Negligence and 
Radical Interpretation theories, an interesting example of the 
same theme without a "dissociation" slant. Fox argues that,
what is meant by "unconscious emotion" is an affect which 
is both experienced and "disguised" (i.e. self-deceivingly 
misrepresented by P to himself). (Fox [1973], p413)
Consequently person P can, for example, be afraid even though 
he does not feel afraid. Fox adds,
when he talks of repression as a clinically observed 
phenomenon, Freud is referring to "failed" repression 
(primarily), which allows affects into consciousness. 
When it is appropriate to label these as emotions, I 
should want to say that they appear to P's conscious 
awareness in a (deliberately) misrepresented form. (p414).
Fox is not arguing that P dissociates his beliefs from his 
emotions: P experiences the emotion but misrepresents it. I
count this as an instance of a "Radical Interpretation" theory 
of self-deception; the reference to Freud (famous for his 
interpretative methods) fits in with this view. However the
Self-Deception Page 391
Hybrid Theories/24
Freudian theme brings with it a dissociation element. For 
Freud argues that it is not enough for a psychoanalyst to 
present and have a patient accept his analysis in order to 
achieve a "cure" of, for example, a phobia. "Abreaction" must 
also occur, and abreaction seems to consist in the 
interpretation offered by the psychoanalyst becoming linked to 
the affect so that the patient feels emotion (e.g., fear) and 
does not just hold the theory that the affect is correctly 
described as fear.
One outstanding debt which I should acknowledge is to Cook 
[1987]. This may be surprising since Cook's discussion is 
about "deciding to believe without self-deception" (his title, 
my emphasis). For me a crucial part of Cook's article was the 
following passage:
He set out to engage in a pattern of action, the 
predictable result of which was his coming to believe a 
certain theory in biology. In time a hexis^ developed, and 
he found himself believing the theory. He learned to 
believe the theory, where that is not sharply 
distinguishable from learning that the theory is 
believable. One might judge that Nick was deceiving 
himself, but a more charitable account would hold that he 
has successfully carried out a program of belief 
acquisition by a roundabout route. (p446)
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The expression, "roundabout route" is drawn from Williams 
[1973], which Cook quotes with approval. I have, perhaps 
unfairly, used Williams as the butt of many of my criticisms. 
The tenor of those criticisms, you may recall, was to ask if 
there is a more direct route by which to acquire beliefs; and 
my answer to that rhetorical question was that there is no more 
direct route. So, given my way of reading Cook, it follows 
that Cook is referring to the process (or one of the processes) 
by which beliefs in general (not just the self-deceptive ones) 
are acquired. The process which results in justified true 
beliefs could, in other applications, result in unjustified 
false beliefs, whence my claim that there are no special 
techniques for self-deception.
Cook's article lacks any explanation of how Nick, the exemplar 
of "deciding to believe without self-deception" achieved his 
new belief. Nick plans the feat, and then.
Six years later, Nick emerges from graduate school.
Doctorate in hand, fully versed in and accepting of
contemporary biological theory. (p443)




Referring to him prior to implementation of his strategy 
as Nickl, and upon graduation ... as Nick2, this 
[situation] can be described as follows: Nickl views his 
own beliefs as based upon warranting evidence and foresees 
Nick2's beliefs to be the results of nonevidential causal 
influences (professors' prestige, social pressures), 
prejudicially selective habits of attention, and 
employment of tendentious interpretive hypotheses. 
Likewise, Nick2 views his own beliefs as evidentially 
warranted and those of Nickl as the result of ignorance, 
distorted perspective, ritual belief reinforcement and 
other nonrational causal influences. The fact that each 
can "explain away" the beliefs and the evidential 
standards of the other provides sufficient "epistemic 
insulation" between the two to permit Nick2 sincerely to 
believe p without having to forget or deceive himself 
about the fact that his belief is a consequence of Nickl1s 
decision to believe that p. (p444)
This is excellent, but does not explain how the trick was done. 
It strongly implies, though, that it was done by some process 
(which took six years to perform, incidentally), namely, (a) 
adopting a role, and (b) interpreting. This invites a Process 
theory about self-deception, which ties together Role theories 
and Radical Interpretation theories.
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I have given a non-paradoxical account of self-deception. To 
do so, I have rejected some major epistemic theories (such as 
f oundationalism) because, in my view, they give rise to the 
paradoxes of self-deception and prevent us giving a workable 
account of what self-deception involves. This is not a trivial 
result to obtain from a discussion of a "fringe" topic such as 
self-deception.
My distinction between "data" and "evidence" enables us to 
simplify considerably our epistemological discussions of 
evidence and also opens the way to a long overdue reassertion 
of the importance of pretending (in the archaic sense of that 
word) for the formation of beliefs and for enquiry generally.
The Process theory of self-deception is the offshoot of a 
process theory of enquiry. For this reason it enables us to 
put self-deception in a broader context than it is usual to 
provide when discussing this topic. Unlike "static" theories 
of self-deception, the Process theory allows us to give a 
comprehensive classification of the varieties of self- 
deception. By listing the "factors of production" it gives 
clear guidelines for applying the expressions, 'self-deceived'
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and 'self-deceiving'. It enables us to contrast and compare 
self-deception with other related phenomena.
Expressions like 'self-deceived' are part of our language 
because they have useful work to perform. The Process theory 
enables us to put them to work more effectively. It also 
enables us to relate the theories of enquirers as diverse as 
those in the following list: Plato, Nietzsche, Butler, Marx, 
Descartes. Sartre, Locke, and Pascal.
Process theories resolve the "must know" problems which give 
rise to the paradoxes of self-deception. They do not 
characterise self-deception as a way of having two mutually 
inconsistent beliefs simultaneously. A self-deceiver may have 
two (or more) mutually inconsistent interpretations 
simultaneously; but, at most, only one of these is fixed as a 
belief at any one time. The self-deceiver may have two or more 
belief-like interpretations simultaneously, for they may be 
fixed in different ways e.g. one interpretation may guide 
actions while another interpretation guides emotions. When 
someone has two belief-like interpretations, they cannot be 
fixed in the same respect at the same time; for example, if 
someone performs an action because he is using interpretation 
A, he cannot simultaneously not perform the action using 
interpretation B. Inconsistency within a set of
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interpretations is not manifested in inconsistent (i.e. 
impossible) activity.
Someone who is self-deceived is responsible (in a rather strong 
sense of 'responsible') for having false beliefs, or not having 
true beliefs, but most importantly, even if he gains true 
beliefs and avoids false beliefs, he not only lacks regard for 
truth, he also displays active preferences for some varieties 
of falsehoods. Process theories explain how it is possible to 
be responsible (in this strong sense) for the interpretations 
one produces and the roles one adopts. Therefore they explain 
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